Past 'gaps' between stated policy and actual action, as well as past 'patterns' of policy and actions, has forced many in the Mideast (directly involved, or even remotely affected by, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) to question the effectiveness, and even the sincerity and seriousness, of proposed/announced peace initiatives. A huge chunk, if not most, of this skepticism has tended to come from the Arabs and Muslims mostly towards the United States----to the extent that latter has sadly "earned" a notorious reputation as a 'Dishonest Broker' and a (global) 'bully.'
The most important peace/negotiation initiative--known widely as the Oslo Process--has been declared as a "failure" even by the Arab League collectively in an unprecedentedly somber statement by Secretary-General Amr Moussa. It is in the tumultuous--and highly uneven--path to Mideast peace, as well as in the unevenness in both policies and actions (current and past), that many in the region interpreted with great reservation any renewed hope offered major actors like the US. These levels of concern and skepticism are perhaps no less for the very assertive statement that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleesa Rice made recently affirming that "Frankly it's time for the establishment of Palestinian state... That's really a message that I think only I can deliver."
It is questionable, however, on how effectively such stated assertiveness and confidence can realistically produce results that are substantial and substantive, long-lasting, just, wise, and final for the long-conflicting and warring sides. After all, the Camp David process and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of the mid to late 1970's hardly mentioned or did anything for the broader Arab-Israeli conflict (including the Palestinian-Israeli segment); in fact both were strictly bi-lateral between the major conflicting/warring sides of the time period (Egypt and Israel). The Oslo Process, which took off in 1993, began to show serious signs of strain and exhaustion after the initially great levels of euphoria and hope. Skepticism in the public and among commentators, may lead to conclusion that various summits---Wye River Memorandum in the late 1990s, and "Camp David II," along with the various Sharm el Sheikh and Taba conferences earlier in this decade---were all to reduced to little more than mere formalities that accomplished no new ground in resolving the conflict and which had actually failed to prevent its exacerbation, to say the least.
Finally, one can also cite the largely-ignored Arab League peace offer that was first introduced in 2002. The offer----which unprecedently affirmed multilateral Arab recognition of Israel [in return for substantial Israeli acceptance and implimentation of internationally-established principles/ interpretations/ instruments under the two-state formula]----seemed to again fade into oblivion upon its rejuvenation/reintroduction in early 2007. This second apparent refusal seemingly followed Israeli concerns on "some [prohibitive] preconditions" claimed as being placed for negotiations. Yet, other commentators have opined that the 2007 resurrection of Arab Initiative was little more than an affirmation of its already existing flexible 2002-based origins.
In all, the sea of pessimism (produced by the frustrations/strains thrusted upon the long years of the 1991 Madrid Conference and the subsequent Oslo Process) was capped by, and crowned with, both a general trend of increasing intensity of violence and tension between the Palestinians and the Israelis and the above-mentioned declaration of Oslo's failure by the Arab League (but there seems to be at least some optimism regarding current US moves according to a headline in a recent Arab League press statement reporting Moussa as commenting on having "sensed American desire towards serious peace conference" during a meeting with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice).
To make matters worse, intra-Palestinian relations have been marred and exacerbated in the past few years by cycles in the outbreaks and continuation of violence followed by cycles of uncertain and fragile cease-fires and power-arrangement settlements between the two main rival factions, the Fatah-led Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas, the "Islamist" opposition group which had formed the major portion of the Palestinian government up until as recently as late last year. Recently, there have new reported moves toward rapprochement between these two factions, but I think it is still reasonable to assume that both factions are far from reaching a serious reduction in tensions.
With the long history of setbacks outweighing successes, and with little time left for the duration of the Bush Administration before the next presidential elections, the Bush Administration is bound to realize that it is competing against time, against developments in the conflict and region, and the domestic environment of interest-group politics, constraints of and related to US foreign policy considerations, as well as against developments in the broader international community that are even remotely related to the region. If it hopes to make any substantial, and unprecedented, American ground (in even merely beginning) to end one of the world's most troubling and long-lasting conflicts, it needs to act decisively, quickly--and above all--with vision, wisdom, confidence-building, the courage for its implimentation, and with an avoidance of haste and any temptations to fall for band-aid remedies.
Some have realized that a successful resolution of conflict has also been prevented by attempts to heavily restrict public debate and discussion in Western societies, and especially in the United States and Britain--essentially in what apparently amounts to a broader "McCarthyism" in academia and public discourse over Islam/Muslim-Western relations, the Arab World, the threat of terrorism and the 'appropriate national security' response, and the Middle East, in general. [Some high-profile cases have involved the controversy pitting allegations of some students against professors from the well-known MEALAC department at Columbia University; the refusal of tenure for noted professor Dr. Norman Finklestein at DePaul University; the controversy surrounding Dr. Daniel Pipes, his "Middle East Forum" organization and the "dossiers"--charged by many to be academic blacklists--created, among other projects, by the Forum's affiliated arm called "Campus Watch"; and the movement towards restricting, or even eliminating, federal funding towards Middle Eastern Studies and Arab Studies Programs pushed forth by many of the same individuals and groups seen by the mentioned observers as restricting public discourse over critical and sensitive issue areas dealing with the Arab World, Middle East, Islam, US foreign policy, etc.] These observers claim that such restrictions---traced ultimately to lobbying by a relatively small but increasingly influential array of interested groups and persons, and especially by what is being seen by them as 'pseudo-think tanks'---have led to very nasty circumstances and controversies, as well as to maintaining a general status-quo of a number of particularly biased and dangerously faulty US foreign (and domestic) policies.
Having said all that, I am brought to ask some really tough questions: Can the United States, the conflicting parties, and third-party negotiators succeed this time around in resolving the conflict? What can the various sides bring to the negotiating table, what would be required of them? Can reasonable proposals and obligatons be realistically achieved in the current "chaotic" environment? Even just as important, can "reasonable" be "just"? Given polarizations and the fallouts from unrelated conflicts in the region, can the international community (with its very lopsided distribution of influence, national interests, etc) ever reach a "fair" and "final" resolution for conflict and suffering that has lasted for more than 5o years, transcending generations?
In all, the sea of pessimism (produced by the frustrations/strains thrusted upon the long years of the 1991 Madrid Conference and the subsequent Oslo Process) was capped by, and crowned with, both a general trend of increasing intensity of violence and tension between the Palestinians and the Israelis and the above-mentioned declaration of Oslo's failure by the Arab League (but there seems to be at least some optimism regarding current US moves according to a headline in a recent Arab League press statement reporting Moussa as commenting on having "sensed American desire towards serious peace conference" during a meeting with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice).
To make matters worse, intra-Palestinian relations have been marred and exacerbated in the past few years by cycles in the outbreaks and continuation of violence followed by cycles of uncertain and fragile cease-fires and power-arrangement settlements between the two main rival factions, the Fatah-led Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas, the "Islamist" opposition group which had formed the major portion of the Palestinian government up until as recently as late last year. Recently, there have new reported moves toward rapprochement between these two factions, but I think it is still reasonable to assume that both factions are far from reaching a serious reduction in tensions.
With the long history of setbacks outweighing successes, and with little time left for the duration of the Bush Administration before the next presidential elections, the Bush Administration is bound to realize that it is competing against time, against developments in the conflict and region, and the domestic environment of interest-group politics, constraints of and related to US foreign policy considerations, as well as against developments in the broader international community that are even remotely related to the region. If it hopes to make any substantial, and unprecedented, American ground (in even merely beginning) to end one of the world's most troubling and long-lasting conflicts, it needs to act decisively, quickly--and above all--with vision, wisdom, confidence-building, the courage for its implimentation, and with an avoidance of haste and any temptations to fall for band-aid remedies.
Some have realized that a successful resolution of conflict has also been prevented by attempts to heavily restrict public debate and discussion in Western societies, and especially in the United States and Britain--essentially in what apparently amounts to a broader "McCarthyism" in academia and public discourse over Islam/Muslim-Western relations, the Arab World, the threat of terrorism and the 'appropriate national security' response, and the Middle East, in general. [Some high-profile cases have involved the controversy pitting allegations of some students against professors from the well-known MEALAC department at Columbia University; the refusal of tenure for noted professor Dr. Norman Finklestein at DePaul University; the controversy surrounding Dr. Daniel Pipes, his "Middle East Forum" organization and the "dossiers"--charged by many to be academic blacklists--created, among other projects, by the Forum's affiliated arm called "Campus Watch"; and the movement towards restricting, or even eliminating, federal funding towards Middle Eastern Studies and Arab Studies Programs pushed forth by many of the same individuals and groups seen by the mentioned observers as restricting public discourse over critical and sensitive issue areas dealing with the Arab World, Middle East, Islam, US foreign policy, etc.] These observers claim that such restrictions---traced ultimately to lobbying by a relatively small but increasingly influential array of interested groups and persons, and especially by what is being seen by them as 'pseudo-think tanks'---have led to very nasty circumstances and controversies, as well as to maintaining a general status-quo of a number of particularly biased and dangerously faulty US foreign (and domestic) policies.
Having said all that, I am brought to ask some really tough questions: Can the United States, the conflicting parties, and third-party negotiators succeed this time around in resolving the conflict? What can the various sides bring to the negotiating table, what would be required of them? Can reasonable proposals and obligatons be realistically achieved in the current "chaotic" environment? Even just as important, can "reasonable" be "just"? Given polarizations and the fallouts from unrelated conflicts in the region, can the international community (with its very lopsided distribution of influence, national interests, etc) ever reach a "fair" and "final" resolution for conflict and suffering that has lasted for more than 5o years, transcending generations?
Certainly, there are many groups and individuals (including among them Israelis, Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, Jews, and others) that are well-intentioned and are truly striving to find a workable way out of the complexities, rigidiness, and injustices inflicted by these conflicts. But a great obstacle they face is what they see as a considerable lack of attention and awareness from the mainstreams of media, political and decision-making circles, and other "centers" of event-makers and news-shakers. If attention is paid to these peace and human rights activists, many times it is not serious. Nor has such attention seemingly granted them the benefit of the doubt, leading some to sometimes feel ostracized by their own communities.
There are a whole lot of dimensions--whether they relate to policymaking, imbalances in the projections of power between the conflicting sides, major or dramatic developments in the conflict---that can help influence the range of potential solutions, actions, and attitudes carried out or missed, as well as their resulting outcomes. Other developments and conflicts within and outside the region not related specifically to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or even to broader Arab-Israeli tensions, can have positive and negative spillovers. But for now, at least, there will be a lot of speculation and alertness (if not anxiety) towards any "last-minute" US-led peace-promoting, or tension-reducing, manueveurs. The combination of all these factors and circumstances raises the stakes even higher for everyone.
