At uncertain crossroads: a brief preliminary note on Egypt's landmark referendum (March 20, 2011)

**This post was originally published on Sunday, March 20, 2011. But it suddenly disappeared from the blog without any explanation. Luckily, there was an extra copy.**

The referendum results came out earlier today: about 77% in favor of the proposed amendments and roughly 23% opposed, with a 41% turnout.  In the days before the referendum, I have maintained the latter position (of "no" to the amendments).  My understanding is that a number of things need to be established before parliamentary and presidential elections can be held.  A new solid constitution laying out separation of powers, checks-and-balances, individual rights (civil rights and civil liberties), due process of law, rule of law, etc.  An alternative administrative framework for the interim/transitional period (that allows for more transparent and open power-sharing and policy-crafting) between a civilian transitional government and the military, with which security is coordinated.  More time for further developing the political and social momentum and revolutionary environment (i.e. for example, restrengthening of existing parties and building of new ones, along with time for developing platforms, cohesiveness and outreach to and support with the public, etc).  [Under the current plan announced by the Supreme Military Council and supported by the referendum, the parliamentary and presidential elections are expected to be held in June and August respectively, or by slightly later on in the year. ]  

Many reasons exist for this rationale.  One deals with examining historical examples of rushed or nervous elections and state-building across countries.  The examples point out how incomplete evaluation of circumstances and/or the creation of insufficiently adequate institutions, along with other factors, ultimately resulted in tragic missed opportunities.  A second reason lies in concerns about the constitutional amendment proposals themselves.  The amendments address a number of popular demands, such as some restrictions on the ability to institute the state of emergency and limits on presidential terms, which create a positive incentive for approval.  Yet, they still present problems, among them a reluctance to dive deeper and more substantially into the still-extensive and expansive presidential executive powers.  There are also concerns I have about the relatively closed process that brought those proposals forward.  A committee comprised of a few men was charged by the supervising military council to come up with a draft for amendments within 10 days.  The committee deliberated behind closed doors, and nothing emerged from those meetings except the draft that would, with some modifications, become the text of the referendum.  In the end, only 9 changes were proposed, and these changes addressed a few articles in the Constitution.  Reportedly only 3 weeks were given for public discussion of this text.  Finally, there are concerns I have about the process the referendum will institutionalize for rewriting the Constitution.  One of the provisions of the referendum stipulate that, after parliamentary elections, the incoming parliament will appoint a body to rewrite the Constitution.  I share others' concern that the resultant body may not be as inclusive in its representational makeup, and that some groups may have an edge over others in drafting a new foundational document for the country's politics and government.   

Yet, I am very cautiously optimistic about what comes next.  We all have the seen the reawakening of socio-political consciousness in Tahrir and throughout post-Revolution Egypt.  Which is a good sign, but this is not enough as Egypt moves forward.  Turning momentum into concrete efforts and results will take, at the very least, time, openness of space, wise vigilance, and continued civic engagement.  I do believe and notice that this has begun to come out very early on, and that will be of a measure of reassurance.  Furthermore there is the realization that, since approval of the landmark referendum is the majority position, it must be respected and Egyptians must move forward from this point on.  To challenge it may not be a wise move, and may be more likely counterproductive, allowing for instability and institutional uncertainty by fomenting unnecessary divisions and frictions.  While abstaining from post-referendum organizing might risk missing upcoming opportunities in further shaping dynamics of reform, of rebuilding the government's and the state's institutions (and enhancing socio-economic institutions too), and of participating proactively in the creation of a new constitutional framework.  

The hope and (guarded) anticipation are that Saturday's approval was based on informed decision as well as on careful and thorough evaluation.  Hopefully, such approval is reinforced by continued vigorous debate and discussion in an open, respectful, and inclusive atmosphere, which is then translated into careful, concrete, and timely actionable policy.  I also hope that, above all, such an atmosphere also results in strong, meaningful institutions which balance security and individual rights through separation of powers, through checks-and-balances, and through the expansion and maintenance of a vibrant civil society.  The beaming of civility, eagerness and earnestness towards a better a future, and a calmness (excepting a reported rare incident of violence towards  Mohamed El Baradei) displayed during the hours of waiting in long lines and voting is a positive sign and potentially shining indicator in this pivotal moment.  Previously voting was marred by irregularities and intimidations, and results were virtually guaranteed well in advance.  Though much remains to be done in the period(s) ahead, the referendum is---at least initially for now---a major step towards a break from a past so familiar to many Egyptians.

The new bumpy and curvy road for Egypt

Here's a thought or a few.  A peaceful, substantive, deliberating, yet non-restrictive and transparent transition to democracy should be the focal point in/for Egypt from this past Friday forward.  The nation of 80 plus million people now faces a formidable to-do list on the domestic front.


Meticulous and wise constitutional rewriting with enshrining of individual rights and responsibilities to include: championing the rule of law, as well as the separation of powers and checks and balances to especially guarantee judiciary independence as a co-equal branch with the executive and the legislative.  Ending the status of emergency and placing restrictions over its future use.  Starting to rework the government bureaucracies into a beaming bastion of public service.  Eliminating government influence on professional syndicates and student unions, while scrapping out or at least drastically revising the gripping laws on non-governmental and charitable organizations.  Commencing the reform and retraining of police and other security agencies of the state to conduct themselves professionally and to uphold individual liberties and rights (--among them the right to live in dignity without fear of extortion, harassment, or other abuses of power).  Release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience.  The abolition of military tribunals used in the past against civilians.  Creation of an independent electoral commission (or one supervised/staffed by judges) with verifiable assurances of non-interference from authorities, empowered to ensure free, fair, open, and transparent elections.  All of this list means ultimately for concrete and timely progressive steps be taken to create a system that facilitates and reinforces public accountability and equal opportunity for representation in civilian governance throughout all levels and branches.  Part and parcel of this undertaking is a solid ongoing commitment by authorities (and vigilance by the public) towards an open and flourishing, vibrant climate of public debate and discussion that is actionable and productive.


The dynamics inside the country is bound to be busy with other rejuvenation in the political sphere.  Perhaps most crucial is the creation of a non-military transitional body as soon as possible to guide the county towards reform.  An independent civilian caretaker government, divorced from the Mubarak regime, can be installed.  One that is comprised of respected, credible, meticulous, diligent, and wise persons who regularly and openly consult with the people.


Perhaps as good omen of things to come, the Egyptian military's professionalism and restraint was noted in its conduct towards the protesters during the Revolution.  With few reported exceptions, this conduct was exemplary and it contrasted deeply with that of armies in many other developing and newly-industrializing countries in times of crises and uncertainties.


However, a military cannot run the administrative affairs of a country for long.  And---as the cases of, say, Turkey (from the 1920s to the 1990s), post-colonial Algeria, Nigeria (post-colonial to Obesanjo), and post-colonial Sudan, among others---it cannot be the ultimate 'guardian' of democracy or revolution.  Nor can it be the ultimate 'arbiter' of the people's will.  It's primary function is border security, national defense, and helping with logistics and security during the most pressing emergencies, because it is equipped and trained to do so efficiently.  It is generally not as good at the normal daily functions of the state like managing day-to-day traffic, police affairs, managing/monitoring of the economy, and creating policy.  For now, Mubarak's newly-installed cabinet still runs the country but with the highly notable addition that it directly reports to the military.  And this is an arrangement that more or less could last as little as six months with little clear timetables or specifics.  In the overall balance of the current circumstances, a spectrum of speculation has arisen, from dooming worry to cautious optimism to wild optimism/euphoria despite coming odds, among observers, reporters, and protesters (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9).  [Earlier, I had blogged a bit about possible roles for the Egyptian military here.]  


More immediate steps taken commensurate with facilitating democratic politics involves the creation of adequate time and space for the rebuilding and strengthening of political parties as well as for the construction of new ones.  Parties need ample time and space to branch out and get better acquainted with the Egyptian population and to build viable political platforms and programs, but they need to begin now.  In the Sadat policy of infitah (or "opening," "liberalization"), parties were very limited in number by law (about 3 in total) and they were almost micromanaged by the regime.  During the Mubarak presidency---in some ways a continuation of Sadat's ideologically and tactically---there was a visible expansion in the number of parties operating on the political stage.  However, these new additions were approved by the Egyptian Government under very strict conditions and laws, and so the new few that were 'legally' allowed to operate were very weak, functionally incoherent, and with relatively very small numbers of members and supporters.  Similar tweaking and manipulation was done "legally" (i.e. for example, in tightly-closed ways of creating laws favorable to the regime) and extra-legally (i.e. for example, in ways that allowed selective targeting in application/dis-application of laws in combination with state-sponsored violence, intimidation, and fraud).  Thus allowing Mubarak regime domination over space in policy-making or policy discussion, such as elections to student unions, parliament, and even the presidency.  So, it is essential that this time around political institutions like parties and systems like electoral channels are allowed to develop in an atmosphere of openness where the caretaker transitional authority is politically neutral and transparent.  [The Egyptian military reportedly urging the former youth protesters to begin to form parties is encouraging, but it remains to be seen what the military's response will be in developments to come.]      


Judging from Egypt's past experiences with regime-managed electoral and other procedures, many on this (non-exhaustive) to-do list would will need thorough attention and serious resolve, as well as reasonable speed, before parliamentary or presidential elections can take place.  

Meanwhile, action in the political and policy-making realms needs to be coupled with steps to assist the positive Revolution-generated momentum in affecting long-lasting economic and social rebuilding and strengthening.  The enhancement of hospitals which have at times lacked even basic necessary medical supplies, and the reform of overburdened educational institutions are examples of crucial problem areas that need to be tackled.  A lack of access to basic housing amenities such as plumbing in the shantytowns, a near-crisis problem in the lack of access in affordable housing more generally, and construction code violations which continue to place people in harm's way are others.  


[And, in another sign pointing to years-long under-the-surface deterioration, labor strikes have already erupted across multiple industries from the stock exchange, textile and steel firms, media organisations, the postal service to railways, the Culture Ministry, and the Health Ministry.  These occur barely at the end of this past weekend's celebrations, over an array of demands and issues: living and working conditions, better pay, medical care, stable contracts, and the dismissal of superiors viewed as corrupt and unfairly enriched (1, 2, 3, 4).  This new wave of protests prompted the Supreme Military Council in its Fifth Communique to call for an end to these protests.]  


Added to these problems is an overarching one of an economic and business climate that was criticized as unfair nepotism and clientelism---and one with many red-tape hurdles and long considered the personal playground of a privileged few connected to, or close to, the intricacies of the Mubarak regime.  Enacting and enforcing strong anti-corruption, anti-monopoly, intellectual property, and business transparency rules are essential to allow Egypt to profit fully from its human capital and to nurture, expand, and retain enormous Egyptian talent and ingenuity.


The grassroots and re-organizing potential rooted in the desire to realize a better Egypt has already surfaced in the tent city in Tahrir Square, even before the announcement of President Mubarak's resignation.  Scores of self-motivated clean-up volunteers that have emerged in Tahrir after Friday's celebrations continue to show hope of revolutionary country-altering potential.  Tweets and Facebook statuses abound with proclamations of social responsibility as well as with pride and euphoria.  So do YouTube video posts of interviews and activity of people on the streets.  The atmosphere is painted with a civic consciousness the level of which I have never witnessed before in my all years of summer visits to, or in my time spent studying and living in, Egypt.  But, such potential cannot be left to walk the path on its own.  An equally determined and conscientious official effort needs to support and provide platforms for this potential to extend itself.  Some of the Supreme Military Council's announcements and actions (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) in the wake of Mubarak's resignation are a step in the right direction to install and renew confidence of its intentions in the public.  So too does Egypt's business community elite need to step up here, as bigger and bolder calls have been made for their participation.  One high profile call was made for a 100 billion Egyptian Pound development fund for rebuilding the country.  Smaller projects can work alongside separately, or supplement, these calls.   

These are admittedly enormous undertakings, to be handled calmly and methodically but with a sense of urgency and of making visible progress.  These are what part of the processes that political scientists and development specialists have referred to as nation-building and state building.  Monitoring this reconstruction and guaranteeing its success is just as important as keeping tabs on the evolution of Egypt's foreign policy, foremost among them in observers' eyes being Egypt-Israel relations.  Yet, in the immediate present and near future, this reconstruction may take priority over the concern regarding the continuity of Egypt-Israel relations.  It has long been argued and shown that democratic governments, ruling over well-informed populations and an inclusive political culture, are hesitant toward war/conflict, and that they rarely behave aggressively toward other nations.  

Israeli officials and voices in Israeli media have made a lot of noise during the protests about a post-Mubarak era, expressing fear of radicalism waiting to be unleashed.  At the same time, the characterization seemingly anointed Mubarak's regime as the only Egyptian pillar of stability in Egypt's relations with Israel (and by extension, as the only Egyptian pillar of stability in the region more broadly).  After all, as Sadat's vice president with intimate ties to the Egyptian military going back to the days spent as an air force commander, Mubarak was said to be part of the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel Treaty.  His regime's easing of Egypt into expanding economic ties with Israel would serve to the latter as another assurance of the former's attention to keep the bi-lateral peace solid.


But the continuation of Mubarak's regime was more likely to perpetuate a false shell of stability.  This shell would be little more than one propped up by autocratic repression and denial of human rights, slowly cracking and eventually shattering.  In this context, Israel's on-record support of Mubarak could give the impression that it is more important to implement a relatively narrow set of objectives or interests at about any costs---call them "externalities," or "collateral damage," or "non-priorities"---his regime may bring.  It could create the impression that assisting a crafty yet unyielding Egyptian strongman system is more important than other, more-domestically rooted aspirations (for democracy, dignity, and wide-based economic well-being).


Perhaps then Egyptians will conclude that the prevailing Israeli concern was not so much over keeping intact the bi-lateral peace than maintaining, a-la-Mubarak, that Egypt completely sees eye-to-eye with Israel strategically and tactically in enforcing that peace.  A more open, vibrant, and democratic Egypt may try to renegotiate the terms of peace with Israel, which will undoubtedly add dynamics and dimensions to ponder over.  But in the whole balance of things in the region, that may not necessarily be of a negative consequence for Israel or for the broader region.  For that may, with new energy, breath life again into a tangible prospect for a lasting and just Israeli-Palestinian peace.  It may give birth to a real indispensable chance to help redress (rather than perpetuate) the setbacks of the Oslo Process.  To help the region start on a clean page, after decades of suffering partly brought about imbalances in influence, mixed in with animosity and nearly two decades of seemingly over-inflated hope.


At any rate, Egyptians will face a bumpy road ahead as they negotiate around the curves and turns, through the frictions, and above the potholes towards rebuilding and improvement.  The military will certainly play a crucial role in shepherding the country as it travels on this road helping to ensure security, thereby helping to stabilize the political and economic environments.  But as it does, it will need first and foremost to ultimately make good on its commitment to cede political power to civilian rule.  Heeding the lessons of human history and of Egypt's post-colonial history, that will require the military to partner with the Egyptian people as equals during the transition (and then step down from the political and administrative stages).  The international community, from international forums like the U.N. to individual nation-states like the U.S. to groups like the European Union, could lend valuable material, moral, and logistical support to this transition phase/process.  If it chooses to get involved, the international community will also need to partner with the Egyptian people, in ways which place a desire (to see a democratic Egypt lively with self-determination and economic progress) above national or other interests that may conflict with such desire.  


More closer to home, Israel---Egypt's principal neighbor and peace partner in the Mideast region---could learn to deal more with its nervousness in a manner that is more constructive than the conduct it has shown in the run-up to Mubarak's resignation.  Israel knows very well that it is America's principal ally in the region.  An alarmist tone or an aggressive conduct can prompt heavy negative pressure, thereby doing more to jeopardize Egypt's transition than to provide meaningful criticism.  Years of conflict with Israel, followed by a solidly-upheld peace and close cooperation (in the midst of the environment and dynamics of  post-1979 Middle East) are imprinted on the collective memory and awareness of Egyptians.  None of this will do much to reassure Egyptians if Israel sounds out signals that appear less-than-productive to them.  


Time, effort, perseverance, determination, coolness, inclusiveness, openness, care and meticulousness, and wisdom (and/or lack thereof) will ultimately shape the domestic Egyptian dynamics ahead ...                        

PRESIDENT MUBARAK RESIGNS

Friday, February 11, 2011:

At about 6:06 pm Cairo time, an official statement by Vice President Omar Suleiman is made saying that President Mubarak resigns. Here is the translation, provided by the BBC news service:



"In the name of God the merciful, the compassionate, citizens, during these very difficult circumstances Egypt is going through, President Hosni Mubarak has decided to step down from the office of president of the republic and has charged the high council of the armed forces to administer the affairs of the country. May God help everybody."

Crowds erupted with jubilant excitement throughout the country.  Though a very uncertain future awaits Egyptians, with enormous optimism they feel at this moment a very precious freedom after 18 difficult and trying days of demonstrations.  

Three possible scenarios as Egypt goes forward: brief initial thoughts and predictions

February, 11: Massive demonstrations reverberating throughout Egypt, again.  Millions of Egyptians angered by Mubarak's and Suleiman's speeches last night, which acknowledged the death of martyrs among protesters but which also did not satisfy their main demands.  The speeches also highlighted government achievements with respect to points of reform, but the mood among protesters throughout the country show that there is a big gulf between Mubarak and his regime and the protesting masses that can not be mended.  They were understood as a blunt slap in the face upon them.  Military has issued a statement that amounted: to a commitment to protecting the current political transition/reform framework as announced by Mubarak and Suleiman; and lifting the emergency status after protests come to an end, among other pronouncements.  This statement was taken as supporting the regime, and it was also rejected by the masses.  For the first time, protesters spread their demonstrations to the state television building and the presidential palaces in Cairo and Alexandria.  The military warned that these areas were red lines for the protesters to cross.  


In light of the above highlights, let's lay out briefly three scenarios that could happen over the next few days.  Briefly, these are some of my initial thoughts and predictions: 

(1). Mubarak resigns or leaves the country, followed by Suleiman. The rest of regime is dismantled. Protesters say this is possible, despite any current constitutional provisions, because sovereignty rests with the people who are steering a revolution and who have seen the regime--in all its components--as illegitimate.  An independent civilian caretaker government, without any ties to the old regime, is installed in reasonable time.  This government will be set up to preside over a transitional phase, constitutional rewriting or at least major amending, and preparation of eventual elections.  The transitional government will need the army to oversee general security. (The Interior Ministry has been plagued with years of distrust and hatred toward it because of the use by the regime of the state of emergency, the National Security apparatus, and Central Security 'anti-riot' forces.  Interior Ministry is also hated because of association with brutality and harassment at regular police stations.)  Parliament may be dissolved, as it has been seen as part of the decades-entrenched regime: indeed it is one of a number of assets that has provided the political vehicle for Mubarak to ascend to the Presidency.    

But several challenges the new government will encounter.  For example, will the military be an "equal" partner along with the transitional government, or be under civilian control?  Or will the military seek to influence policy and politics in the immediate post-Mubarak transitional phase?  Second, another question over how to also sort out and rework the bewildering enigmas and the endless circle of a constitution---designed in the Mubarak era as a tool of entrenchment---in speedy and progressing way?  Should this be a reworking from scratch, or a major amending?  A third question: how also to take care of the economy during this period simultaneously, as a new body installed?  A fourth question, perhaps the most important: how can opposition elements---who have long been weakened and fragmented, in part because of a system of laws created by regime, and who have been involved in squabbles of differences---create or be part of a transitional government?


Despite all the uncertainties, this is perhaps the most favorable of all scenarios for the people because of a strong desire for a breath of fresh air signified by a complete break with the Mubarak regime.  They are keen on preserving their new-found freedom. They are also likely to view such a scenario as a genuine vehicle towards meaningful democratization, with the wide backing of the masses.     

(2).  A transfer of power to Suleiman means that Mubarak will "step aside",  not "step down".  The rest of regime still remains intact.  So an NDP government could still possibly have a hand in shaping the transitional phase.  It is less favorable to the masses than prospect 1, but Mubarak will be out of the scene and away from the direct limelight.  This may ensure a smooth transition, but that is very uncertain.  Suleiman is not trusted by the masses because of at least two reasons: (a). as a Mubarak appointee to the vice presidency; (b) as part of Mubarak's regime in his capacity as an army general, involvement in intelligence, and then as head of Egyptian intelligence before assuming the VP position.  Both reasons mean that Suleiman has had more than enough time to become very familiar with the inner trappings of the regime, and that he is a pivotal player within it.  It is possible Suleiman may hand over power to a transitional governing body at some point.  But, too much damage has already happened over the past three weeks in part because of Suleiman's handling of Egyptian crisis.  His endorsing and continuing of the distortions of the state media portrayal over the protests, as well as his close association with the regime, will only serve to solidify and intensify public distrust towards him.     

(3).  Military coup.  In this scenario, the regime will be completely dismantled, but the military assumes direct full control of government and politics.  Martial rule may be declared, with a strictly enforced curfew.  A new system of civilian-clothed decision-making may eventually be created, but influence in policy-making and politics could be retained by the military.  Or an openly military-based government could rule for some period, even after the transitional phase.  In some ways, this may seem like July 1952 all over again for the older generations among the protesters (allowing for the main fault of a concentration of power in uniform).  At any rate, for a popular revolution seeking to establish a life for its country on new footing, a military coup would undoubtedly be among the worst scenarios to fall into.      

In any of the three cases/options, the position and role of the military will be crucial. On the one hand, the military is very respected among the population, and it hasn't confronted the public before.  It has shown remarkable restraint throughout the protests, a behavior which has helped it to build distance from the regime as the crisis escalated.  A great deal of fraternization has been exchanged on the streets.  On the other hand, the military faces a new, unprecedented situation of a widespread popular pressure that has rocked the regime of which it (the military) has been an integral and loyal part.  All four of the post-colonial presidents have come from the military (and many other powerful decision-makers or shakers have come from a military command background at some point or another).  The new dynamic power of what has been called the "Egyptian Revolution" will likely put both the military and the civilian population in a test in civil-military relations.  Egypt of 2011 is already proving to be a very different Egypt for everyone there.             

Some major domestic highlights for Feb 5, and what they might mean

• Protests continued for a twelfth day. A Christian Mass is announced for Tahrir on Sunday. Protests also planned for next week. Protesters in Tahrir Square and elsewhere throughout Egypt appeared to intensify their calls and resolve for the president's resignation, which in their opinion would open the way for complete and meaningful change. Some government employees broke ranks to join the protesters.

• State television announces resignation of ruling NDP party leadership, including president's son. But many people still are not placated. 

• Reportedly two minor opposition parties broke ranks with the opposition and began discussions with the government. A third group, the Muslim Brotherhood, also reportedly began to seek talks with VP Suleiman, after initially setting down the president's resignation as a precondition for its involvement. The rest of the opposition seems to stand behind the protest movement's demand that President Mubarak resign as a precondition for talks and a transitional phase. VP Suleiman has said the government is inviting opposition groups for an immediate dialog on constitutional reform. Meanwhile, a self-appointed Committee of Wise Men surfaced to talk with VP Suleiman to explore solutions to the standoff and impasse. But this group seems unconnected to the protest movement as there appears to have been no communication between them and the protesters. 

• The army began to move tanks near Tahrir and apparently sought to take down the barricades set up by protesters. Protesters moved in as human shields. Later they appeared to take moves to close off one end of the square. There are still pronunciations of fraternity between army units and demonstrators throughout Egypt, and local observers have dismissed any potential for a showdown between the people and the armed forces.     

• A military commander for the district comprising Tahrir urges the protests to end demonstrations, appealing to nationalist sentiments and saying that foreign intervention was behind the protest movement. Chants of "the Army and the People are one" and "Mubarak must go" erupted, prompting the commander to leave the square.   

• There are concerns that heavy-handedness will resume, with reported redeployments of plain-clothed police to the streets to round up protesters. There are also concerns on the whereabouts of Egyptian human rights activists 

• Some normality has been restored to Egypt, with the resumption of some businesses. Government announced banks would operate for a few hours on Sunday.   

• VP Suleiman's motorcade was caught between gunfire, but Government denies it was an assassination attempt and claims it was a stray bullet. Suleiman was left unscathed. 

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Based on these new developments for Saturday, Feb 5, it is very clear that the standoff/impasse has not yet lost its steam or energy. 

The government is struggling to hold on in its confrontation with the protest masses. It may still want to play a major role in molding what dynamics will emerge next. Various overtures were announced, all being not insignificant. Simultaneously attempts are being made to paint the embattled government and its plight in nationalistic rhetoric. Dynamics of the day also point to the emergence of what may be a strategy to create or exploit disunity among opposition elements. The regime possibly signals through these actions that it is not quite ready to throw the towel.  

A desire is among the Egyptian population for a sense of normality. Various segments, however, differ about approach. Concerned about chaos, some segments are conciliatory towards Mubarak finishing out the remainder of his term. Yet the protesters are still backed by many other segments of the population. Protesters remain determined to engage in the tug-of-war with the regime until their main demand of resignation is met. They also repeated declarations on a new awakening of Egypt that has brought the nation together in a new alert consciousness which remains distrustful towards the regime.      

The top cadres of the Army perhaps are beginning to lose patience with the standoff/impasse, but still seem to be on thin tightrope while they seek to hold together their apparent coolness and firmness. The army still has protected protesters thus far. But some actions on Saturday indicate a testy relationship between the two that could dramatically change the trajectory and scope of developments in the near future.    

All of this makes for a situation that is still very highly volatile, and one that is uncertain in which direction the pendulum will ultimately swing. The atmosphere may take a turn for the worse if a miscalculation is made or an unmeasured response/ initiative is taken.

A week in, Egypt's mass revolt has undoubtedly appeared to gain critical mass

Today: Feb 1, 2011. 

Nearly 2 million protesters in Tahrir Square (center Cairo) and its immediate environs; hundreds of 1000s reported in Alexandria; about 500 thousand reported in El Mansoura; about 100 thousand reported in Damanhour; thousands reported in Port Said; massive protests also reported in El Mahalla.  This has come one week into protests across the country since the 25th of January "Day of Anger", implemented by tens of thousands of youth (and twenty-somethings and thirty-somethings) having no visible formal leader or representative on their behalf.  Despite major roads between Alexandria and Cairo--the two most populous cities in the country--being reported blocked and in spite of the shutdown of the country's railway system and domestic flights, masses across the country have shown determination to continue protesting.  


The anti-regime movement has continued to draw and absorb momentum, power, and support from Egyptians.  Movie celebrities and Nobel-prize recipients, artists and journalists, opposition elements and the older common man on the street have joined.  These dynamics come with a life and existence previously unknown, to the surprise or joy of many and apparently beyond a slow regime's recognition or comprehension.  Much like throughout the past week, the protests continue to show no sign of sectarian or other factionalized divides.  Masses of people (mostly young, as mentioned above) are united to demand a complete change of government and of direction for the country, as well as an end to associated crippling corruption, heavy-handed brutality, and lack of freedoms and opportunities---symbolized to them most prominently by President Mubarak's departure from the political stage.  These demands have been summed up in the widely displayed Arabic word irhal, meaning "leave."        


In light of events and public official statements through the past week, especially today, there is very little indication or anticipation in this tense yet hope-glimmered environment that the contending sides will be backing down easily.  There are certainly profound outward displays of stubbornness by the regime and the protesters.  Yet all indications are towards approaching tipping point.  Or, that possibly a tipping point has already been tip-toed on, waiting for one little push of inertia.  There are plans for a fresh round of demonstrations to be held on Friday, international news reports say.    

Continuously shifting displays of drama have defined the mood and structure of this past week.  Protesters defied curfews to camp out in areas or to continue running bakeries.  And despite an engineered internet blackout, combined with partial media and telephone clamp-down, they returned to demonstrating.  A vice-president has been appointed (for the first time in 3 decades) amid cabinet reshuffling.  But the young masses who took to the streets are still not appeased or placated, and they are distrustful towards such moves by the regime.  President Mubarak has also announced he will not seek a new term, while saying that he stay on until the upcoming elections and guide the country toward constitutional reform and transitional government.  In the same speech, he also defended his service to the country.  Still no budge from these masses who---seeing this as a ploy to hold onto power as long as possible, and as a defiance to the public---insisted on his stepping down.  


Earlier, anti-riot forces, having initially cracked down brutally on seemingly largely peaceful demonstrators in the first few days, had then mysteriously and inexplicably receded.  They were replaced by army units that have reportedly behaved very differently (positively) on the streets.  Police is still conspicuously absent on many streets, forcing people to form neighborhood and public property watch committees (in cooperation with troops) to maintain order, prevent looting, and to apprehend/ return escaped prisoners to custody.  There are also reports of a general atmosphere of camaraderie among protesters and the masses in coordinating demonstration activity and distributing foodstuffs and water. 

Now, in conjunction with opposition elements, constitutional scholars, thinkers, members of the business community, among others, the youth brunt behind the protests need to settle down and think calmly and clearly on how to proceed strategically.  They need to start planning on how to move forward from this point to participate in the next (transitional) phase.  For them to succeed, they need to embark on these directions without giving up ground or pressure gained in the past few days.  Specifically, they need to begin engaging in the discussions with intelligence chief Mr. Omar Suleiman and a former minister of aviation Mr. Ahmed Shafik (appointed as Vice-President and Prime Minister, respectively), and extend their activities beyond protesting and displaying mass anger.  Yet, with so much at stake, it is crucial to highlight that this inexperienced movement cannot be expected to tread alone with much success into the sophistication and intricacies of such interaction with the state.  This is especially the case if other developments, like an escalation in/towards violence, occur.  To sustain the peaceful momentum it has generated and translate such momentum effectively  into realizing its goals, the young anti-regime protesters may ultimately need the logistical, material, and moral support and guidance of the established opposition.  These protesters will also need to continue to hold steadfast to one another and work in unison.         


In supporting and encouraging the youth, all Egyptian opposition elements must not return to clinging to their highly particularized interests/positions and squabbling and discord.  This older anti-regime segment can work to speak on behalf of the protesting youth.  But they must realize that if their efforts are to succeed, they must ultimately partner with youth rather than to take any action or make any proposal that could signal or be interpreted as a domination over the latter's voices.  For example, towards this end, the opposition can work to mentor the youth movement protesters and help them to productively channel the latter's energies (with resources and moral support) towards making effective arguments and proposals for change as these younger compatriots stand their ground.


In other words, at the very least there needs to be constant communication and coordination within and between these two groups.


On many levels, the coming days and weeks will prove ultimately as a report card to the unprecedented protests that have defined this youth-generated movement.  Indeed, much uncertainty and ill-comfort about what might happen next still hang in the air.  But no one can doubt that much has been achieved already, providing a foundation for a new constructive political culture and consciousness in the country.  No one can deny that there has been a loud and notable break with long-established physical, cultural, and psychological barriers of apathy, fear, intimidation, and debilitating hopelessness.  Similarly, momentum and ongoing drama are prompting talk of an Egyptian rebirth and of pride.  Now it is the moment of the youth and of the twenty-somethings and thirty-somethings, and it is critical that they work to translate this moment into a deep legacy to continue inspiring the rest of the country.  It is equally critical that opposition elements, thinkers, writers and journalists, constitutional scholars, and other established opinion-makers and movers and shakers with an interest to see meaningful change continue to lend and even increase support for their younger compatriots.  

Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution": Regional (and Broader) Implications?

Within the past month, Tunisia has witnessed a large popular uprising culminating in and galvanized by familiarly recognizable protests over poor economic prospects/conditions and the heavy-handed regime-sanctioned crackdowns on the street.  Called the "Jasmine Revolution" the nearly-month-long uprising is particularly significant in the high speed, and especially in the civilian source of its projection [although this assumption that the final blow was dealt by popular pressure has now been disputed], with which intense drama has unfolded.  At any rate, what we have witnessed is nothing short of remarkable.  

The MENA (Middle East and North Africa region) has witnessed several revolts, protests, coups, insurrections, and wars challenging regimes and status-quo environments even in the post-colonial era.  Yet such past challenges, despite the varying circumstances in which they were born, have almost uniformly yielded little.  The most significantly emerging fruit here has, as many commentators will have undoubtedly pointed out, often been merely changes of names.  That, at most, touted changes have been often suspected of carrying the stitching marks of elaborate cosmetic surgeries: that wounds---old and new---have been repackaged hastily without regard to considerations over fully healing.  

In contrast to this, the recent and continuing Tunisian dynamics brings to focus serious questions regarding the sustainability of political systems and economic systems in uncertain times.  At a deeper more specific level, they once again put the spotlight on the wisdom and viability of exercising governmental authority in a repressive and over-aggressive manner (combined with what has been seen as periodic crumbs and general widespread official apathy), in the region.  Leaders, pundits, and officials are quick to either proclaim or dismiss the possibility of the "Tunisian Scenario" on the airwaves, in blogs, and on social media sites.  In trying to get a hold over understanding the seemingly dizzying weeks, I present in no particular sequence a list of news articles and op-eds that put Tunisia's events in the broader regional contexts (not a completely exhaustive list, but one that can hopefully be sufficiently representative).  Of course, much more information and analysis will be available in the days and weeks to come ...    

[Note: a temporary caretaker cabinet has been set up to organize elections, stabilize the country, and to implement reforms and head inquiry commissions over corruption and Ben Ali's regime's response to the protests.  But the retention of Ben Ali officials for the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Interior Minister (responsible for internal security) posts in the new 'unity government' has left many Tunisians skeptical and angry.  A fresh round of protests has been reported, along with the resignation of 3 independent members of the cabinet, barely a day after the new cabinet announcement.]  

  1. Could other Arab countries follow Tunisia's example? Roger Hardy, BBC. 

  2. No sign Egypt will take the Tunisian road. John Leyne, BBC; another view/angle. 

  3. Tunisia unrest a wake-up call for the region. Ian Black, The Guardian. 

  4. Tunisia's protests spark suicides in Algeria and fears throughout the Arab world. Ian Black, The  
  Guardian; The Arab world's horrific new trend: self-immolation. Blake Hounshell. Foreign Policy 
  Passport. (blog); new additional reported attempts here. 

  5. The 'bin Laden' of marginalisation: the real terror eating at the Arab world is the socio-economic 
  marginalisation. Larbi Sadiki, Al Jazeera English. 

  6. Tunisia protests serve warning to autocratic Middle Eastern regimes. Kristen Chick. The Christian
  Science Monitor. 


  7. To the tyrants of the Arab world ... Lamis Andoni, Al Jazeera English.  

  8. Arab regimes on edge. Marc Lynch. Foreign Policy. blog. 


  9. Two views/angles of U.S. comprehension of, and response to, Tunisia (1,2)

  10. People power succeed without Western backing. Emad Mekay, Inter Press Service (Johannesburg); 
  another view/angle.

  11. Unrest spreads to Algeria. Emad Mekay, Inter Press Service (Johannesburg).

  12. Arab bloggers cheer on Tunisia's Revolution. Robert Mackey. THE LEDE. The New York Times. 
  (blog)

  13. Kenya should draw lessons from the goings-on in Tunisia. Daily Nation. (Nairobi). [Not a part of 
  the MENA obviously, but an article like this reveals that people are feeling the reverberations far from 
  Tunisia and are reflecting on them.] 

President Obama, and an Old Familiar Tug of War

When reading a friend's simple Facebook status, I was inspired to ponder and write this long blog article.  

In addition to a remarkable eloquence that draws you in with a sense of compelling non-elitism, President Obama's ability to combine idealistic values with a pragmatic emphasis is perhaps unmatched in the current political class.  This second characteristic is significant, not least because frustrating tensions between idealism and pragmatism are nothing new.  And such tensions have oft-frequently weighed down on past presidents, advocates/activists, and many others among both those seeking change and those seeking to perpetuate the status quo.  

In the 1950's, Eisenhower as president sounded the horn on the increasing convergence of national security and economic interests in what he termed the "Military/Industrial Complex."  Yet Eisenhower, in his experience as a general in WWII and later on as the second Cold War-based U.S. Commander-in-Chief, 

must have realized the significance and implications that U.S.-Soviet competition for world influence would present to him, his Soviet counterparts, and each other's respective allies.  From the very beginning of these newly-erupting tensions, these implications included armed conflict, and just as important: espionage, counter-intelligence, and covert ops.  The CIA's and British Intelligence's involvement in the overthrow of an unfavored yet democratically-elected Mossadegh was just as significant in Iran and the Middle East as the place the Korean War held for the Korean Peninsula and Far East Asia during the same time period.  It can be argued that both of these events have legacies that have shaped the contours and substance of their immediate targets lasting well into the present day.  These two cases have similar objectives in common.  Besides the stated fear of culturally losing Iran to the Eastern Bloc, there was also the very real anger at Mossadegh Government's move to nationalize the British-dominated Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in a proclaimed act of economic and political self-determination.  Meanwhile, the Korean War was the first test venue of flying jets and using them in aerial combats.  And they were both, to varying degrees, proxy engagements between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  Yet, these two cases have end up very differently: South Korea (the ally to be protected from an invading North) has generally prospered, with the exception of North Korea; while Iran has partly found, and partly contributed to, itself moving along a course where it remains internationally shunned.  Neither the U.S. nor its principal Cold War allies are solely responsible for these outcomes; they have however played pivotal roles.  Nor have the two cases been only the cases emerging from the pages of Cold War, but they are among the first to perhaps play out contradictions in a difficult and testing modern time period.       

Jimmy Carter's presidency was seen as a breath of fresh air in the wake of Nixon's Watergate disaster and amid revelations of Nixon's paranoia-induced massive wiretapping and surveillance.  [President Gerald Ford's efforts towards healing the nation and his public demeanor and stature as Washington outsider of sorts was certainly admirable to the public mood of the time, but that wasn't enough to salvage his position especially given Ford's decision to pardon his ex-President.]  Furthermore, Carter's public electoral campaign and presidential emphasis on humanitarian values was so pronounced that his term has been noted as the "human rights presidency."  Above all, the cornerstone of the shine of his presidency lay in success at helping to broker the first-ever peace process for the Middle East (Camp David Accords/Egypt-Israel Treaty). Despite these high points, Carter's single term ended with disaster abroad (i.e. the Iranian Hostage Crisis) and continuing debilitating inflation at home [the argued culprit here was especially the charge that he hadn't moved fast enough to deregulate the economy].  Former President Carter has been for expanding humanitarian work since his departure from national political office; and, though not without controversy (some of it needlessly hyped), he has seemingly managed to continue to set the bar high among members of subsequent political classes after him running into the present.      

In the early 1990s President early Bill Clinton's and First Wife Hillary Clinton's efforts at health care--among other intiatives--re-energized the country with new found hope in social/economic issues in a way that is perhaps up until then unparalleled since Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal program.  Yet Clinton was bogged down and frustrated by many elements, most notably a hostile Republican-controlled Congress. [Remember Newt Gingrich and Jesse Helms?].  Further compounding his frustration lay in media seemingly more interested in his Oval Office intimacy than engaging him in his actual policy direction.  While Reagan was known as the Great Communicator and Bush I as the man who saved Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (and by extension, the rest of Arabian Peninsula & the Arab World) from Saddam, Clinton was perhaps known as a Great Negotiator or Great Bridger (or, according to some displeased Liberals, the Great Compromiser) of sorts.  He's the president who brought Don't Ask/Don't as a middle-road compromise between Liberals and Conservatives (even to the chagrin of a moderate Conservative in the military, future Sectary of State Colin Powell, who reportedly resigned from his then-Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff position in protest).  Clinton's also the president who---recognizing the opportunities of interconnectivity and growth brought about by the incoming new wave of Globalization to sweep the world, once the Soviet Union became fully relegated to the annals of history---championed the international trade agreement mechanisms (NAFTA), embraced the WTO (which had been transformed from GATT), and did much to deregulate the financial industry to the concern of culturally and politically liberal allies.  

Despite all of this apparent across-the-aisle outreach, he was still deeply challenged (especially domestically) by his Conservative detractors, and the well-known impeachment and media frenzy ensued.

I honestly don't know what to make of the much-disastrous eight years of the previous Bush II Administration in terms of analyzing the idealism-pragmatism tug of war.  Maybe I am hesitant to do so because perhaps my understandings of idealism and pragmatism, and especially of idealism, are so drastically dissimilar to many Neoconservative views.  Maybe it is also because I am confused by the stark gulf of contrasts between Neoconservative publicly uttered idealism and the realism of conditions (especially political, economic, and diplomatic) on the ground that the held idealism was supposed to smooth over.     

Even Obama, despite his impressive command of words and his profound intelligence and grasp of political/socio-economic environments---and in spite of repeated efforts to reach across the aisle---has been frustrated time and time again by lack of cooperation (to put it mildly and diplomatically) from not only across the aisle but also from some leading members of his own party.  Added to this is a new strange phenomenon he has been facing of anti-this and anti-that which has snagged many segments of American society---from Muslim/Arab Americans to Latino immigrants to health care expansion to the GLBT community---in a vicious dragnet and forced-out steam of hype, phobia, anger, hyperbole.  And of course, the continuing serious problems in stabilizing and rebuilding the mess that has been characterizing post-9/11 Afghanistan, the still-somewhat-uncertainty of Iraq, the draining stalemate (to put it mildly) over Israel/Palestine, as well as continuing civil rights concerns (such as FBI approaches with Muslim/Arab Americans) and delay of fulfilling some campaign promises (such as taking the last steps/phases of closing down Gitmo) are way too much on a single person's plate.  The resurgence of the Republican party (now reinvigorated by Tea Partiers) in last November's elections not only accentuates the importance of opportunities missed by Democrats, but also should highlight disturbing concerns and reservations about what turbulence may come---even among moderate and establishment Republicans who care to ponder.  Opportunities were missed due to many, perhaps intertwining, reasons: lack of sufficient resolve among some crucial segments of the Democratic leadership; continual discord directed by many Republicans; and unchallenged hype/distortion created by some of their quarters; sluggish improvements in inherited economic and other conditions which possibly denied longer-term perspectives over proposed initiatives, among others.              

What we see in all these examples is the great energy (but also great obstruction) in the idealism-pragmatism tug of war.  What we also see is the inevitability of that tug of war, whose dynamics can molded into a working platform or be deliberately exacerbated by short-term or foolish selfishness of action.  It is very hard (and politically suicidal, many in the Washington Beltway might conventionally add) to rise above the entrenched unwisdom of conventional systems of interactions and policy-making, not least because such dynamics and modes help to shape and solidify the rules of the game of setting the agenda, defining the issues, even creating the standards/criteria of analysis and evaluation---no matter who initiated unwisdom and lack of foresight.  Which makes the need to avoid---or at least, minimize---the pushes and and pulls between (considerations regarding the "right thing to do" and "what could be presented and accepted as workable") all the more pronounced.  Well-justified euphoria can be ripped apart by even the slightest doubt in the face of relatively-less-volatile circumstances, or by enormous sincere and heartfelt momentum that is generated only to not fully materialize in word and deed.  

In less than two years, President Obama has proven to be the "man of the hour" and the "man of the moment" for his electrifying energy, his passionate courage, his sober conviction.  But as hopeful as I have been swept to be, the euphoria could be temporary band-aid as much as it can be the signal of a new light to be lit.  Of course, things could've been much worse; yet there is as much as, if not more, potential still unrealized.  The complicated interactions, plights, drama, and dynamics of the problems, challenges, and the good luck and the misfortunes, etc are cannot be simplified to a specific game-winning shot in a sports video.  Neither do real-life "shots" boil down to a relatively straightforward game-plan and counter-plan.  Nor can the real-life "spectator crowd" simply settle for a few plays during game.  I understand that things take time, dedicated effort, patience and perseverance.  And wisdom at some point is bound to be acquired.  But they also take constant pressuring and being receptive to pressure, mixed with a delicate balancing act between compromising on a given stance and insistence on a stance.  All the while realizing that the wrong compromise can set one back years or undo a lot of what good has been done, just as much as the wrong insistence can block one for years from moving forward.  Big and bolder constructive steps need to be taken, and bigger and bolder constructive support needs to be given.       

An Awakening for America

In the wake of the shooting in Arizona just three days ago that critically wounded a Congresswoman and that slew a federal judge, I would have to agree with seasoned observers that something strange, alongside the frustrations of a sluggish economy, is happening in the United States.  A climate (or upsurge) of hate and deliberate provocation, mixed in with a genuine concern about the direction(s) the country is taking, is emerging and continuing to fester.  

However I will briefly add to the discussion on this development.  Last year, I wrote a bit about the anti-Obama mischaracterization, and a little bit more on growing peculiar anti-Muslim sentiments (1,2,3,4) in the U.S.  It is my understanding that these and other outbursts of frustration or opposition are travelling in different directions, targeting a diverse array of issues.  These venues have included acrimonious town-halls over healthcare reform, the debate over and the reaction to the repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell military policy, and the swelling of inflammatory and hyped nativist attitude and physical attacks directed towards American Muslim property and their persons.  But [especially with the surfacing and prominence of various right-wing pundits (such as on Fox News, blogging channels, and radio stations) and various fringes of right-wing groups like the Tea Party Movement---not to forget even some Republican candidates' election campaigns throughout last year---] these outbursts hardly indicate a random or chance congruence.  At the very least, they appear to be shared through broader networks weaving the anti-this and anti-that together.  

When violence and ugly rhetoric---from threats, incitements, and racist and inflammatory slurs to assaults and arsons---coincides with the surfacing of such frustration and opposition, it is a clue that something very serious is lurking around.  All the more when such rhetoric and activity are encouraged by, or when they find a receptive or uncritical ear in, segments of the political establishment and of the media/punditry.  I agree with those who call for sincere and calm soul-searching.  Many of us are facing difficulty and uncertainty regarding financial, job, and other stability.  Many of us are frustrated about the current state of affairs, where progress has seemed very sluggish.  These fears and concerns are understandable and worthy of empathy/sympathy.  But absolutely NONE of these constitute legitimate space for cheap, dangerous, and bigoted opportunistic rhetoric.  Absolutely NONE of these serve as justifications for condoning or acting upon it, either.  

On a similar note, imagery has always been a powerful tool for criticism, sarcasm, and for even having an innocent laugh.  But controversies throughout the last few years---from the bigoted and inflammatory ugliness displayed in the run up to the 2008 presidential election, to the ugliness manifested in the "Ground Zero Mosque" debate, to the continuing increase in physical and verbal anti-Muslim attacks and discrimination, to reported attacks or threats on people merely for attending rallies, to finally the recent episode in Arizona---potentially reveal the dark side to the potency in the imagery of pictures and words.  We must be more thoughtful in the construction and usage of the metaphors and images we call upon.  We need to exercise restraint in our words, attitudes, and demeanor.  We must work to constructively challenge action which fails to hold up to the standards of civility.  And we must demand of those in a position of influence to join the effort to do so (and, especially, to provide a positive example).  

Some advice that is very good for on, and off, the field

There are many places where we could physically gain insight, balance, perspective, wisdom, and patience (and modesty) that could foster positive forward-thinking---and encourage others to do so---if we take the opportunity. One such place is especially competitive sports. For good sportsmanship is not only an admirable behavior displayed on a pitch in a small moment of time: it can also be an ethic, a lifestyle, that transcends and informs (and even transforms) many activities and interactions. Here are some valuable tips I found.

In the Spirit of Mickey Mouse ... and the Newer Disney

Ever since Pinocchio and Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, Disney's old movies had generally three main components: (a) a central solemn plot that laid out a moral or two, (b) character growth that developed and reinforced the morals, (c) and a musical score created specifically for the movie and supported by an orchestra that provided a light-heartedness to balance (and deflect away a bit from) the heaviness of the movie's themes and characters' ordeals.  In the early 1990s, the movie animators started to experiment with CGI (computer-generated imagery)---especially in a few scenes in Aladdin (the carpet ride through the Cave of Wonders); Beauty and the Beast (the panorama of the ballroom dance scene); and The Lion King (the perilous chase through the Elephant Graveyard)---and so we had 3-D rendering in its infancy. 

With Toy Story, everything changed.  CGI had taken a bigger role---in a fact a dominant one---as 3-D rendering, shading, movement, coloring, and lighting swept across the movies' storyboards.  Even the basic movie formula mentioned above was not spared.  Now, it's not that I don't welcome advancement; certainly Toy Story is valuable for what it offered on the screen and for the further potential it (and subsequent animated movies) have promised.  Indeed, I count the Shrek series, Monster's, Inc. (a Disney/Pixar flick), and Kung-Fu Panda among my contemporary favorites.  But the changes these features brought along are so huge in proportion to their time spans, so revolutionary, that they are worth twirling with in mental gymnastics (I will briefly continue to elaborate on only a few observations).  And despite going through some rocky and tumultuous periods, there is no doubt that Walt Disney Studios still captures much of the lead in major motion picture animation, and that it will be very unlikely for this trailblazer to easily relinquish that highly-coveted hold.  

Long gone are the solemn plots, now replaced largely by comedic effect.  So too are orchestras, the emphasis on characters singing, and the creation of songs specifically for a given film---all of whom have bowed out to insertions of already-published professional albums.  As for character growth and development, few post-Toy Story movies I can think of (or I am aware of) display the depth (or something close to the depth) of the old classics.  One memorable contemporary movie for me is Cloudy with a Chance of Meatballs---not a Disney move to the best of my knowledge; it combined a solemn theme with character development and a dose of light-heartedness (absent, of course, musical scores).  If there is a way that Disney (and others) could combine (and continue to combine) the old and new formulas of animation, I would imagine it bearing spectacular fruit for all to enjoy and to be enriched with.   

As I read though the countless comments of many people posted on social media such as You Tube or Facebook pages, I am led to believe that there seems to be a consensus that a similar drastic change in substance and editorial prioritization has taken place in Disney TV programming.  I have noticed this myself, as I struggle to search for the Disney character cartoons of old (Mickey Mouse, Goofy, Donald Duck, and the like).  These trademark Disney creations have been replaced by some cartoons, but especially (and more significantly by) pre-teen-and-teen-oriented comedy shows, several of whom which bear little (if any) resemblance to the classic and conventional formulas of family sitcoms.  This is not necessarily a bad phenomenon, though---in trying to put it mildly and diplomatically---I am not deeply attached to much of the  current teen-and-pre-teen lineup.    

Perhaps the frustrations, alerts, and confusions about these new Disney directions will prove to be little more than merely the outgrowth of generational tensions in the response against, and in the reception for, changes.  And yet perhaps, as in other generational tensions, there is merit to the concerns held and voiced by the older groups.  However these dynamics ultimately play out, change is inevitable; what matters is what shape a transformation will take, how it is/will be critiqued, and what guidelines is/will be developed to differentiate between that which is worthy of critiquing and that which can be tossed aside.