The new bumpy and curvy road for Egypt

Here's a thought or a few.  A peaceful, substantive, deliberating, yet non-restrictive and transparent transition to democracy should be the focal point in/for Egypt from this past Friday forward.  The nation of 80 plus million people now faces a formidable to-do list on the domestic front.


Meticulous and wise constitutional rewriting with enshrining of individual rights and responsibilities to include: championing the rule of law, as well as the separation of powers and checks and balances to especially guarantee judiciary independence as a co-equal branch with the executive and the legislative.  Ending the status of emergency and placing restrictions over its future use.  Starting to rework the government bureaucracies into a beaming bastion of public service.  Eliminating government influence on professional syndicates and student unions, while scrapping out or at least drastically revising the gripping laws on non-governmental and charitable organizations.  Commencing the reform and retraining of police and other security agencies of the state to conduct themselves professionally and to uphold individual liberties and rights (--among them the right to live in dignity without fear of extortion, harassment, or other abuses of power).  Release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience.  The abolition of military tribunals used in the past against civilians.  Creation of an independent electoral commission (or one supervised/staffed by judges) with verifiable assurances of non-interference from authorities, empowered to ensure free, fair, open, and transparent elections.  All of this list means ultimately for concrete and timely progressive steps be taken to create a system that facilitates and reinforces public accountability and equal opportunity for representation in civilian governance throughout all levels and branches.  Part and parcel of this undertaking is a solid ongoing commitment by authorities (and vigilance by the public) towards an open and flourishing, vibrant climate of public debate and discussion that is actionable and productive.


The dynamics inside the country is bound to be busy with other rejuvenation in the political sphere.  Perhaps most crucial is the creation of a non-military transitional body as soon as possible to guide the county towards reform.  An independent civilian caretaker government, divorced from the Mubarak regime, can be installed.  One that is comprised of respected, credible, meticulous, diligent, and wise persons who regularly and openly consult with the people.


Perhaps as good omen of things to come, the Egyptian military's professionalism and restraint was noted in its conduct towards the protesters during the Revolution.  With few reported exceptions, this conduct was exemplary and it contrasted deeply with that of armies in many other developing and newly-industrializing countries in times of crises and uncertainties.


However, a military cannot run the administrative affairs of a country for long.  And---as the cases of, say, Turkey (from the 1920s to the 1990s), post-colonial Algeria, Nigeria (post-colonial to Obesanjo), and post-colonial Sudan, among others---it cannot be the ultimate 'guardian' of democracy or revolution.  Nor can it be the ultimate 'arbiter' of the people's will.  It's primary function is border security, national defense, and helping with logistics and security during the most pressing emergencies, because it is equipped and trained to do so efficiently.  It is generally not as good at the normal daily functions of the state like managing day-to-day traffic, police affairs, managing/monitoring of the economy, and creating policy.  For now, Mubarak's newly-installed cabinet still runs the country but with the highly notable addition that it directly reports to the military.  And this is an arrangement that more or less could last as little as six months with little clear timetables or specifics.  In the overall balance of the current circumstances, a spectrum of speculation has arisen, from dooming worry to cautious optimism to wild optimism/euphoria despite coming odds, among observers, reporters, and protesters (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9).  [Earlier, I had blogged a bit about possible roles for the Egyptian military here.]  


More immediate steps taken commensurate with facilitating democratic politics involves the creation of adequate time and space for the rebuilding and strengthening of political parties as well as for the construction of new ones.  Parties need ample time and space to branch out and get better acquainted with the Egyptian population and to build viable political platforms and programs, but they need to begin now.  In the Sadat policy of infitah (or "opening," "liberalization"), parties were very limited in number by law (about 3 in total) and they were almost micromanaged by the regime.  During the Mubarak presidency---in some ways a continuation of Sadat's ideologically and tactically---there was a visible expansion in the number of parties operating on the political stage.  However, these new additions were approved by the Egyptian Government under very strict conditions and laws, and so the new few that were 'legally' allowed to operate were very weak, functionally incoherent, and with relatively very small numbers of members and supporters.  Similar tweaking and manipulation was done "legally" (i.e. for example, in tightly-closed ways of creating laws favorable to the regime) and extra-legally (i.e. for example, in ways that allowed selective targeting in application/dis-application of laws in combination with state-sponsored violence, intimidation, and fraud).  Thus allowing Mubarak regime domination over space in policy-making or policy discussion, such as elections to student unions, parliament, and even the presidency.  So, it is essential that this time around political institutions like parties and systems like electoral channels are allowed to develop in an atmosphere of openness where the caretaker transitional authority is politically neutral and transparent.  [The Egyptian military reportedly urging the former youth protesters to begin to form parties is encouraging, but it remains to be seen what the military's response will be in developments to come.]      


Judging from Egypt's past experiences with regime-managed electoral and other procedures, many on this (non-exhaustive) to-do list would will need thorough attention and serious resolve, as well as reasonable speed, before parliamentary or presidential elections can take place.  

Meanwhile, action in the political and policy-making realms needs to be coupled with steps to assist the positive Revolution-generated momentum in affecting long-lasting economic and social rebuilding and strengthening.  The enhancement of hospitals which have at times lacked even basic necessary medical supplies, and the reform of overburdened educational institutions are examples of crucial problem areas that need to be tackled.  A lack of access to basic housing amenities such as plumbing in the shantytowns, a near-crisis problem in the lack of access in affordable housing more generally, and construction code violations which continue to place people in harm's way are others.  


[And, in another sign pointing to years-long under-the-surface deterioration, labor strikes have already erupted across multiple industries from the stock exchange, textile and steel firms, media organisations, the postal service to railways, the Culture Ministry, and the Health Ministry.  These occur barely at the end of this past weekend's celebrations, over an array of demands and issues: living and working conditions, better pay, medical care, stable contracts, and the dismissal of superiors viewed as corrupt and unfairly enriched (1, 2, 3, 4).  This new wave of protests prompted the Supreme Military Council in its Fifth Communique to call for an end to these protests.]  


Added to these problems is an overarching one of an economic and business climate that was criticized as unfair nepotism and clientelism---and one with many red-tape hurdles and long considered the personal playground of a privileged few connected to, or close to, the intricacies of the Mubarak regime.  Enacting and enforcing strong anti-corruption, anti-monopoly, intellectual property, and business transparency rules are essential to allow Egypt to profit fully from its human capital and to nurture, expand, and retain enormous Egyptian talent and ingenuity.


The grassroots and re-organizing potential rooted in the desire to realize a better Egypt has already surfaced in the tent city in Tahrir Square, even before the announcement of President Mubarak's resignation.  Scores of self-motivated clean-up volunteers that have emerged in Tahrir after Friday's celebrations continue to show hope of revolutionary country-altering potential.  Tweets and Facebook statuses abound with proclamations of social responsibility as well as with pride and euphoria.  So do YouTube video posts of interviews and activity of people on the streets.  The atmosphere is painted with a civic consciousness the level of which I have never witnessed before in my all years of summer visits to, or in my time spent studying and living in, Egypt.  But, such potential cannot be left to walk the path on its own.  An equally determined and conscientious official effort needs to support and provide platforms for this potential to extend itself.  Some of the Supreme Military Council's announcements and actions (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) in the wake of Mubarak's resignation are a step in the right direction to install and renew confidence of its intentions in the public.  So too does Egypt's business community elite need to step up here, as bigger and bolder calls have been made for their participation.  One high profile call was made for a 100 billion Egyptian Pound development fund for rebuilding the country.  Smaller projects can work alongside separately, or supplement, these calls.   

These are admittedly enormous undertakings, to be handled calmly and methodically but with a sense of urgency and of making visible progress.  These are what part of the processes that political scientists and development specialists have referred to as nation-building and state building.  Monitoring this reconstruction and guaranteeing its success is just as important as keeping tabs on the evolution of Egypt's foreign policy, foremost among them in observers' eyes being Egypt-Israel relations.  Yet, in the immediate present and near future, this reconstruction may take priority over the concern regarding the continuity of Egypt-Israel relations.  It has long been argued and shown that democratic governments, ruling over well-informed populations and an inclusive political culture, are hesitant toward war/conflict, and that they rarely behave aggressively toward other nations.  

Israeli officials and voices in Israeli media have made a lot of noise during the protests about a post-Mubarak era, expressing fear of radicalism waiting to be unleashed.  At the same time, the characterization seemingly anointed Mubarak's regime as the only Egyptian pillar of stability in Egypt's relations with Israel (and by extension, as the only Egyptian pillar of stability in the region more broadly).  After all, as Sadat's vice president with intimate ties to the Egyptian military going back to the days spent as an air force commander, Mubarak was said to be part of the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel Treaty.  His regime's easing of Egypt into expanding economic ties with Israel would serve to the latter as another assurance of the former's attention to keep the bi-lateral peace solid.


But the continuation of Mubarak's regime was more likely to perpetuate a false shell of stability.  This shell would be little more than one propped up by autocratic repression and denial of human rights, slowly cracking and eventually shattering.  In this context, Israel's on-record support of Mubarak could give the impression that it is more important to implement a relatively narrow set of objectives or interests at about any costs---call them "externalities," or "collateral damage," or "non-priorities"---his regime may bring.  It could create the impression that assisting a crafty yet unyielding Egyptian strongman system is more important than other, more-domestically rooted aspirations (for democracy, dignity, and wide-based economic well-being).


Perhaps then Egyptians will conclude that the prevailing Israeli concern was not so much over keeping intact the bi-lateral peace than maintaining, a-la-Mubarak, that Egypt completely sees eye-to-eye with Israel strategically and tactically in enforcing that peace.  A more open, vibrant, and democratic Egypt may try to renegotiate the terms of peace with Israel, which will undoubtedly add dynamics and dimensions to ponder over.  But in the whole balance of things in the region, that may not necessarily be of a negative consequence for Israel or for the broader region.  For that may, with new energy, breath life again into a tangible prospect for a lasting and just Israeli-Palestinian peace.  It may give birth to a real indispensable chance to help redress (rather than perpetuate) the setbacks of the Oslo Process.  To help the region start on a clean page, after decades of suffering partly brought about imbalances in influence, mixed in with animosity and nearly two decades of seemingly over-inflated hope.


At any rate, Egyptians will face a bumpy road ahead as they negotiate around the curves and turns, through the frictions, and above the potholes towards rebuilding and improvement.  The military will certainly play a crucial role in shepherding the country as it travels on this road helping to ensure security, thereby helping to stabilize the political and economic environments.  But as it does, it will need first and foremost to ultimately make good on its commitment to cede political power to civilian rule.  Heeding the lessons of human history and of Egypt's post-colonial history, that will require the military to partner with the Egyptian people as equals during the transition (and then step down from the political and administrative stages).  The international community, from international forums like the U.N. to individual nation-states like the U.S. to groups like the European Union, could lend valuable material, moral, and logistical support to this transition phase/process.  If it chooses to get involved, the international community will also need to partner with the Egyptian people, in ways which place a desire (to see a democratic Egypt lively with self-determination and economic progress) above national or other interests that may conflict with such desire.  


More closer to home, Israel---Egypt's principal neighbor and peace partner in the Mideast region---could learn to deal more with its nervousness in a manner that is more constructive than the conduct it has shown in the run-up to Mubarak's resignation.  Israel knows very well that it is America's principal ally in the region.  An alarmist tone or an aggressive conduct can prompt heavy negative pressure, thereby doing more to jeopardize Egypt's transition than to provide meaningful criticism.  Years of conflict with Israel, followed by a solidly-upheld peace and close cooperation (in the midst of the environment and dynamics of  post-1979 Middle East) are imprinted on the collective memory and awareness of Egyptians.  None of this will do much to reassure Egyptians if Israel sounds out signals that appear less-than-productive to them.  


Time, effort, perseverance, determination, coolness, inclusiveness, openness, care and meticulousness, and wisdom (and/or lack thereof) will ultimately shape the domestic Egyptian dynamics ahead ...                        

We All Need Mirrors: A Response to the "Two Americas."

In the discussion over the "two Americas," one of the basic premises of Ross Douthat's op-ed article is that the relationship between a minority/immigrant group and the American society overall are based upon give-and-take/compromise/exchanges of contributions, etc.  In inter-group relationships in society, this is a very natural demand and dynamic, without which the society may not function properly.

Now, the question is not whether this dynamic should exist.  To pretend or believe that it should not exist would cause a disservice not only to the Non-Muslim majority but also to the Muslim minority/immigrant group.  But, as with many other minority/immigrant issues,  this one needs to be handled prudently and delicately.  Of course, there is merit in the concern that tones expressed regarding this dynamic could reveal an unease or an outright xenophobia.  Even so, perhaps there is a logical reasoning to at least be willing to consider multiple angles and present them for a fuller evaluation.

The question [---and this is part where the author perhaps should have been more thoughtful, and one in which I find the tone troubling---] should be over the PARAMETERS of the dynamic of give-and-take/ compromise/ exchange of contributions/etc.  In a similar note, I am puzzled by why the author chose to use the word "assimilation" instead of "integration."  For "assimilation" lies closer to a "blending in" to form a more cohesive whole [consider how a soup is made, with all the individual elements being almost rendered variously indistinguishable].  While "integration" moves more towards a coming together of diversified parts to form a more cohesive whole [consider how a salad is made; all its separate elements form a unit, but they are individually distinguishable even in the same bowl].  Both integration and assimilation have just about the same objective/end result in mind, with markedly different paths (and the different paths/methods can have different implications for both minorities/immigrants and the overall society).

I am struck by the Douthat's apparent negligence (or willful omission, at worst) of the [mostly] tragic history of Native American Indians in what became the Continental U.S.  I am struck also by the inconsistency in reasoning and tone this attitude could invite.  The potential exists for an inconsistency of standards that invite one of set of parameters in the analysis over the relationship between the majority Native Indians and predominantly Anglo-Saxon settlers in one (historical) case, and standards that invite another set of diametrically opposite parameters in the current context of Muslims in a predominantly Anglo-Saxon America.  

By almost every measure, the true indigenous inhabitants of the Americas (both South and North) were tribal groups like the Cheyenne, Sioux, Shawnee, Cherokee, etc.  Even by the time of the American Revolution (1775), the European settlers (mostly Anglo-Saxon) and their descendants were still much "relatively new" in comparison to the Natives.  Indeed, the first permanent major English settlement in the Continental U.S., Jamestown, Virginia, was established in 1607.  Much of the same could be said about the American settlers who migrated westward of the Mississippi River, and the Indians who suffered later on.

Had the author lived during the those critical historical periods, what ideas would he have penned then for Native-Settler relations concerning the basic premise(s) upon which he insists for contemporary American society's relationship with Muslims now?  Certainly, as a writer looking back in time, he would've noticed that the analysis requires a different perspective into demographic compositions and dynamics from which to work.  Almost by parallel, he would have characterized that past society as being a narrative of "the two Native Indian Americas."  

In such case, "the first Native America" would be reserved for the unconditionally accepting Native America which opened its arms wide to Plymouth and Jamestown colonists.  As newcomers in a distant and strange land the early colonists likely would not (and could not) have survived, owing to devastating epidemics of foreign illnesses (to which they were not immune) and to famine.  Indeed, mortality rates were relatively high during those first years.  Indigenous tribes' support and goodwill thus were crucial to those colonists' well-being, and by extension to the enduring establishment of the thirteen remaining majority-Anglo-Saxon colonies (the earliest foundation of what the U.S. as it is today).  The "second Native America" would have consisted of tribes that began to distrust and resist the settler colonists.  Under such context, would he have been sympathetic to his characterizations of "the second America" to which he sympathetically exhibits in this article?  What would have been his attitude to other crucial turning points in U.S. history which also had a profound impact upon Native Americans, such as "Manifest Destiny?"  

  

A thoroughly thoughtful appreciation of this history still casts a long and deep shadow and stain on our national consciousness.  A shadow and stains from which we still have to apparently fully learn.   Seeking to be fully aware of seemingly callous "adoption" of Native American property should cause us to stop for a moment and think deeply.  The standards of tolerance and mutual respect as defined by "the first America" would contrast sharply with prominently-negative historical treatment of Native Americans.  It may perhaps even contrast with some contemporary considerations of them.     

For example, apparently among the most prominent and enduring conscious imagery of Native Americans widespread throughout the U.S. today are those used in professional sports teams and logos.  At face value, these images hardly say anything about the legacy and history of Native American cultures, societies, rituals, beliefs, customs, or contributions to the North American landscape.  I am not suggesting that anyone who has even so much attended or watched a major sport like American football or baseball game is complicit in this regard.  Nor do I hold anything against professional sports.   

But I do think it is worthy to pause and ask a few questions.  How did names---like the Cleveland Indians, Washington Redskins, and Atlanta Braves---come to be used (in name and physical image) in professional sports industries?  Do/did Native Americans object to commercial uses of their likenesses and to the commercial uses of variations thereof?  Were they to object would we stop engaging in such use?  Would we develop ways to compensate them for the use of these likenesses, and if so how?  And even if they do not/did not object, how might many of us feel if the situation was put in reverse?  With scores of Native Americans mimicking non-Native Indian likenesses in sports uniforms, trademark/logos, and so on, made to look like Anglo-American settlers?  [Of course, such behavior pales in comparison to other treatments of the Native American narratives such as portrayals in Old Western movies and inexpensive Old Western novels popular in the time period.  I point this one out as a relative measurement and because of its ongoing use.]  

          

Perhaps Douthat does not believe or think that allusions to historical realities (and residual issues) dealing with Native Americans apply in the case of America's treatment of Muslims in the United States.  Regardless, this is an argument that has been made in other minority and immigrant cases.  People from across the southern border will 'change' the America as we know it (assumed for the worse)---politically, cultural, economically, and socially.  And so they must be fiercely and aggressively resisted.  Or, they must 'assimilate'--that is, extending Douthat's tone and definitions---abide by the rules of the "Second America" so that they are, by the grace of the "First America," accepted among Americans' ranks.  But there was also a time when Anglo-American settlers and European explorers were different and alien to the American continents all together.  Undoubtedly American Indians faced many of the same questions we do today, and the collectivity of their responses are a diversity of resistances mixed in with accommodations.  

But the America as we currently know it has been different from a few centuries ago when Native tribes dominated its landscape; it was the non-Natives, not the indigenous tribes, who have "prevailed" in shaping most of the "character" of present-day United States.  And on the whole it was mostly the non-Natives, not the indigenous tribes, who insisted on others following their lead and example.  Today's "Natives" include a mix that, collectively, are vastly different from pre-colonization's tribes.  I realize that a discussion of immigration is far too complex to be covered in any summarized points here.  But there are (worrying) undertones I find in some immigration arguments that are strikingly similar to the characterizations presented in Douthat's "two Americas" lenses.        

If anything, all of us are in need of mirrors.  The author's article started off promising.  He has a right to point out that sensitivity on the part of Muslims should be part-and-parcel of decisions over the Park51 community center.  Yet the article's preachy mood carried a seeming lack of internal mirror that, in espousing and cheering all the qualities of "the two Americas," rendered it instead more disappointing than enlightening.