The new bumpy and curvy road for Egypt

Here's a thought or a few.  A peaceful, substantive, deliberating, yet non-restrictive and transparent transition to democracy should be the focal point in/for Egypt from this past Friday forward.  The nation of 80 plus million people now faces a formidable to-do list on the domestic front.


Meticulous and wise constitutional rewriting with enshrining of individual rights and responsibilities to include: championing the rule of law, as well as the separation of powers and checks and balances to especially guarantee judiciary independence as a co-equal branch with the executive and the legislative.  Ending the status of emergency and placing restrictions over its future use.  Starting to rework the government bureaucracies into a beaming bastion of public service.  Eliminating government influence on professional syndicates and student unions, while scrapping out or at least drastically revising the gripping laws on non-governmental and charitable organizations.  Commencing the reform and retraining of police and other security agencies of the state to conduct themselves professionally and to uphold individual liberties and rights (--among them the right to live in dignity without fear of extortion, harassment, or other abuses of power).  Release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience.  The abolition of military tribunals used in the past against civilians.  Creation of an independent electoral commission (or one supervised/staffed by judges) with verifiable assurances of non-interference from authorities, empowered to ensure free, fair, open, and transparent elections.  All of this list means ultimately for concrete and timely progressive steps be taken to create a system that facilitates and reinforces public accountability and equal opportunity for representation in civilian governance throughout all levels and branches.  Part and parcel of this undertaking is a solid ongoing commitment by authorities (and vigilance by the public) towards an open and flourishing, vibrant climate of public debate and discussion that is actionable and productive.


The dynamics inside the country is bound to be busy with other rejuvenation in the political sphere.  Perhaps most crucial is the creation of a non-military transitional body as soon as possible to guide the county towards reform.  An independent civilian caretaker government, divorced from the Mubarak regime, can be installed.  One that is comprised of respected, credible, meticulous, diligent, and wise persons who regularly and openly consult with the people.


Perhaps as good omen of things to come, the Egyptian military's professionalism and restraint was noted in its conduct towards the protesters during the Revolution.  With few reported exceptions, this conduct was exemplary and it contrasted deeply with that of armies in many other developing and newly-industrializing countries in times of crises and uncertainties.


However, a military cannot run the administrative affairs of a country for long.  And---as the cases of, say, Turkey (from the 1920s to the 1990s), post-colonial Algeria, Nigeria (post-colonial to Obesanjo), and post-colonial Sudan, among others---it cannot be the ultimate 'guardian' of democracy or revolution.  Nor can it be the ultimate 'arbiter' of the people's will.  It's primary function is border security, national defense, and helping with logistics and security during the most pressing emergencies, because it is equipped and trained to do so efficiently.  It is generally not as good at the normal daily functions of the state like managing day-to-day traffic, police affairs, managing/monitoring of the economy, and creating policy.  For now, Mubarak's newly-installed cabinet still runs the country but with the highly notable addition that it directly reports to the military.  And this is an arrangement that more or less could last as little as six months with little clear timetables or specifics.  In the overall balance of the current circumstances, a spectrum of speculation has arisen, from dooming worry to cautious optimism to wild optimism/euphoria despite coming odds, among observers, reporters, and protesters (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9).  [Earlier, I had blogged a bit about possible roles for the Egyptian military here.]  


More immediate steps taken commensurate with facilitating democratic politics involves the creation of adequate time and space for the rebuilding and strengthening of political parties as well as for the construction of new ones.  Parties need ample time and space to branch out and get better acquainted with the Egyptian population and to build viable political platforms and programs, but they need to begin now.  In the Sadat policy of infitah (or "opening," "liberalization"), parties were very limited in number by law (about 3 in total) and they were almost micromanaged by the regime.  During the Mubarak presidency---in some ways a continuation of Sadat's ideologically and tactically---there was a visible expansion in the number of parties operating on the political stage.  However, these new additions were approved by the Egyptian Government under very strict conditions and laws, and so the new few that were 'legally' allowed to operate were very weak, functionally incoherent, and with relatively very small numbers of members and supporters.  Similar tweaking and manipulation was done "legally" (i.e. for example, in tightly-closed ways of creating laws favorable to the regime) and extra-legally (i.e. for example, in ways that allowed selective targeting in application/dis-application of laws in combination with state-sponsored violence, intimidation, and fraud).  Thus allowing Mubarak regime domination over space in policy-making or policy discussion, such as elections to student unions, parliament, and even the presidency.  So, it is essential that this time around political institutions like parties and systems like electoral channels are allowed to develop in an atmosphere of openness where the caretaker transitional authority is politically neutral and transparent.  [The Egyptian military reportedly urging the former youth protesters to begin to form parties is encouraging, but it remains to be seen what the military's response will be in developments to come.]      


Judging from Egypt's past experiences with regime-managed electoral and other procedures, many on this (non-exhaustive) to-do list would will need thorough attention and serious resolve, as well as reasonable speed, before parliamentary or presidential elections can take place.  

Meanwhile, action in the political and policy-making realms needs to be coupled with steps to assist the positive Revolution-generated momentum in affecting long-lasting economic and social rebuilding and strengthening.  The enhancement of hospitals which have at times lacked even basic necessary medical supplies, and the reform of overburdened educational institutions are examples of crucial problem areas that need to be tackled.  A lack of access to basic housing amenities such as plumbing in the shantytowns, a near-crisis problem in the lack of access in affordable housing more generally, and construction code violations which continue to place people in harm's way are others.  


[And, in another sign pointing to years-long under-the-surface deterioration, labor strikes have already erupted across multiple industries from the stock exchange, textile and steel firms, media organisations, the postal service to railways, the Culture Ministry, and the Health Ministry.  These occur barely at the end of this past weekend's celebrations, over an array of demands and issues: living and working conditions, better pay, medical care, stable contracts, and the dismissal of superiors viewed as corrupt and unfairly enriched (1, 2, 3, 4).  This new wave of protests prompted the Supreme Military Council in its Fifth Communique to call for an end to these protests.]  


Added to these problems is an overarching one of an economic and business climate that was criticized as unfair nepotism and clientelism---and one with many red-tape hurdles and long considered the personal playground of a privileged few connected to, or close to, the intricacies of the Mubarak regime.  Enacting and enforcing strong anti-corruption, anti-monopoly, intellectual property, and business transparency rules are essential to allow Egypt to profit fully from its human capital and to nurture, expand, and retain enormous Egyptian talent and ingenuity.


The grassroots and re-organizing potential rooted in the desire to realize a better Egypt has already surfaced in the tent city in Tahrir Square, even before the announcement of President Mubarak's resignation.  Scores of self-motivated clean-up volunteers that have emerged in Tahrir after Friday's celebrations continue to show hope of revolutionary country-altering potential.  Tweets and Facebook statuses abound with proclamations of social responsibility as well as with pride and euphoria.  So do YouTube video posts of interviews and activity of people on the streets.  The atmosphere is painted with a civic consciousness the level of which I have never witnessed before in my all years of summer visits to, or in my time spent studying and living in, Egypt.  But, such potential cannot be left to walk the path on its own.  An equally determined and conscientious official effort needs to support and provide platforms for this potential to extend itself.  Some of the Supreme Military Council's announcements and actions (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) in the wake of Mubarak's resignation are a step in the right direction to install and renew confidence of its intentions in the public.  So too does Egypt's business community elite need to step up here, as bigger and bolder calls have been made for their participation.  One high profile call was made for a 100 billion Egyptian Pound development fund for rebuilding the country.  Smaller projects can work alongside separately, or supplement, these calls.   

These are admittedly enormous undertakings, to be handled calmly and methodically but with a sense of urgency and of making visible progress.  These are what part of the processes that political scientists and development specialists have referred to as nation-building and state building.  Monitoring this reconstruction and guaranteeing its success is just as important as keeping tabs on the evolution of Egypt's foreign policy, foremost among them in observers' eyes being Egypt-Israel relations.  Yet, in the immediate present and near future, this reconstruction may take priority over the concern regarding the continuity of Egypt-Israel relations.  It has long been argued and shown that democratic governments, ruling over well-informed populations and an inclusive political culture, are hesitant toward war/conflict, and that they rarely behave aggressively toward other nations.  

Israeli officials and voices in Israeli media have made a lot of noise during the protests about a post-Mubarak era, expressing fear of radicalism waiting to be unleashed.  At the same time, the characterization seemingly anointed Mubarak's regime as the only Egyptian pillar of stability in Egypt's relations with Israel (and by extension, as the only Egyptian pillar of stability in the region more broadly).  After all, as Sadat's vice president with intimate ties to the Egyptian military going back to the days spent as an air force commander, Mubarak was said to be part of the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel Treaty.  His regime's easing of Egypt into expanding economic ties with Israel would serve to the latter as another assurance of the former's attention to keep the bi-lateral peace solid.


But the continuation of Mubarak's regime was more likely to perpetuate a false shell of stability.  This shell would be little more than one propped up by autocratic repression and denial of human rights, slowly cracking and eventually shattering.  In this context, Israel's on-record support of Mubarak could give the impression that it is more important to implement a relatively narrow set of objectives or interests at about any costs---call them "externalities," or "collateral damage," or "non-priorities"---his regime may bring.  It could create the impression that assisting a crafty yet unyielding Egyptian strongman system is more important than other, more-domestically rooted aspirations (for democracy, dignity, and wide-based economic well-being).


Perhaps then Egyptians will conclude that the prevailing Israeli concern was not so much over keeping intact the bi-lateral peace than maintaining, a-la-Mubarak, that Egypt completely sees eye-to-eye with Israel strategically and tactically in enforcing that peace.  A more open, vibrant, and democratic Egypt may try to renegotiate the terms of peace with Israel, which will undoubtedly add dynamics and dimensions to ponder over.  But in the whole balance of things in the region, that may not necessarily be of a negative consequence for Israel or for the broader region.  For that may, with new energy, breath life again into a tangible prospect for a lasting and just Israeli-Palestinian peace.  It may give birth to a real indispensable chance to help redress (rather than perpetuate) the setbacks of the Oslo Process.  To help the region start on a clean page, after decades of suffering partly brought about imbalances in influence, mixed in with animosity and nearly two decades of seemingly over-inflated hope.


At any rate, Egyptians will face a bumpy road ahead as they negotiate around the curves and turns, through the frictions, and above the potholes towards rebuilding and improvement.  The military will certainly play a crucial role in shepherding the country as it travels on this road helping to ensure security, thereby helping to stabilize the political and economic environments.  But as it does, it will need first and foremost to ultimately make good on its commitment to cede political power to civilian rule.  Heeding the lessons of human history and of Egypt's post-colonial history, that will require the military to partner with the Egyptian people as equals during the transition (and then step down from the political and administrative stages).  The international community, from international forums like the U.N. to individual nation-states like the U.S. to groups like the European Union, could lend valuable material, moral, and logistical support to this transition phase/process.  If it chooses to get involved, the international community will also need to partner with the Egyptian people, in ways which place a desire (to see a democratic Egypt lively with self-determination and economic progress) above national or other interests that may conflict with such desire.  


More closer to home, Israel---Egypt's principal neighbor and peace partner in the Mideast region---could learn to deal more with its nervousness in a manner that is more constructive than the conduct it has shown in the run-up to Mubarak's resignation.  Israel knows very well that it is America's principal ally in the region.  An alarmist tone or an aggressive conduct can prompt heavy negative pressure, thereby doing more to jeopardize Egypt's transition than to provide meaningful criticism.  Years of conflict with Israel, followed by a solidly-upheld peace and close cooperation (in the midst of the environment and dynamics of  post-1979 Middle East) are imprinted on the collective memory and awareness of Egyptians.  None of this will do much to reassure Egyptians if Israel sounds out signals that appear less-than-productive to them.  


Time, effort, perseverance, determination, coolness, inclusiveness, openness, care and meticulousness, and wisdom (and/or lack thereof) will ultimately shape the domestic Egyptian dynamics ahead ...                        

A week in, Egypt's mass revolt has undoubtedly appeared to gain critical mass

Today: Feb 1, 2011. 

Nearly 2 million protesters in Tahrir Square (center Cairo) and its immediate environs; hundreds of 1000s reported in Alexandria; about 500 thousand reported in El Mansoura; about 100 thousand reported in Damanhour; thousands reported in Port Said; massive protests also reported in El Mahalla.  This has come one week into protests across the country since the 25th of January "Day of Anger", implemented by tens of thousands of youth (and twenty-somethings and thirty-somethings) having no visible formal leader or representative on their behalf.  Despite major roads between Alexandria and Cairo--the two most populous cities in the country--being reported blocked and in spite of the shutdown of the country's railway system and domestic flights, masses across the country have shown determination to continue protesting.  


The anti-regime movement has continued to draw and absorb momentum, power, and support from Egyptians.  Movie celebrities and Nobel-prize recipients, artists and journalists, opposition elements and the older common man on the street have joined.  These dynamics come with a life and existence previously unknown, to the surprise or joy of many and apparently beyond a slow regime's recognition or comprehension.  Much like throughout the past week, the protests continue to show no sign of sectarian or other factionalized divides.  Masses of people (mostly young, as mentioned above) are united to demand a complete change of government and of direction for the country, as well as an end to associated crippling corruption, heavy-handed brutality, and lack of freedoms and opportunities---symbolized to them most prominently by President Mubarak's departure from the political stage.  These demands have been summed up in the widely displayed Arabic word irhal, meaning "leave."        


In light of events and public official statements through the past week, especially today, there is very little indication or anticipation in this tense yet hope-glimmered environment that the contending sides will be backing down easily.  There are certainly profound outward displays of stubbornness by the regime and the protesters.  Yet all indications are towards approaching tipping point.  Or, that possibly a tipping point has already been tip-toed on, waiting for one little push of inertia.  There are plans for a fresh round of demonstrations to be held on Friday, international news reports say.    

Continuously shifting displays of drama have defined the mood and structure of this past week.  Protesters defied curfews to camp out in areas or to continue running bakeries.  And despite an engineered internet blackout, combined with partial media and telephone clamp-down, they returned to demonstrating.  A vice-president has been appointed (for the first time in 3 decades) amid cabinet reshuffling.  But the young masses who took to the streets are still not appeased or placated, and they are distrustful towards such moves by the regime.  President Mubarak has also announced he will not seek a new term, while saying that he stay on until the upcoming elections and guide the country toward constitutional reform and transitional government.  In the same speech, he also defended his service to the country.  Still no budge from these masses who---seeing this as a ploy to hold onto power as long as possible, and as a defiance to the public---insisted on his stepping down.  


Earlier, anti-riot forces, having initially cracked down brutally on seemingly largely peaceful demonstrators in the first few days, had then mysteriously and inexplicably receded.  They were replaced by army units that have reportedly behaved very differently (positively) on the streets.  Police is still conspicuously absent on many streets, forcing people to form neighborhood and public property watch committees (in cooperation with troops) to maintain order, prevent looting, and to apprehend/ return escaped prisoners to custody.  There are also reports of a general atmosphere of camaraderie among protesters and the masses in coordinating demonstration activity and distributing foodstuffs and water. 

Now, in conjunction with opposition elements, constitutional scholars, thinkers, members of the business community, among others, the youth brunt behind the protests need to settle down and think calmly and clearly on how to proceed strategically.  They need to start planning on how to move forward from this point to participate in the next (transitional) phase.  For them to succeed, they need to embark on these directions without giving up ground or pressure gained in the past few days.  Specifically, they need to begin engaging in the discussions with intelligence chief Mr. Omar Suleiman and a former minister of aviation Mr. Ahmed Shafik (appointed as Vice-President and Prime Minister, respectively), and extend their activities beyond protesting and displaying mass anger.  Yet, with so much at stake, it is crucial to highlight that this inexperienced movement cannot be expected to tread alone with much success into the sophistication and intricacies of such interaction with the state.  This is especially the case if other developments, like an escalation in/towards violence, occur.  To sustain the peaceful momentum it has generated and translate such momentum effectively  into realizing its goals, the young anti-regime protesters may ultimately need the logistical, material, and moral support and guidance of the established opposition.  These protesters will also need to continue to hold steadfast to one another and work in unison.         


In supporting and encouraging the youth, all Egyptian opposition elements must not return to clinging to their highly particularized interests/positions and squabbling and discord.  This older anti-regime segment can work to speak on behalf of the protesting youth.  But they must realize that if their efforts are to succeed, they must ultimately partner with youth rather than to take any action or make any proposal that could signal or be interpreted as a domination over the latter's voices.  For example, towards this end, the opposition can work to mentor the youth movement protesters and help them to productively channel the latter's energies (with resources and moral support) towards making effective arguments and proposals for change as these younger compatriots stand their ground.


In other words, at the very least there needs to be constant communication and coordination within and between these two groups.


On many levels, the coming days and weeks will prove ultimately as a report card to the unprecedented protests that have defined this youth-generated movement.  Indeed, much uncertainty and ill-comfort about what might happen next still hang in the air.  But no one can doubt that much has been achieved already, providing a foundation for a new constructive political culture and consciousness in the country.  No one can deny that there has been a loud and notable break with long-established physical, cultural, and psychological barriers of apathy, fear, intimidation, and debilitating hopelessness.  Similarly, momentum and ongoing drama are prompting talk of an Egyptian rebirth and of pride.  Now it is the moment of the youth and of the twenty-somethings and thirty-somethings, and it is critical that they work to translate this moment into a deep legacy to continue inspiring the rest of the country.  It is equally critical that opposition elements, thinkers, writers and journalists, constitutional scholars, and other established opinion-makers and movers and shakers with an interest to see meaningful change continue to lend and even increase support for their younger compatriots.  

Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution": Regional (and Broader) Implications?

Within the past month, Tunisia has witnessed a large popular uprising culminating in and galvanized by familiarly recognizable protests over poor economic prospects/conditions and the heavy-handed regime-sanctioned crackdowns on the street.  Called the "Jasmine Revolution" the nearly-month-long uprising is particularly significant in the high speed, and especially in the civilian source of its projection [although this assumption that the final blow was dealt by popular pressure has now been disputed], with which intense drama has unfolded.  At any rate, what we have witnessed is nothing short of remarkable.  

The MENA (Middle East and North Africa region) has witnessed several revolts, protests, coups, insurrections, and wars challenging regimes and status-quo environments even in the post-colonial era.  Yet such past challenges, despite the varying circumstances in which they were born, have almost uniformly yielded little.  The most significantly emerging fruit here has, as many commentators will have undoubtedly pointed out, often been merely changes of names.  That, at most, touted changes have been often suspected of carrying the stitching marks of elaborate cosmetic surgeries: that wounds---old and new---have been repackaged hastily without regard to considerations over fully healing.  

In contrast to this, the recent and continuing Tunisian dynamics brings to focus serious questions regarding the sustainability of political systems and economic systems in uncertain times.  At a deeper more specific level, they once again put the spotlight on the wisdom and viability of exercising governmental authority in a repressive and over-aggressive manner (combined with what has been seen as periodic crumbs and general widespread official apathy), in the region.  Leaders, pundits, and officials are quick to either proclaim or dismiss the possibility of the "Tunisian Scenario" on the airwaves, in blogs, and on social media sites.  In trying to get a hold over understanding the seemingly dizzying weeks, I present in no particular sequence a list of news articles and op-eds that put Tunisia's events in the broader regional contexts (not a completely exhaustive list, but one that can hopefully be sufficiently representative).  Of course, much more information and analysis will be available in the days and weeks to come ...    

[Note: a temporary caretaker cabinet has been set up to organize elections, stabilize the country, and to implement reforms and head inquiry commissions over corruption and Ben Ali's regime's response to the protests.  But the retention of Ben Ali officials for the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Interior Minister (responsible for internal security) posts in the new 'unity government' has left many Tunisians skeptical and angry.  A fresh round of protests has been reported, along with the resignation of 3 independent members of the cabinet, barely a day after the new cabinet announcement.]  

  1. Could other Arab countries follow Tunisia's example? Roger Hardy, BBC. 

  2. No sign Egypt will take the Tunisian road. John Leyne, BBC; another view/angle. 

  3. Tunisia unrest a wake-up call for the region. Ian Black, The Guardian. 

  4. Tunisia's protests spark suicides in Algeria and fears throughout the Arab world. Ian Black, The  
  Guardian; The Arab world's horrific new trend: self-immolation. Blake Hounshell. Foreign Policy 
  Passport. (blog); new additional reported attempts here. 

  5. The 'bin Laden' of marginalisation: the real terror eating at the Arab world is the socio-economic 
  marginalisation. Larbi Sadiki, Al Jazeera English. 

  6. Tunisia protests serve warning to autocratic Middle Eastern regimes. Kristen Chick. The Christian
  Science Monitor. 


  7. To the tyrants of the Arab world ... Lamis Andoni, Al Jazeera English.  

  8. Arab regimes on edge. Marc Lynch. Foreign Policy. blog. 


  9. Two views/angles of U.S. comprehension of, and response to, Tunisia (1,2)

  10. People power succeed without Western backing. Emad Mekay, Inter Press Service (Johannesburg); 
  another view/angle.

  11. Unrest spreads to Algeria. Emad Mekay, Inter Press Service (Johannesburg).

  12. Arab bloggers cheer on Tunisia's Revolution. Robert Mackey. THE LEDE. The New York Times. 
  (blog)

  13. Kenya should draw lessons from the goings-on in Tunisia. Daily Nation. (Nairobi). [Not a part of 
  the MENA obviously, but an article like this reveals that people are feeling the reverberations far from 
  Tunisia and are reflecting on them.] 

Hot Topic: proposed upcoming US-hosted mideast peace summit?

Past 'gaps' between stated policy and actual action, as well as past 'patterns' of policy and actions, has forced many in the Mideast (directly involved, or even remotely affected by, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) to question the effectiveness, and even the sincerity and seriousness, of proposed/announced peace initiatives. A huge chunk, if not most, of this skepticism has tended to come from the Arabs and Muslims mostly towards the United States----to the extent that latter has sadly "earned" a notorious reputation as a 'Dishonest Broker' and a (global) 'bully.'

The most important peace/negotiation initiative--known widely as the Oslo Process--has been declared as a "failure" even by the Arab League collectively in an unprecedentedly somber statement by Secretary-General Amr Moussa. It is in the tumultuous--and highly uneven--path to Mideast peace, as well as in the unevenness in both policies and actions (current and past), that many in the region interpreted with great reservation any renewed hope offered major actors like the US. These levels of concern and skepticism are perhaps no less for the very assertive statement that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleesa Rice made recently affirming that "Frankly it's time for the establishment of Palestinian state... That's really a message that I think only I can deliver."

It is questionable, however, on how effectively such stated assertiveness and confidence can realistically produce results that are substantial and substantive, long-lasting, just, wise, and final for the long-conflicting and warring sides. After all, the Camp David process and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of the mid to late 1970's hardly mentioned or did anything for the broader Arab-Israeli conflict (including the Palestinian-Israeli segment); in fact both were strictly bi-lateral between the major conflicting/warring sides of the time period (Egypt and Israel). The Oslo Process, which took off in 1993, began to show serious signs of strain and exhaustion after the initially great levels of euphoria and hope. Skepticism in the public and among commentators, may lead to conclusion that various summits---Wye River Memorandum in the late 1990s, and "Camp David II," along with the various Sharm el Sheikh and Taba conferences earlier in this decade---were all to reduced to little more than mere formalities that accomplished no new ground in resolving the conflict and which had actually failed to prevent its exacerbation, to say the least.

Finally, one can also cite the largely-ignored Arab League peace offer that was first introduced in 2002. The offer----which unprecedently affirmed multilateral Arab recognition of Israel [in return for substantial Israeli acceptance and implimentation of internationally-established principles/ interpretations/ instruments under the two-state formula]----seemed to again fade into oblivion upon its rejuvenation/reintroduction in early 2007. This second apparent refusal seemingly followed Israeli concerns on "some [prohibitive] preconditions" claimed as being placed for negotiations. Yet, other commentators have opined that the 2007 resurrection of Arab Initiative was little more than an affirmation of its already existing flexible 2002-based origins.

In all, the sea of pessimism (produced by the frustrations/strains thrusted upon the long years of the 1991 Madrid Conference and the subsequent Oslo Process) was capped by, and crowned with, both a general trend of increasing intensity of violence and tension between the Palestinians and the Israelis and the above-mentioned declaration of Oslo's failure by the Arab League (but there seems to be at least some optimism regarding current US moves according to a headline in a recent Arab League press statement reporting Moussa as commenting on having "sensed American desire towards serious peace conference" during a meeting with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice).

To make matters worse, intra-Palestinian relations have been marred and exacerbated in the past few years by cycles in the outbreaks and continuation of violence followed by cycles of uncertain and fragile cease-fires and power-arrangement settlements between the two main rival factions, the Fatah-led Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas, the "Islamist" opposition group which had formed the major portion of the Palestinian government up until as recently as late last year. Recently, there have new reported moves toward rapprochement between these two factions, but I think it is still reasonable to assume that both factions are far from reaching a serious reduction in tensions.

With the long history of setbacks outweighing successes, and with little time left for the duration of the Bush Administration before the next presidential elections, the Bush Administration is bound to realize that it is competing against time, against developments in the conflict and region, and the domestic environment of interest-group politics, constraints of and related to US foreign policy considerations, as well as against developments in the broader international community that are even remotely related to the region. If it hopes to make any substantial, and unprecedented, American ground (in even merely beginning) to end one of the world's most troubling and long-lasting conflicts, it needs to act decisively, quickly--and above all--with vision, wisdom, confidence-building, the courage for its implimentation, and with an avoidance of haste and any temptations to fall for band-aid remedies.

Some have realized that a successful resolution of conflict has also been prevented by attempts to heavily restrict public debate and discussion in Western societies, and especially in the United States and Britain--essentially in what apparently amounts to a broader "McCarthyism" in academia and public discourse over Islam/Muslim-Western relations, the Arab World, the threat of terrorism and the 'appropriate national security' response, and the Middle East, in general. [Some high-profile cases have involved the controversy pitting allegations of some students against professors from the well-known MEALAC department at Columbia University; the refusal of tenure for noted professor Dr. Norman Finklestein at DePaul University; the controversy surrounding Dr. Daniel Pipes, his "Middle East Forum" organization and the "dossiers"--charged by many to be academic blacklists--created, among other projects, by the Forum's affiliated arm called "Campus Watch"; and the movement towards restricting, or even eliminating, federal funding towards Middle Eastern Studies and Arab Studies Programs pushed forth by many of the same individuals and groups seen by the mentioned observers as restricting public discourse over critical and sensitive issue areas dealing with the Arab World, Middle East, Islam, US foreign policy, etc.] These observers claim that such restrictions---traced ultimately to lobbying by a relatively small but increasingly influential array of interested groups and persons, and especially by what is being seen by them as 'pseudo-think tanks'---have led to very nasty circumstances and controversies, as well as to maintaining a general status-quo of a number of particularly biased and dangerously faulty US foreign (and domestic) policies.

Having said all that, I am brought to ask some really tough questions: Can the United States, the conflicting parties, and third-party negotiators succeed this time around in resolving the conflict? What can the various sides bring to the negotiating table, what would be required of them? Can reasonable proposals and obligatons be realistically achieved in the current "chaotic" environment? Even just as important, can "reasonable" be "just"? Given polarizations and the fallouts from unrelated conflicts in the region, can the international community (with its very lopsided distribution of influence, national interests, etc) ever reach a "fair" and "final" resolution for conflict and suffering that has lasted for more than 5o years, transcending generations?

Certainly, there are many groups and individuals (including among them Israelis, Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, Jews, and others) that are well-intentioned and are truly striving to find a workable way out of the complexities, rigidiness, and injustices inflicted by these conflicts. But a great obstacle they face is what they see as a considerable lack of attention and awareness from the mainstreams of media, political and decision-making circles, and other "centers" of event-makers and news-shakers. If attention is paid to these peace and human rights activists, many times it is not serious. Nor has such attention seemingly granted them the benefit of the doubt, leading some to sometimes feel ostracized by their own communities.

There are a whole lot of dimensions--whether they relate to policymaking, imbalances in the projections of power between the conflicting sides, major or dramatic developments in the conflict---that can help influence the range of potential solutions, actions, and attitudes carried out or missed, as well as their resulting outcomes. Other developments and conflicts within and outside the region not related specifically to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or even to broader Arab-Israeli tensions, can have positive and negative spillovers. But for now, at least, there will be a lot of speculation and alertness (if not anxiety) towards any "last-minute" US-led peace-promoting, or tension-reducing, manueveurs. The combination of all these factors and circumstances raises the stakes even higher for everyone.