Three possible scenarios as Egypt goes forward: brief initial thoughts and predictions

February, 11: Massive demonstrations reverberating throughout Egypt, again.  Millions of Egyptians angered by Mubarak's and Suleiman's speeches last night, which acknowledged the death of martyrs among protesters but which also did not satisfy their main demands.  The speeches also highlighted government achievements with respect to points of reform, but the mood among protesters throughout the country show that there is a big gulf between Mubarak and his regime and the protesting masses that can not be mended.  They were understood as a blunt slap in the face upon them.  Military has issued a statement that amounted: to a commitment to protecting the current political transition/reform framework as announced by Mubarak and Suleiman; and lifting the emergency status after protests come to an end, among other pronouncements.  This statement was taken as supporting the regime, and it was also rejected by the masses.  For the first time, protesters spread their demonstrations to the state television building and the presidential palaces in Cairo and Alexandria.  The military warned that these areas were red lines for the protesters to cross.  


In light of the above highlights, let's lay out briefly three scenarios that could happen over the next few days.  Briefly, these are some of my initial thoughts and predictions: 

(1). Mubarak resigns or leaves the country, followed by Suleiman. The rest of regime is dismantled. Protesters say this is possible, despite any current constitutional provisions, because sovereignty rests with the people who are steering a revolution and who have seen the regime--in all its components--as illegitimate.  An independent civilian caretaker government, without any ties to the old regime, is installed in reasonable time.  This government will be set up to preside over a transitional phase, constitutional rewriting or at least major amending, and preparation of eventual elections.  The transitional government will need the army to oversee general security. (The Interior Ministry has been plagued with years of distrust and hatred toward it because of the use by the regime of the state of emergency, the National Security apparatus, and Central Security 'anti-riot' forces.  Interior Ministry is also hated because of association with brutality and harassment at regular police stations.)  Parliament may be dissolved, as it has been seen as part of the decades-entrenched regime: indeed it is one of a number of assets that has provided the political vehicle for Mubarak to ascend to the Presidency.    

But several challenges the new government will encounter.  For example, will the military be an "equal" partner along with the transitional government, or be under civilian control?  Or will the military seek to influence policy and politics in the immediate post-Mubarak transitional phase?  Second, another question over how to also sort out and rework the bewildering enigmas and the endless circle of a constitution---designed in the Mubarak era as a tool of entrenchment---in speedy and progressing way?  Should this be a reworking from scratch, or a major amending?  A third question: how also to take care of the economy during this period simultaneously, as a new body installed?  A fourth question, perhaps the most important: how can opposition elements---who have long been weakened and fragmented, in part because of a system of laws created by regime, and who have been involved in squabbles of differences---create or be part of a transitional government?


Despite all the uncertainties, this is perhaps the most favorable of all scenarios for the people because of a strong desire for a breath of fresh air signified by a complete break with the Mubarak regime.  They are keen on preserving their new-found freedom. They are also likely to view such a scenario as a genuine vehicle towards meaningful democratization, with the wide backing of the masses.     

(2).  A transfer of power to Suleiman means that Mubarak will "step aside",  not "step down".  The rest of regime still remains intact.  So an NDP government could still possibly have a hand in shaping the transitional phase.  It is less favorable to the masses than prospect 1, but Mubarak will be out of the scene and away from the direct limelight.  This may ensure a smooth transition, but that is very uncertain.  Suleiman is not trusted by the masses because of at least two reasons: (a). as a Mubarak appointee to the vice presidency; (b) as part of Mubarak's regime in his capacity as an army general, involvement in intelligence, and then as head of Egyptian intelligence before assuming the VP position.  Both reasons mean that Suleiman has had more than enough time to become very familiar with the inner trappings of the regime, and that he is a pivotal player within it.  It is possible Suleiman may hand over power to a transitional governing body at some point.  But, too much damage has already happened over the past three weeks in part because of Suleiman's handling of Egyptian crisis.  His endorsing and continuing of the distortions of the state media portrayal over the protests, as well as his close association with the regime, will only serve to solidify and intensify public distrust towards him.     

(3).  Military coup.  In this scenario, the regime will be completely dismantled, but the military assumes direct full control of government and politics.  Martial rule may be declared, with a strictly enforced curfew.  A new system of civilian-clothed decision-making may eventually be created, but influence in policy-making and politics could be retained by the military.  Or an openly military-based government could rule for some period, even after the transitional phase.  In some ways, this may seem like July 1952 all over again for the older generations among the protesters (allowing for the main fault of a concentration of power in uniform).  At any rate, for a popular revolution seeking to establish a life for its country on new footing, a military coup would undoubtedly be among the worst scenarios to fall into.      

In any of the three cases/options, the position and role of the military will be crucial. On the one hand, the military is very respected among the population, and it hasn't confronted the public before.  It has shown remarkable restraint throughout the protests, a behavior which has helped it to build distance from the regime as the crisis escalated.  A great deal of fraternization has been exchanged on the streets.  On the other hand, the military faces a new, unprecedented situation of a widespread popular pressure that has rocked the regime of which it (the military) has been an integral and loyal part.  All four of the post-colonial presidents have come from the military (and many other powerful decision-makers or shakers have come from a military command background at some point or another).  The new dynamic power of what has been called the "Egyptian Revolution" will likely put both the military and the civilian population in a test in civil-military relations.  Egypt of 2011 is already proving to be a very different Egypt for everyone there.             

Some major domestic highlights for Feb 5, and what they might mean

• Protests continued for a twelfth day. A Christian Mass is announced for Tahrir on Sunday. Protests also planned for next week. Protesters in Tahrir Square and elsewhere throughout Egypt appeared to intensify their calls and resolve for the president's resignation, which in their opinion would open the way for complete and meaningful change. Some government employees broke ranks to join the protesters.

• State television announces resignation of ruling NDP party leadership, including president's son. But many people still are not placated. 

• Reportedly two minor opposition parties broke ranks with the opposition and began discussions with the government. A third group, the Muslim Brotherhood, also reportedly began to seek talks with VP Suleiman, after initially setting down the president's resignation as a precondition for its involvement. The rest of the opposition seems to stand behind the protest movement's demand that President Mubarak resign as a precondition for talks and a transitional phase. VP Suleiman has said the government is inviting opposition groups for an immediate dialog on constitutional reform. Meanwhile, a self-appointed Committee of Wise Men surfaced to talk with VP Suleiman to explore solutions to the standoff and impasse. But this group seems unconnected to the protest movement as there appears to have been no communication between them and the protesters. 

• The army began to move tanks near Tahrir and apparently sought to take down the barricades set up by protesters. Protesters moved in as human shields. Later they appeared to take moves to close off one end of the square. There are still pronunciations of fraternity between army units and demonstrators throughout Egypt, and local observers have dismissed any potential for a showdown between the people and the armed forces.     

• A military commander for the district comprising Tahrir urges the protests to end demonstrations, appealing to nationalist sentiments and saying that foreign intervention was behind the protest movement. Chants of "the Army and the People are one" and "Mubarak must go" erupted, prompting the commander to leave the square.   

• There are concerns that heavy-handedness will resume, with reported redeployments of plain-clothed police to the streets to round up protesters. There are also concerns on the whereabouts of Egyptian human rights activists 

• Some normality has been restored to Egypt, with the resumption of some businesses. Government announced banks would operate for a few hours on Sunday.   

• VP Suleiman's motorcade was caught between gunfire, but Government denies it was an assassination attempt and claims it was a stray bullet. Suleiman was left unscathed. 

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Based on these new developments for Saturday, Feb 5, it is very clear that the standoff/impasse has not yet lost its steam or energy. 

The government is struggling to hold on in its confrontation with the protest masses. It may still want to play a major role in molding what dynamics will emerge next. Various overtures were announced, all being not insignificant. Simultaneously attempts are being made to paint the embattled government and its plight in nationalistic rhetoric. Dynamics of the day also point to the emergence of what may be a strategy to create or exploit disunity among opposition elements. The regime possibly signals through these actions that it is not quite ready to throw the towel.  

A desire is among the Egyptian population for a sense of normality. Various segments, however, differ about approach. Concerned about chaos, some segments are conciliatory towards Mubarak finishing out the remainder of his term. Yet the protesters are still backed by many other segments of the population. Protesters remain determined to engage in the tug-of-war with the regime until their main demand of resignation is met. They also repeated declarations on a new awakening of Egypt that has brought the nation together in a new alert consciousness which remains distrustful towards the regime.      

The top cadres of the Army perhaps are beginning to lose patience with the standoff/impasse, but still seem to be on thin tightrope while they seek to hold together their apparent coolness and firmness. The army still has protected protesters thus far. But some actions on Saturday indicate a testy relationship between the two that could dramatically change the trajectory and scope of developments in the near future.    

All of this makes for a situation that is still very highly volatile, and one that is uncertain in which direction the pendulum will ultimately swing. The atmosphere may take a turn for the worse if a miscalculation is made or an unmeasured response/ initiative is taken.

A week in, Egypt's mass revolt has undoubtedly appeared to gain critical mass

Today: Feb 1, 2011. 

Nearly 2 million protesters in Tahrir Square (center Cairo) and its immediate environs; hundreds of 1000s reported in Alexandria; about 500 thousand reported in El Mansoura; about 100 thousand reported in Damanhour; thousands reported in Port Said; massive protests also reported in El Mahalla.  This has come one week into protests across the country since the 25th of January "Day of Anger", implemented by tens of thousands of youth (and twenty-somethings and thirty-somethings) having no visible formal leader or representative on their behalf.  Despite major roads between Alexandria and Cairo--the two most populous cities in the country--being reported blocked and in spite of the shutdown of the country's railway system and domestic flights, masses across the country have shown determination to continue protesting.  


The anti-regime movement has continued to draw and absorb momentum, power, and support from Egyptians.  Movie celebrities and Nobel-prize recipients, artists and journalists, opposition elements and the older common man on the street have joined.  These dynamics come with a life and existence previously unknown, to the surprise or joy of many and apparently beyond a slow regime's recognition or comprehension.  Much like throughout the past week, the protests continue to show no sign of sectarian or other factionalized divides.  Masses of people (mostly young, as mentioned above) are united to demand a complete change of government and of direction for the country, as well as an end to associated crippling corruption, heavy-handed brutality, and lack of freedoms and opportunities---symbolized to them most prominently by President Mubarak's departure from the political stage.  These demands have been summed up in the widely displayed Arabic word irhal, meaning "leave."        


In light of events and public official statements through the past week, especially today, there is very little indication or anticipation in this tense yet hope-glimmered environment that the contending sides will be backing down easily.  There are certainly profound outward displays of stubbornness by the regime and the protesters.  Yet all indications are towards approaching tipping point.  Or, that possibly a tipping point has already been tip-toed on, waiting for one little push of inertia.  There are plans for a fresh round of demonstrations to be held on Friday, international news reports say.    

Continuously shifting displays of drama have defined the mood and structure of this past week.  Protesters defied curfews to camp out in areas or to continue running bakeries.  And despite an engineered internet blackout, combined with partial media and telephone clamp-down, they returned to demonstrating.  A vice-president has been appointed (for the first time in 3 decades) amid cabinet reshuffling.  But the young masses who took to the streets are still not appeased or placated, and they are distrustful towards such moves by the regime.  President Mubarak has also announced he will not seek a new term, while saying that he stay on until the upcoming elections and guide the country toward constitutional reform and transitional government.  In the same speech, he also defended his service to the country.  Still no budge from these masses who---seeing this as a ploy to hold onto power as long as possible, and as a defiance to the public---insisted on his stepping down.  


Earlier, anti-riot forces, having initially cracked down brutally on seemingly largely peaceful demonstrators in the first few days, had then mysteriously and inexplicably receded.  They were replaced by army units that have reportedly behaved very differently (positively) on the streets.  Police is still conspicuously absent on many streets, forcing people to form neighborhood and public property watch committees (in cooperation with troops) to maintain order, prevent looting, and to apprehend/ return escaped prisoners to custody.  There are also reports of a general atmosphere of camaraderie among protesters and the masses in coordinating demonstration activity and distributing foodstuffs and water. 

Now, in conjunction with opposition elements, constitutional scholars, thinkers, members of the business community, among others, the youth brunt behind the protests need to settle down and think calmly and clearly on how to proceed strategically.  They need to start planning on how to move forward from this point to participate in the next (transitional) phase.  For them to succeed, they need to embark on these directions without giving up ground or pressure gained in the past few days.  Specifically, they need to begin engaging in the discussions with intelligence chief Mr. Omar Suleiman and a former minister of aviation Mr. Ahmed Shafik (appointed as Vice-President and Prime Minister, respectively), and extend their activities beyond protesting and displaying mass anger.  Yet, with so much at stake, it is crucial to highlight that this inexperienced movement cannot be expected to tread alone with much success into the sophistication and intricacies of such interaction with the state.  This is especially the case if other developments, like an escalation in/towards violence, occur.  To sustain the peaceful momentum it has generated and translate such momentum effectively  into realizing its goals, the young anti-regime protesters may ultimately need the logistical, material, and moral support and guidance of the established opposition.  These protesters will also need to continue to hold steadfast to one another and work in unison.         


In supporting and encouraging the youth, all Egyptian opposition elements must not return to clinging to their highly particularized interests/positions and squabbling and discord.  This older anti-regime segment can work to speak on behalf of the protesting youth.  But they must realize that if their efforts are to succeed, they must ultimately partner with youth rather than to take any action or make any proposal that could signal or be interpreted as a domination over the latter's voices.  For example, towards this end, the opposition can work to mentor the youth movement protesters and help them to productively channel the latter's energies (with resources and moral support) towards making effective arguments and proposals for change as these younger compatriots stand their ground.


In other words, at the very least there needs to be constant communication and coordination within and between these two groups.


On many levels, the coming days and weeks will prove ultimately as a report card to the unprecedented protests that have defined this youth-generated movement.  Indeed, much uncertainty and ill-comfort about what might happen next still hang in the air.  But no one can doubt that much has been achieved already, providing a foundation for a new constructive political culture and consciousness in the country.  No one can deny that there has been a loud and notable break with long-established physical, cultural, and psychological barriers of apathy, fear, intimidation, and debilitating hopelessness.  Similarly, momentum and ongoing drama are prompting talk of an Egyptian rebirth and of pride.  Now it is the moment of the youth and of the twenty-somethings and thirty-somethings, and it is critical that they work to translate this moment into a deep legacy to continue inspiring the rest of the country.  It is equally critical that opposition elements, thinkers, writers and journalists, constitutional scholars, and other established opinion-makers and movers and shakers with an interest to see meaningful change continue to lend and even increase support for their younger compatriots.  

Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution": Regional (and Broader) Implications?

Within the past month, Tunisia has witnessed a large popular uprising culminating in and galvanized by familiarly recognizable protests over poor economic prospects/conditions and the heavy-handed regime-sanctioned crackdowns on the street.  Called the "Jasmine Revolution" the nearly-month-long uprising is particularly significant in the high speed, and especially in the civilian source of its projection [although this assumption that the final blow was dealt by popular pressure has now been disputed], with which intense drama has unfolded.  At any rate, what we have witnessed is nothing short of remarkable.  

The MENA (Middle East and North Africa region) has witnessed several revolts, protests, coups, insurrections, and wars challenging regimes and status-quo environments even in the post-colonial era.  Yet such past challenges, despite the varying circumstances in which they were born, have almost uniformly yielded little.  The most significantly emerging fruit here has, as many commentators will have undoubtedly pointed out, often been merely changes of names.  That, at most, touted changes have been often suspected of carrying the stitching marks of elaborate cosmetic surgeries: that wounds---old and new---have been repackaged hastily without regard to considerations over fully healing.  

In contrast to this, the recent and continuing Tunisian dynamics brings to focus serious questions regarding the sustainability of political systems and economic systems in uncertain times.  At a deeper more specific level, they once again put the spotlight on the wisdom and viability of exercising governmental authority in a repressive and over-aggressive manner (combined with what has been seen as periodic crumbs and general widespread official apathy), in the region.  Leaders, pundits, and officials are quick to either proclaim or dismiss the possibility of the "Tunisian Scenario" on the airwaves, in blogs, and on social media sites.  In trying to get a hold over understanding the seemingly dizzying weeks, I present in no particular sequence a list of news articles and op-eds that put Tunisia's events in the broader regional contexts (not a completely exhaustive list, but one that can hopefully be sufficiently representative).  Of course, much more information and analysis will be available in the days and weeks to come ...    

[Note: a temporary caretaker cabinet has been set up to organize elections, stabilize the country, and to implement reforms and head inquiry commissions over corruption and Ben Ali's regime's response to the protests.  But the retention of Ben Ali officials for the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Interior Minister (responsible for internal security) posts in the new 'unity government' has left many Tunisians skeptical and angry.  A fresh round of protests has been reported, along with the resignation of 3 independent members of the cabinet, barely a day after the new cabinet announcement.]  

  1. Could other Arab countries follow Tunisia's example? Roger Hardy, BBC. 

  2. No sign Egypt will take the Tunisian road. John Leyne, BBC; another view/angle. 

  3. Tunisia unrest a wake-up call for the region. Ian Black, The Guardian. 

  4. Tunisia's protests spark suicides in Algeria and fears throughout the Arab world. Ian Black, The  
  Guardian; The Arab world's horrific new trend: self-immolation. Blake Hounshell. Foreign Policy 
  Passport. (blog); new additional reported attempts here. 

  5. The 'bin Laden' of marginalisation: the real terror eating at the Arab world is the socio-economic 
  marginalisation. Larbi Sadiki, Al Jazeera English. 

  6. Tunisia protests serve warning to autocratic Middle Eastern regimes. Kristen Chick. The Christian
  Science Monitor. 


  7. To the tyrants of the Arab world ... Lamis Andoni, Al Jazeera English.  

  8. Arab regimes on edge. Marc Lynch. Foreign Policy. blog. 


  9. Two views/angles of U.S. comprehension of, and response to, Tunisia (1,2)

  10. People power succeed without Western backing. Emad Mekay, Inter Press Service (Johannesburg); 
  another view/angle.

  11. Unrest spreads to Algeria. Emad Mekay, Inter Press Service (Johannesburg).

  12. Arab bloggers cheer on Tunisia's Revolution. Robert Mackey. THE LEDE. The New York Times. 
  (blog)

  13. Kenya should draw lessons from the goings-on in Tunisia. Daily Nation. (Nairobi). [Not a part of 
  the MENA obviously, but an article like this reveals that people are feeling the reverberations far from 
  Tunisia and are reflecting on them.] 

An Awakening for America

In the wake of the shooting in Arizona just three days ago that critically wounded a Congresswoman and that slew a federal judge, I would have to agree with seasoned observers that something strange, alongside the frustrations of a sluggish economy, is happening in the United States.  A climate (or upsurge) of hate and deliberate provocation, mixed in with a genuine concern about the direction(s) the country is taking, is emerging and continuing to fester.  

However I will briefly add to the discussion on this development.  Last year, I wrote a bit about the anti-Obama mischaracterization, and a little bit more on growing peculiar anti-Muslim sentiments (1,2,3,4) in the U.S.  It is my understanding that these and other outbursts of frustration or opposition are travelling in different directions, targeting a diverse array of issues.  These venues have included acrimonious town-halls over healthcare reform, the debate over and the reaction to the repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell military policy, and the swelling of inflammatory and hyped nativist attitude and physical attacks directed towards American Muslim property and their persons.  But [especially with the surfacing and prominence of various right-wing pundits (such as on Fox News, blogging channels, and radio stations) and various fringes of right-wing groups like the Tea Party Movement---not to forget even some Republican candidates' election campaigns throughout last year---] these outbursts hardly indicate a random or chance congruence.  At the very least, they appear to be shared through broader networks weaving the anti-this and anti-that together.  

When violence and ugly rhetoric---from threats, incitements, and racist and inflammatory slurs to assaults and arsons---coincides with the surfacing of such frustration and opposition, it is a clue that something very serious is lurking around.  All the more when such rhetoric and activity are encouraged by, or when they find a receptive or uncritical ear in, segments of the political establishment and of the media/punditry.  I agree with those who call for sincere and calm soul-searching.  Many of us are facing difficulty and uncertainty regarding financial, job, and other stability.  Many of us are frustrated about the current state of affairs, where progress has seemed very sluggish.  These fears and concerns are understandable and worthy of empathy/sympathy.  But absolutely NONE of these constitute legitimate space for cheap, dangerous, and bigoted opportunistic rhetoric.  Absolutely NONE of these serve as justifications for condoning or acting upon it, either.  

On a similar note, imagery has always been a powerful tool for criticism, sarcasm, and for even having an innocent laugh.  But controversies throughout the last few years---from the bigoted and inflammatory ugliness displayed in the run up to the 2008 presidential election, to the ugliness manifested in the "Ground Zero Mosque" debate, to the continuing increase in physical and verbal anti-Muslim attacks and discrimination, to reported attacks or threats on people merely for attending rallies, to finally the recent episode in Arizona---potentially reveal the dark side to the potency in the imagery of pictures and words.  We must be more thoughtful in the construction and usage of the metaphors and images we call upon.  We need to exercise restraint in our words, attitudes, and demeanor.  We must work to constructively challenge action which fails to hold up to the standards of civility.  And we must demand of those in a position of influence to join the effort to do so (and, especially, to provide a positive example).