Here's a thought or a few. A peaceful, substantive, deliberating, yet non-restrictive and transparent transition to democracy should be the focal point in/for Egypt from this past Friday forward. The nation of 80 plus million people now faces a formidable to-do list on the domestic front.
Meticulous and wise constitutional rewriting with enshrining of individual rights and responsibilities to include: championing the rule of law, as well as the separation of powers and checks and balances to especially guarantee judiciary independence as a co-equal branch with the executive and the legislative. Ending the status of emergency and placing restrictions over its future use. Starting to rework the government bureaucracies into a beaming bastion of public service. Eliminating government influence on professional syndicates and student unions, while scrapping out or at least drastically revising the gripping laws on non-governmental and charitable organizations. Commencing the reform and retraining of police and other security agencies of the state to conduct themselves professionally and to uphold individual liberties and rights (--among them the right to live in dignity without fear of extortion, harassment, or other abuses of power). Release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience. The abolition of military tribunals used in the past against civilians. Creation of an independent electoral commission (or one supervised/staffed by judges) with verifiable assurances of non-interference from authorities, empowered to ensure free, fair, open, and transparent elections. All of this list means ultimately for concrete and timely progressive steps be taken to create a system that facilitates and reinforces public accountability and equal opportunity for representation in civilian governance throughout all levels and branches. Part and parcel of this undertaking is a solid ongoing commitment by authorities (and vigilance by the public) towards an open and flourishing, vibrant climate of public debate and discussion that is actionable and productive.
The dynamics inside the country is bound to be busy with other rejuvenation in the political sphere. Perhaps most crucial is the creation of a non-military transitional body as soon as possible to guide the county towards reform. An independent civilian caretaker government, divorced from the Mubarak regime, can be installed. One that is comprised of respected, credible, meticulous, diligent, and wise persons who regularly and openly consult with the people.
Perhaps as good omen of things to come, the Egyptian military's professionalism and restraint was noted in its conduct towards the protesters during the Revolution. With few reported exceptions, this conduct was exemplary and it contrasted deeply with that of armies in many other developing and newly-industrializing countries in times of crises and uncertainties.
However, a military cannot run the administrative affairs of a country for long. And---as the cases of, say, Turkey (from the 1920s to the 1990s), post-colonial Algeria, Nigeria (post-colonial to Obesanjo), and post-colonial Sudan, among others---it cannot be the ultimate 'guardian' of democracy or revolution. Nor can it be the ultimate 'arbiter' of the people's will. It's primary function is border security, national defense, and helping with logistics and security during the most pressing emergencies, because it is equipped and trained to do so efficiently. It is generally not as good at the normal daily functions of the state like managing day-to-day traffic, police affairs, managing/monitoring of the economy, and creating policy. For now, Mubarak's newly-installed cabinet still runs the country but with the highly notable addition that it directly reports to the military. And this is an arrangement that more or less could last as little as six months with little clear timetables or specifics. In the overall balance of the current circumstances, a spectrum of speculation has arisen, from dooming worry to cautious optimism to wild optimism/euphoria despite coming odds, among observers, reporters, and protesters (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). [Earlier, I had blogged a bit about possible roles for the Egyptian military here.]
More immediate steps taken commensurate with facilitating democratic politics involves the creation of adequate time and space for the rebuilding and strengthening of political parties as well as for the construction of new ones. Parties need ample time and space to branch out and get better acquainted with the Egyptian population and to build viable political platforms and programs, but they need to begin now. In the Sadat policy of infitah (or "opening," "liberalization"), parties were very limited in number by law (about 3 in total) and they were almost micromanaged by the regime. During the Mubarak presidency---in some ways a continuation of Sadat's ideologically and tactically---there was a visible expansion in the number of parties operating on the political stage. However, these new additions were approved by the Egyptian Government under very strict conditions and laws, and so the new few that were 'legally' allowed to operate were very weak, functionally incoherent, and with relatively very small numbers of members and supporters. Similar tweaking and manipulation was done "legally" (i.e. for example, in tightly-closed ways of creating laws favorable to the regime) and extra-legally (i.e. for example, in ways that allowed selective targeting in application/dis-application of laws in combination with state-sponsored violence, intimidation, and fraud). Thus allowing Mubarak regime domination over space in policy-making or policy discussion, such as elections to student unions, parliament, and even the presidency. So, it is essential that this time around political institutions like parties and systems like electoral channels are allowed to develop in an atmosphere of openness where the caretaker transitional authority is politically neutral and transparent. [The Egyptian military reportedly urging the former youth protesters to begin to form parties is encouraging, but it remains to be seen what the military's response will be in developments to come.]
Judging from Egypt's past experiences with regime-managed electoral and other procedures, many on this (non-exhaustive) to-do list would will need thorough attention and serious resolve, as well as reasonable speed, before parliamentary or presidential elections can take place.
Meticulous and wise constitutional rewriting with enshrining of individual rights and responsibilities to include: championing the rule of law, as well as the separation of powers and checks and balances to especially guarantee judiciary independence as a co-equal branch with the executive and the legislative. Ending the status of emergency and placing restrictions over its future use. Starting to rework the government bureaucracies into a beaming bastion of public service. Eliminating government influence on professional syndicates and student unions, while scrapping out or at least drastically revising the gripping laws on non-governmental and charitable organizations. Commencing the reform and retraining of police and other security agencies of the state to conduct themselves professionally and to uphold individual liberties and rights (--among them the right to live in dignity without fear of extortion, harassment, or other abuses of power). Release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience. The abolition of military tribunals used in the past against civilians. Creation of an independent electoral commission (or one supervised/staffed by judges) with verifiable assurances of non-interference from authorities, empowered to ensure free, fair, open, and transparent elections. All of this list means ultimately for concrete and timely progressive steps be taken to create a system that facilitates and reinforces public accountability and equal opportunity for representation in civilian governance throughout all levels and branches. Part and parcel of this undertaking is a solid ongoing commitment by authorities (and vigilance by the public) towards an open and flourishing, vibrant climate of public debate and discussion that is actionable and productive.
The dynamics inside the country is bound to be busy with other rejuvenation in the political sphere. Perhaps most crucial is the creation of a non-military transitional body as soon as possible to guide the county towards reform. An independent civilian caretaker government, divorced from the Mubarak regime, can be installed. One that is comprised of respected, credible, meticulous, diligent, and wise persons who regularly and openly consult with the people.
Perhaps as good omen of things to come, the Egyptian military's professionalism and restraint was noted in its conduct towards the protesters during the Revolution. With few reported exceptions, this conduct was exemplary and it contrasted deeply with that of armies in many other developing and newly-industrializing countries in times of crises and uncertainties.
However, a military cannot run the administrative affairs of a country for long. And---as the cases of, say, Turkey (from the 1920s to the 1990s), post-colonial Algeria, Nigeria (post-colonial to Obesanjo), and post-colonial Sudan, among others---it cannot be the ultimate 'guardian' of democracy or revolution. Nor can it be the ultimate 'arbiter' of the people's will. It's primary function is border security, national defense, and helping with logistics and security during the most pressing emergencies, because it is equipped and trained to do so efficiently. It is generally not as good at the normal daily functions of the state like managing day-to-day traffic, police affairs, managing/monitoring of the economy, and creating policy. For now, Mubarak's newly-installed cabinet still runs the country but with the highly notable addition that it directly reports to the military. And this is an arrangement that more or less could last as little as six months with little clear timetables or specifics. In the overall balance of the current circumstances, a spectrum of speculation has arisen, from dooming worry to cautious optimism to wild optimism/euphoria despite coming odds, among observers, reporters, and protesters (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). [Earlier, I had blogged a bit about possible roles for the Egyptian military here.]
More immediate steps taken commensurate with facilitating democratic politics involves the creation of adequate time and space for the rebuilding and strengthening of political parties as well as for the construction of new ones. Parties need ample time and space to branch out and get better acquainted with the Egyptian population and to build viable political platforms and programs, but they need to begin now. In the Sadat policy of infitah (or "opening," "liberalization"), parties were very limited in number by law (about 3 in total) and they were almost micromanaged by the regime. During the Mubarak presidency---in some ways a continuation of Sadat's ideologically and tactically---there was a visible expansion in the number of parties operating on the political stage. However, these new additions were approved by the Egyptian Government under very strict conditions and laws, and so the new few that were 'legally' allowed to operate were very weak, functionally incoherent, and with relatively very small numbers of members and supporters. Similar tweaking and manipulation was done "legally" (i.e. for example, in tightly-closed ways of creating laws favorable to the regime) and extra-legally (i.e. for example, in ways that allowed selective targeting in application/dis-application of laws in combination with state-sponsored violence, intimidation, and fraud). Thus allowing Mubarak regime domination over space in policy-making or policy discussion, such as elections to student unions, parliament, and even the presidency. So, it is essential that this time around political institutions like parties and systems like electoral channels are allowed to develop in an atmosphere of openness where the caretaker transitional authority is politically neutral and transparent. [The Egyptian military reportedly urging the former youth protesters to begin to form parties is encouraging, but it remains to be seen what the military's response will be in developments to come.]
Judging from Egypt's past experiences with regime-managed electoral and other procedures, many on this (non-exhaustive) to-do list would will need thorough attention and serious resolve, as well as reasonable speed, before parliamentary or presidential elections can take place.
Meanwhile, action in the political and policy-making realms needs to be coupled with steps to assist the positive Revolution-generated momentum in affecting long-lasting economic and social rebuilding and strengthening. The enhancement of hospitals which have at times lacked even basic necessary medical supplies, and the reform of overburdened educational institutions are examples of crucial problem areas that need to be tackled. A lack of access to basic housing amenities such as plumbing in the shantytowns, a near-crisis problem in the lack of access in affordable housing more generally, and construction code violations which continue to place people in harm's way are others.
[And, in another sign pointing to years-long under-the-surface deterioration, labor strikes have already erupted across multiple industries from the stock exchange, textile and steel firms, media organisations, the postal service to railways, the Culture Ministry, and the Health Ministry. These occur barely at the end of this past weekend's celebrations, over an array of demands and issues: living and working conditions, better pay, medical care, stable contracts, and the dismissal of superiors viewed as corrupt and unfairly enriched (1, 2, 3, 4). This new wave of protests prompted the Supreme Military Council in its Fifth Communique to call for an end to these protests.]
Added to these problems is an overarching one of an economic and business climate that was criticized as unfair nepotism and clientelism---and one with many red-tape hurdles and long considered the personal playground of a privileged few connected to, or close to, the intricacies of the Mubarak regime. Enacting and enforcing strong anti-corruption, anti-monopoly, intellectual property, and business transparency rules are essential to allow Egypt to profit fully from its human capital and to nurture, expand, and retain enormous Egyptian talent and ingenuity.
The grassroots and re-organizing potential rooted in the desire to realize a better Egypt has already surfaced in the tent city in Tahrir Square, even before the announcement of President Mubarak's resignation. Scores of self-motivated clean-up volunteers that have emerged in Tahrir after Friday's celebrations continue to show hope of revolutionary country-altering potential. Tweets and Facebook statuses abound with proclamations of social responsibility as well as with pride and euphoria. So do YouTube video posts of interviews and activity of people on the streets. The atmosphere is painted with a civic consciousness the level of which I have never witnessed before in my all years of summer visits to, or in my time spent studying and living in, Egypt. But, such potential cannot be left to walk the path on its own. An equally determined and conscientious official effort needs to support and provide platforms for this potential to extend itself. Some of the Supreme Military Council's announcements and actions (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) in the wake of Mubarak's resignation are a step in the right direction to install and renew confidence of its intentions in the public. So too does Egypt's business community elite need to step up here, as bigger and bolder calls have been made for their participation. One high profile call was made for a 100 billion Egyptian Pound development fund for rebuilding the country. Smaller projects can work alongside separately, or supplement, these calls.
[And, in another sign pointing to years-long under-the-surface deterioration, labor strikes have already erupted across multiple industries from the stock exchange, textile and steel firms, media organisations, the postal service to railways, the Culture Ministry, and the Health Ministry. These occur barely at the end of this past weekend's celebrations, over an array of demands and issues: living and working conditions, better pay, medical care, stable contracts, and the dismissal of superiors viewed as corrupt and unfairly enriched (1, 2, 3, 4). This new wave of protests prompted the Supreme Military Council in its Fifth Communique to call for an end to these protests.]
Added to these problems is an overarching one of an economic and business climate that was criticized as unfair nepotism and clientelism---and one with many red-tape hurdles and long considered the personal playground of a privileged few connected to, or close to, the intricacies of the Mubarak regime. Enacting and enforcing strong anti-corruption, anti-monopoly, intellectual property, and business transparency rules are essential to allow Egypt to profit fully from its human capital and to nurture, expand, and retain enormous Egyptian talent and ingenuity.
The grassroots and re-organizing potential rooted in the desire to realize a better Egypt has already surfaced in the tent city in Tahrir Square, even before the announcement of President Mubarak's resignation. Scores of self-motivated clean-up volunteers that have emerged in Tahrir after Friday's celebrations continue to show hope of revolutionary country-altering potential. Tweets and Facebook statuses abound with proclamations of social responsibility as well as with pride and euphoria. So do YouTube video posts of interviews and activity of people on the streets. The atmosphere is painted with a civic consciousness the level of which I have never witnessed before in my all years of summer visits to, or in my time spent studying and living in, Egypt. But, such potential cannot be left to walk the path on its own. An equally determined and conscientious official effort needs to support and provide platforms for this potential to extend itself. Some of the Supreme Military Council's announcements and actions (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) in the wake of Mubarak's resignation are a step in the right direction to install and renew confidence of its intentions in the public. So too does Egypt's business community elite need to step up here, as bigger and bolder calls have been made for their participation. One high profile call was made for a 100 billion Egyptian Pound development fund for rebuilding the country. Smaller projects can work alongside separately, or supplement, these calls.
These are admittedly enormous undertakings, to be handled calmly and methodically but with a sense of urgency and of making visible progress. These are what part of the processes that political scientists and development specialists have referred to as nation-building and state building. Monitoring this reconstruction and guaranteeing its success is just as important as keeping tabs on the evolution of Egypt's foreign policy, foremost among them in observers' eyes being Egypt-Israel relations. Yet, in the immediate present and near future, this reconstruction may take priority over the concern regarding the continuity of Egypt-Israel relations. It has long been argued and shown that democratic governments, ruling over well-informed populations and an inclusive political culture, are hesitant toward war/conflict, and that they rarely behave aggressively toward other nations.
Israeli officials and voices in Israeli media have made a lot of noise during the protests about a post-Mubarak era, expressing fear of radicalism waiting to be unleashed. At the same time, the characterization seemingly anointed Mubarak's regime as the only Egyptian pillar of stability in Egypt's relations with Israel (and by extension, as the only Egyptian pillar of stability in the region more broadly). After all, as Sadat's vice president with intimate ties to the Egyptian military going back to the days spent as an air force commander, Mubarak was said to be part of the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel Treaty. His regime's easing of Egypt into expanding economic ties with Israel would serve to the latter as another assurance of the former's attention to keep the bi-lateral peace solid.
But the continuation of Mubarak's regime was more likely to perpetuate a false shell of stability. This shell would be little more than one propped up by autocratic repression and denial of human rights, slowly cracking and eventually shattering. In this context, Israel's on-record support of Mubarak could give the impression that it is more important to implement a relatively narrow set of objectives or interests at about any costs---call them "externalities," or "collateral damage," or "non-priorities"---his regime may bring. It could create the impression that assisting a crafty yet unyielding Egyptian strongman system is more important than other, more-domestically rooted aspirations (for democracy, dignity, and wide-based economic well-being).
Perhaps then Egyptians will conclude that the prevailing Israeli concern was not so much over keeping intact the bi-lateral peace than maintaining, a-la-Mubarak, that Egypt completely sees eye-to-eye with Israel strategically and tactically in enforcing that peace. A more open, vibrant, and democratic Egypt may try to renegotiate the terms of peace with Israel, which will undoubtedly add dynamics and dimensions to ponder over. But in the whole balance of things in the region, that may not necessarily be of a negative consequence for Israel or for the broader region. For that may, with new energy, breath life again into a tangible prospect for a lasting and just Israeli-Palestinian peace. It may give birth to a real indispensable chance to help redress (rather than perpetuate) the setbacks of the Oslo Process. To help the region start on a clean page, after decades of suffering partly brought about imbalances in influence, mixed in with animosity and nearly two decades of seemingly over-inflated hope.
At any rate, Egyptians will face a bumpy road ahead as they negotiate around the curves and turns, through the frictions, and above the potholes towards rebuilding and improvement. The military will certainly play a crucial role in shepherding the country as it travels on this road helping to ensure security, thereby helping to stabilize the political and economic environments. But as it does, it will need first and foremost to ultimately make good on its commitment to cede political power to civilian rule. Heeding the lessons of human history and of Egypt's post-colonial history, that will require the military to partner with the Egyptian people as equals during the transition (and then step down from the political and administrative stages). The international community, from international forums like the U.N. to individual nation-states like the U.S. to groups like the European Union, could lend valuable material, moral, and logistical support to this transition phase/process. If it chooses to get involved, the international community will also need to partner with the Egyptian people, in ways which place a desire (to see a democratic Egypt lively with self-determination and economic progress) above national or other interests that may conflict with such desire.
More closer to home, Israel---Egypt's principal neighbor and peace partner in the Mideast region---could learn to deal more with its nervousness in a manner that is more constructive than the conduct it has shown in the run-up to Mubarak's resignation. Israel knows very well that it is America's principal ally in the region. An alarmist tone or an aggressive conduct can prompt heavy negative pressure, thereby doing more to jeopardize Egypt's transition than to provide meaningful criticism. Years of conflict with Israel, followed by a solidly-upheld peace and close cooperation (in the midst of the environment and dynamics of post-1979 Middle East) are imprinted on the collective memory and awareness of Egyptians. None of this will do much to reassure Egyptians if Israel sounds out signals that appear less-than-productive to them.
Time, effort, perseverance, determination, coolness, inclusiveness, openness, care and meticulousness, and wisdom (and/or lack thereof) will ultimately shape the domestic Egyptian dynamics ahead ...
But the continuation of Mubarak's regime was more likely to perpetuate a false shell of stability. This shell would be little more than one propped up by autocratic repression and denial of human rights, slowly cracking and eventually shattering. In this context, Israel's on-record support of Mubarak could give the impression that it is more important to implement a relatively narrow set of objectives or interests at about any costs---call them "externalities," or "collateral damage," or "non-priorities"---his regime may bring. It could create the impression that assisting a crafty yet unyielding Egyptian strongman system is more important than other, more-domestically rooted aspirations (for democracy, dignity, and wide-based economic well-being).
Perhaps then Egyptians will conclude that the prevailing Israeli concern was not so much over keeping intact the bi-lateral peace than maintaining, a-la-Mubarak, that Egypt completely sees eye-to-eye with Israel strategically and tactically in enforcing that peace. A more open, vibrant, and democratic Egypt may try to renegotiate the terms of peace with Israel, which will undoubtedly add dynamics and dimensions to ponder over. But in the whole balance of things in the region, that may not necessarily be of a negative consequence for Israel or for the broader region. For that may, with new energy, breath life again into a tangible prospect for a lasting and just Israeli-Palestinian peace. It may give birth to a real indispensable chance to help redress (rather than perpetuate) the setbacks of the Oslo Process. To help the region start on a clean page, after decades of suffering partly brought about imbalances in influence, mixed in with animosity and nearly two decades of seemingly over-inflated hope.
At any rate, Egyptians will face a bumpy road ahead as they negotiate around the curves and turns, through the frictions, and above the potholes towards rebuilding and improvement. The military will certainly play a crucial role in shepherding the country as it travels on this road helping to ensure security, thereby helping to stabilize the political and economic environments. But as it does, it will need first and foremost to ultimately make good on its commitment to cede political power to civilian rule. Heeding the lessons of human history and of Egypt's post-colonial history, that will require the military to partner with the Egyptian people as equals during the transition (and then step down from the political and administrative stages). The international community, from international forums like the U.N. to individual nation-states like the U.S. to groups like the European Union, could lend valuable material, moral, and logistical support to this transition phase/process. If it chooses to get involved, the international community will also need to partner with the Egyptian people, in ways which place a desire (to see a democratic Egypt lively with self-determination and economic progress) above national or other interests that may conflict with such desire.
More closer to home, Israel---Egypt's principal neighbor and peace partner in the Mideast region---could learn to deal more with its nervousness in a manner that is more constructive than the conduct it has shown in the run-up to Mubarak's resignation. Israel knows very well that it is America's principal ally in the region. An alarmist tone or an aggressive conduct can prompt heavy negative pressure, thereby doing more to jeopardize Egypt's transition than to provide meaningful criticism. Years of conflict with Israel, followed by a solidly-upheld peace and close cooperation (in the midst of the environment and dynamics of post-1979 Middle East) are imprinted on the collective memory and awareness of Egyptians. None of this will do much to reassure Egyptians if Israel sounds out signals that appear less-than-productive to them.
Time, effort, perseverance, determination, coolness, inclusiveness, openness, care and meticulousness, and wisdom (and/or lack thereof) will ultimately shape the domestic Egyptian dynamics ahead ...
