Three possible scenarios as Egypt goes forward: brief initial thoughts and predictions

February, 11: Massive demonstrations reverberating throughout Egypt, again.  Millions of Egyptians angered by Mubarak's and Suleiman's speeches last night, which acknowledged the death of martyrs among protesters but which also did not satisfy their main demands.  The speeches also highlighted government achievements with respect to points of reform, but the mood among protesters throughout the country show that there is a big gulf between Mubarak and his regime and the protesting masses that can not be mended.  They were understood as a blunt slap in the face upon them.  Military has issued a statement that amounted: to a commitment to protecting the current political transition/reform framework as announced by Mubarak and Suleiman; and lifting the emergency status after protests come to an end, among other pronouncements.  This statement was taken as supporting the regime, and it was also rejected by the masses.  For the first time, protesters spread their demonstrations to the state television building and the presidential palaces in Cairo and Alexandria.  The military warned that these areas were red lines for the protesters to cross.  


In light of the above highlights, let's lay out briefly three scenarios that could happen over the next few days.  Briefly, these are some of my initial thoughts and predictions: 

(1). Mubarak resigns or leaves the country, followed by Suleiman. The rest of regime is dismantled. Protesters say this is possible, despite any current constitutional provisions, because sovereignty rests with the people who are steering a revolution and who have seen the regime--in all its components--as illegitimate.  An independent civilian caretaker government, without any ties to the old regime, is installed in reasonable time.  This government will be set up to preside over a transitional phase, constitutional rewriting or at least major amending, and preparation of eventual elections.  The transitional government will need the army to oversee general security. (The Interior Ministry has been plagued with years of distrust and hatred toward it because of the use by the regime of the state of emergency, the National Security apparatus, and Central Security 'anti-riot' forces.  Interior Ministry is also hated because of association with brutality and harassment at regular police stations.)  Parliament may be dissolved, as it has been seen as part of the decades-entrenched regime: indeed it is one of a number of assets that has provided the political vehicle for Mubarak to ascend to the Presidency.    

But several challenges the new government will encounter.  For example, will the military be an "equal" partner along with the transitional government, or be under civilian control?  Or will the military seek to influence policy and politics in the immediate post-Mubarak transitional phase?  Second, another question over how to also sort out and rework the bewildering enigmas and the endless circle of a constitution---designed in the Mubarak era as a tool of entrenchment---in speedy and progressing way?  Should this be a reworking from scratch, or a major amending?  A third question: how also to take care of the economy during this period simultaneously, as a new body installed?  A fourth question, perhaps the most important: how can opposition elements---who have long been weakened and fragmented, in part because of a system of laws created by regime, and who have been involved in squabbles of differences---create or be part of a transitional government?


Despite all the uncertainties, this is perhaps the most favorable of all scenarios for the people because of a strong desire for a breath of fresh air signified by a complete break with the Mubarak regime.  They are keen on preserving their new-found freedom. They are also likely to view such a scenario as a genuine vehicle towards meaningful democratization, with the wide backing of the masses.     

(2).  A transfer of power to Suleiman means that Mubarak will "step aside",  not "step down".  The rest of regime still remains intact.  So an NDP government could still possibly have a hand in shaping the transitional phase.  It is less favorable to the masses than prospect 1, but Mubarak will be out of the scene and away from the direct limelight.  This may ensure a smooth transition, but that is very uncertain.  Suleiman is not trusted by the masses because of at least two reasons: (a). as a Mubarak appointee to the vice presidency; (b) as part of Mubarak's regime in his capacity as an army general, involvement in intelligence, and then as head of Egyptian intelligence before assuming the VP position.  Both reasons mean that Suleiman has had more than enough time to become very familiar with the inner trappings of the regime, and that he is a pivotal player within it.  It is possible Suleiman may hand over power to a transitional governing body at some point.  But, too much damage has already happened over the past three weeks in part because of Suleiman's handling of Egyptian crisis.  His endorsing and continuing of the distortions of the state media portrayal over the protests, as well as his close association with the regime, will only serve to solidify and intensify public distrust towards him.     

(3).  Military coup.  In this scenario, the regime will be completely dismantled, but the military assumes direct full control of government and politics.  Martial rule may be declared, with a strictly enforced curfew.  A new system of civilian-clothed decision-making may eventually be created, but influence in policy-making and politics could be retained by the military.  Or an openly military-based government could rule for some period, even after the transitional phase.  In some ways, this may seem like July 1952 all over again for the older generations among the protesters (allowing for the main fault of a concentration of power in uniform).  At any rate, for a popular revolution seeking to establish a life for its country on new footing, a military coup would undoubtedly be among the worst scenarios to fall into.      

In any of the three cases/options, the position and role of the military will be crucial. On the one hand, the military is very respected among the population, and it hasn't confronted the public before.  It has shown remarkable restraint throughout the protests, a behavior which has helped it to build distance from the regime as the crisis escalated.  A great deal of fraternization has been exchanged on the streets.  On the other hand, the military faces a new, unprecedented situation of a widespread popular pressure that has rocked the regime of which it (the military) has been an integral and loyal part.  All four of the post-colonial presidents have come from the military (and many other powerful decision-makers or shakers have come from a military command background at some point or another).  The new dynamic power of what has been called the "Egyptian Revolution" will likely put both the military and the civilian population in a test in civil-military relations.  Egypt of 2011 is already proving to be a very different Egypt for everyone there.