Hot Topic: proposed upcoming US-hosted mideast peace summit?

Past 'gaps' between stated policy and actual action, as well as past 'patterns' of policy and actions, has forced many in the Mideast (directly involved, or even remotely affected by, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) to question the effectiveness, and even the sincerity and seriousness, of proposed/announced peace initiatives. A huge chunk, if not most, of this skepticism has tended to come from the Arabs and Muslims mostly towards the United States----to the extent that latter has sadly "earned" a notorious reputation as a 'Dishonest Broker' and a (global) 'bully.'

The most important peace/negotiation initiative--known widely as the Oslo Process--has been declared as a "failure" even by the Arab League collectively in an unprecedentedly somber statement by Secretary-General Amr Moussa. It is in the tumultuous--and highly uneven--path to Mideast peace, as well as in the unevenness in both policies and actions (current and past), that many in the region interpreted with great reservation any renewed hope offered major actors like the US. These levels of concern and skepticism are perhaps no less for the very assertive statement that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleesa Rice made recently affirming that "Frankly it's time for the establishment of Palestinian state... That's really a message that I think only I can deliver."

It is questionable, however, on how effectively such stated assertiveness and confidence can realistically produce results that are substantial and substantive, long-lasting, just, wise, and final for the long-conflicting and warring sides. After all, the Camp David process and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of the mid to late 1970's hardly mentioned or did anything for the broader Arab-Israeli conflict (including the Palestinian-Israeli segment); in fact both were strictly bi-lateral between the major conflicting/warring sides of the time period (Egypt and Israel). The Oslo Process, which took off in 1993, began to show serious signs of strain and exhaustion after the initially great levels of euphoria and hope. Skepticism in the public and among commentators, may lead to conclusion that various summits---Wye River Memorandum in the late 1990s, and "Camp David II," along with the various Sharm el Sheikh and Taba conferences earlier in this decade---were all to reduced to little more than mere formalities that accomplished no new ground in resolving the conflict and which had actually failed to prevent its exacerbation, to say the least.

Finally, one can also cite the largely-ignored Arab League peace offer that was first introduced in 2002. The offer----which unprecedently affirmed multilateral Arab recognition of Israel [in return for substantial Israeli acceptance and implimentation of internationally-established principles/ interpretations/ instruments under the two-state formula]----seemed to again fade into oblivion upon its rejuvenation/reintroduction in early 2007. This second apparent refusal seemingly followed Israeli concerns on "some [prohibitive] preconditions" claimed as being placed for negotiations. Yet, other commentators have opined that the 2007 resurrection of Arab Initiative was little more than an affirmation of its already existing flexible 2002-based origins.

In all, the sea of pessimism (produced by the frustrations/strains thrusted upon the long years of the 1991 Madrid Conference and the subsequent Oslo Process) was capped by, and crowned with, both a general trend of increasing intensity of violence and tension between the Palestinians and the Israelis and the above-mentioned declaration of Oslo's failure by the Arab League (but there seems to be at least some optimism regarding current US moves according to a headline in a recent Arab League press statement reporting Moussa as commenting on having "sensed American desire towards serious peace conference" during a meeting with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice).

To make matters worse, intra-Palestinian relations have been marred and exacerbated in the past few years by cycles in the outbreaks and continuation of violence followed by cycles of uncertain and fragile cease-fires and power-arrangement settlements between the two main rival factions, the Fatah-led Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas, the "Islamist" opposition group which had formed the major portion of the Palestinian government up until as recently as late last year. Recently, there have new reported moves toward rapprochement between these two factions, but I think it is still reasonable to assume that both factions are far from reaching a serious reduction in tensions.

With the long history of setbacks outweighing successes, and with little time left for the duration of the Bush Administration before the next presidential elections, the Bush Administration is bound to realize that it is competing against time, against developments in the conflict and region, and the domestic environment of interest-group politics, constraints of and related to US foreign policy considerations, as well as against developments in the broader international community that are even remotely related to the region. If it hopes to make any substantial, and unprecedented, American ground (in even merely beginning) to end one of the world's most troubling and long-lasting conflicts, it needs to act decisively, quickly--and above all--with vision, wisdom, confidence-building, the courage for its implimentation, and with an avoidance of haste and any temptations to fall for band-aid remedies.

Some have realized that a successful resolution of conflict has also been prevented by attempts to heavily restrict public debate and discussion in Western societies, and especially in the United States and Britain--essentially in what apparently amounts to a broader "McCarthyism" in academia and public discourse over Islam/Muslim-Western relations, the Arab World, the threat of terrorism and the 'appropriate national security' response, and the Middle East, in general. [Some high-profile cases have involved the controversy pitting allegations of some students against professors from the well-known MEALAC department at Columbia University; the refusal of tenure for noted professor Dr. Norman Finklestein at DePaul University; the controversy surrounding Dr. Daniel Pipes, his "Middle East Forum" organization and the "dossiers"--charged by many to be academic blacklists--created, among other projects, by the Forum's affiliated arm called "Campus Watch"; and the movement towards restricting, or even eliminating, federal funding towards Middle Eastern Studies and Arab Studies Programs pushed forth by many of the same individuals and groups seen by the mentioned observers as restricting public discourse over critical and sensitive issue areas dealing with the Arab World, Middle East, Islam, US foreign policy, etc.] These observers claim that such restrictions---traced ultimately to lobbying by a relatively small but increasingly influential array of interested groups and persons, and especially by what is being seen by them as 'pseudo-think tanks'---have led to very nasty circumstances and controversies, as well as to maintaining a general status-quo of a number of particularly biased and dangerously faulty US foreign (and domestic) policies.

Having said all that, I am brought to ask some really tough questions: Can the United States, the conflicting parties, and third-party negotiators succeed this time around in resolving the conflict? What can the various sides bring to the negotiating table, what would be required of them? Can reasonable proposals and obligatons be realistically achieved in the current "chaotic" environment? Even just as important, can "reasonable" be "just"? Given polarizations and the fallouts from unrelated conflicts in the region, can the international community (with its very lopsided distribution of influence, national interests, etc) ever reach a "fair" and "final" resolution for conflict and suffering that has lasted for more than 5o years, transcending generations?

Certainly, there are many groups and individuals (including among them Israelis, Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, Jews, and others) that are well-intentioned and are truly striving to find a workable way out of the complexities, rigidiness, and injustices inflicted by these conflicts. But a great obstacle they face is what they see as a considerable lack of attention and awareness from the mainstreams of media, political and decision-making circles, and other "centers" of event-makers and news-shakers. If attention is paid to these peace and human rights activists, many times it is not serious. Nor has such attention seemingly granted them the benefit of the doubt, leading some to sometimes feel ostracized by their own communities.

There are a whole lot of dimensions--whether they relate to policymaking, imbalances in the projections of power between the conflicting sides, major or dramatic developments in the conflict---that can help influence the range of potential solutions, actions, and attitudes carried out or missed, as well as their resulting outcomes. Other developments and conflicts within and outside the region not related specifically to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or even to broader Arab-Israeli tensions, can have positive and negative spillovers. But for now, at least, there will be a lot of speculation and alertness (if not anxiety) towards any "last-minute" US-led peace-promoting, or tension-reducing, manueveurs. The combination of all these factors and circumstances raises the stakes even higher for everyone.

Barbie has a new "sister"?: Geography, MNCs/TNCs, and Local Alternatives

It is logical to assume that multinational corporations [MNCs] (or transnational corporations [TNCs] as they are also called)--tend to cater to local populations by adding "localized" variations of their products to supplement their 'standard' menus/product lines, when they establish themselves in new foreign markets. When consumers in those markets still feel they cannot derive what they need or desire from the newly established or expanded presence of such MNCs/TNCs and their product lines, it isn't before long that some entrepreneur finds a way to produce an alternative that is both similar in form to an MNC's/TNC's product line and that possesses distinctive attributes corresponding to particular cultural, social, and/or economic needs and wants. Alternatives can also be sought by such entrepreneurs to satsify demand that created in reaction to, or in the midst of, unforeseen political circumstances.

Reuters reports Barbie has a new colleague, named Salma. Created independently of Mattel, Salma is dressed to satisfy non-Western (specifically, Indonesian and then particularly, "Islamic") notions/ conceptions of modesty. According to local consumers and producers, these notions and conceptions are apparently lacking in Salma's more-established and more well-known counterpart. It is likely that demand for, and supply of, Salma, in Indonesia will increase as Islamic holy month of Ramadan ends and the holiday of Eid el-Fitr approaches.

[Searching through the official websites, Mattel's Barbie website and the affilated BarbieCollector, I did come across one "Morocan Barbie" version--discontinued since 1999 release year--which was the about the closest I could find to be oriented around an Arab-Muslim theme. But, even here, it was categorized geographically by continent as part of the limited-scale "Dolls of the World-Africa" product line, and not in any particularized religious or ethnic sense disregarding country-specific labels of course. Other religious-oriented dolls are listed generally as a sort of a Western-based 'happy holidays' themed category with a number of Barbie versions specifically themed in, and geared towards, common holidays there, like Christmas. Given Mattel's varied focus on different target markets, the disparities in the scales of product lines are logical. Whether Salma will be able to take advantage of such disparities, and thus perhaps cause a restrategizing of Mattel's production lines, is the ultimate question.]

But questions still remain as to the competitiveness and attractiveness of Salma vis-a-vis the "glamor" of Barbie and Mattel worldwide and in the Arab-Muslim world, not just during the Eid but in the longer run as well. Another vital question: even if we were put to aside any considerations in which we were to compare Salma with Barbie and Mattel, will Salma (on its own) be successful in Indonesia and in the broader Arab-Muslim world?

For now, we can just resolve ourselves to more short-term questions....how will Mattel react to this new development? Certainly, a company with an internationally-recognized brand name (Barbie) like Mattel will not have lost sight of the fact that Ramadan/Eid period arguably represents one of the largest of holiday/shopping seasons in a rapidly-growing slew of regional markets (i.e. the Arab-Muslim world)? [The other major season is, perhaps, the Eid el Adha towards the end of the Islamic lunar year.] Will Mattel, too, introduce a "Muslim Barbie" as part of its product line specifically sent to the region? Or will they seek to buy the manufacturing rights of "Salma" from its Indonesian entrepreneur? Or will they ignore Barbie's 'sister'-doll as a short-lived seasonal fad whose lure they might anticipate will die away shortly after this holiday/shopping season ends?

The answers to these questions and more are very likely to be found in more than just extra pieces of cloth.......

Concepts and Controversies in the Meaning of Terrorism

A trying and tragic day-and its troublesome aftermath......

The sixth anniversary of the September 11 attacks are just around the corner. On the US public/social and personal/private scenes, many Americans will be preoccupied with commemerating the lives lost of their beloved and their friends, colleagues, and of the rescue and aid workers who horrifically perished that day. Public officials and politicians will send out condolences and/or eulogies in some or another. The media will reciprocate with airing special news segments and programs, perhaps to analyze some aspect of, or simply bring memory to, the largest event of terrorism on US soil to occur in contemporary American history. The media is even likely to air reportages purported to analyzing new trends and developments in international terrorism and similar threats facing America's security. 

Though it will be understandably a week of intense emotional drama caused by the twin pains of mourning and insecurity, it will also be a very jittery week with the strong and formidable potential to attract and illicit an upsurge of ethnic hate crimes to add on to what rights monitors have warned as the already existant trend of yearly increase. Undoubtedly, questions over how to how with the aftermath of 9/11 are crucial not only for healing processes, but also for determining/establishing patterns and regimes for societal, political, legal, and even economic/trade, interactions. If anything, the up-and-down battles over the Patriot Act, the domestic phone wiretapping scandal, the moral and legal challenges regarding the operation of Guantanamo Bay camps, the processing, interrogation, and trial of suspects /detainees in secret or special holding centers abroad, the detention and interrogation of non-documented immigrants through constitutionally questionable methods(Latinos, Arabs, and South Asians), the failure of police/public safety units to effectively clamp down or reduce hate crimes increasing in frequency and intensity, the yearly increasing allegations and complaints of discrimination and profiling at the workplace, and the allegedly intense profiling practices against specific minorities by law enforcement, among others [a good introductory source for more information about such backlash is the annual civil rights reports issued by the Washington, D.C.-based Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) ], should serve as a deeply troubling wake-up call warning all Americans and others about the erosion of America's generally multipluralistic fabric.



All of these various sets of interaction and public policy decisions modeling, be they organized or sponttaneous, are in turn partly influenced by what Americans and others conceive of terrorism violence and other perceived or real threats they face. Likewise what they conceive of these threats are partly shaped by the debates and controversies raging over how to identify, conceptualize, and classify them as well as how to best respond to them.

Origins of the term "Terrorism" and Early Usages

Despite the fact that different academic and theoretical disciplines have more or less established methods to study acts of terrorism, in modern times, what is professionally refered to “terrorism” is essentially a type of “political violence,” or violence conducted to statisfy political motivations. In turn, then, “terrorism” refers to a category of human expression studied by a methodoligical approch with primary (though not exclusive) roots in the dicipline of Political Science.

Some scholars have noted that, historically, one of the earliest references to terrorism violence dealt with groups that operated in the Middle East during various intervals in the medival period. Specifically, the reference was to a very notorious political-religious sect that challenged not only the authority of public adminstrators but also purposefully created widespread uncertainty and panic. Then known as the Hashshahsheen, the secret society arose in the last decade of the Tenth Century AD, and for the following three centuries, they posioned or struck by dagger any person civilian and government official who was marked for death as a threat to the secret society. The Arabic name of the sect, hashshasheen ("druggies") was itself a reference to the sect's use of hasheesh (a type of narcotic) that was used as a tool both for initiating new members and for prepping up members selected for a murder mission. Europeans (mainly Crusaders) who came into contact with the Hashshasheen anglicized and romanized the latter's Arabic nickname into various form spellings--Heissessini, Assessini, and Assassini--all of which later evolved to the English variant, "assassin." (Mazhar-ul-Haqq, Outlines of Islamic History, Bookland, 4th ed. 1992, 332-5).

[Today, in the field of Political Science, assassinations are classified as one type of terrorism violence.]

Yet throughout history, neither the use of terrorism violence nor even the use of a specific term to describe that violence was restricted to events only in, or connected to, the Middle East. Europe also had tremendous share of chaos during the Middle Ages and throughout the Enlightenment subsequently after. For example, the French Revoltion of 1789 was a period of much bloodshed in which revolutionaries clashed with the Ancien Regime to depose the monarchy, the nobility and the clergy and to create a republican (not related to the Republican Party) system of governance. The Revolution's utopian ideals quickly transformed into nightmares as conflicts between the revolutionaries emerged. These conflicts heightened and turned deadly in large part as the result of a popular revolutionary leader, Maximilien de Robespierre, who soon engaged in firebrand politics. Robespierre purged the l'Assemblie Nationale, the legislative institution set up by the Revolution, of its moderate faction and cracked down on anyone he suspected as being a threat or a traitor to the Revolution. Countless people faced imprisonment or execution by the guillotine (invented in this time period) en masse. (J. Suzanne Ravise, Tableaux Culturels de la France, National Textbook Company, 3rd ed. 1994, 65-9). It is no coincidence, therefore, that the French use the term "la Terreur" ("The Terror")---perhaps a variant of the word "terrorism"---to refer Robespierre's regime and reign (Ibid).

Modern/Contempoary Applications of the Term and Conceptual Considerations

For social scientists, and especially political scientists, It is especially important to distinguish between political violence and other forms of violence (such as more ‘ordinary’ crimes like fraud, murder, etc).

In studying terrorism, Political Scientists have realized that signficant ambiguity exists as to what exactly constitutes “terrorism” at any given point of time or environment. This is not a deliberate result of political science, but reflects a response to the international environment. Since, terrorism (and actors) are politically motivated, there has been no strong international consensus on a specific statement defining this phenomenon, whether among governments/nation-states or non-governemental actors. [A glimpse through the UN Treaties webpage depicting the various treaties, conventions, and agreements on terrorism can help us to understand how diverse interpretations of terrorism are regionally, internationally, and on the level of the individual nation-state.] In the search for an objective study of terrorism, Political Scientists themselves have worked to create a set of descriptions for terrorism that takes into consideration the reality that nation-states will act on behalf of their own interests, while attempting to avoid making value judgments over the national interests of nation-states. How nation-states define terrorism is as a much a product of their adherence to their own national interests at a given time as other factors, and so Political Scientists try to avoid getting caught in the subjectivity net national interests create. This task is no less crucial for media as purveyors of news.

There are, however, some basic general characteristics that Political Scientists have identified for terrorism (For example, see Cindy Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Prentice Hall, 3rd ed. 2003). These basic guidelines help not only to distinguish between political violence and other forms of violence, but also to distinguish between terrorism and other forms of political violence (such as riots, coups, and to some extent guerrilla warfare). If my memory serves me well, the general characteristics of terrorism violence are:

(1). the act of violence must be politically motivated (examples include: destablize a government, eliminate a government’s monopoly over the use of violence, or to extract concessions from a government);

(2) the act of violence must be performed for an audience/media–--hence the increasing dramatism and intensity of terrorist acts over time;

(3) the act of violence must be at least intended to provoke widespread fear, confusion, disorientation among the population—-hence the increasing dramatism and intensity of terrorist acts over time;

(4)the act of violence must be a deliberate effort to target innocent civilians to result in #(3). (Combs, 10-7)

[Government structures do not necessarily have to be included in the mix of targets in a given attack or plan of attack, as recent trends involving greater frequencies of non-government (i.e. civilian & non-combatant) targets have emerged. The main point here is satisfying the intention to target civilian/non-combatants either directly or indirectly as mentioned above. But attacks against government structures that are intended to provoke concerns about security and public safety could also potentially be considered as a terrorism if a political motivation to it is attached/associated.]

Terrorist acts can be:

a) conducted by governments,

b) sponsored nation-states/governments,

c) can be conducted and/or sponsored by non-state private actors, whether they operate internationally, regionally, or within a country.

Conclusion

As you can see, defining “terrorism” can entail an enormously complex set of tasks and analyses. While treading this complexity carefully can lead to charges of “not being resolute,” moving away from a careful and thoughtful approach to analysis and reporting can lead to serious inaccuracies. It is important that one remains resolute in opposing terrorism. It is equally and sigificantly important that a high level of objectivity and accuracy be maintained during identification and analysis as well. In all, this balance is very tricky and much easier said than done.

Exploring the reality of terrorism and attempting to understand it more deeply doesn't lessen from the value or significance that events like those that occurred on Septermber 11 have or should have. Despite the possible barriers presented by an intensity of emotional, physical, social, and other scars that have yet unfortunately to be fully healed, a more thoughtul inquiry and discussion of terrorism, extremism anywhere should not threaten to remove the "face identity" of anyone who is involved September 11 and elsewhere. The participants, whether victim or perpetrator, should not be reduced to "just another statistic" in an inquiry that is balanced and analytically thoughful as possible. In order for such an inquiry to succeed, however, we can not afford to let emotion or personal interest drag us into continuing the long-held stereotypical views and ignorance towards the Middle East/Arabs/Muslims that have existed in mainstream attitudes, and that have been promoted or replayed by some form of popular culture (particularly many Hollywood/cinematic productions and tv dramas and sitcoms, for instance) or news media ,for at least a century now, or by some politicians and policymakers more recently.

A very illustrative recent example of the potential for continuing and expanding ignorance, stereotypes, blacklashes that come out of careless thinking can be found in Representative Peter King's (R-NY) statements that "too many mosques [exist] in America" as a threat of "radical Islam" to American society. The most worrisome aspect of King's arguments is that they fail to make a crucial distinction between institutions themselves that help many Muslims practice their faith on the one hand, and varying levels of extremism among Muslims worldwide, on the other. Whether there are some or any number of extremists in a mosque/Islamic center and the extent to which they may or may not influence the centers in the US or abroad is one question. Appearing to simplistically associate the mere concept of a mosque/Islamic center with radicalism/extremism/terrorism is a different consideration altogether. The former attitude may possibly help to enagage Muslims, depending on the circumstances (such as outreach from both sides). While the latter attitude places absolute suspicion on a Muslim minority's ability to not just to integrate into, but also to coexist with, the broader society (or of the ability of Muslims abroad to deal responsibly with the international community). The suspicion is placed simply by virtue of their background, faith, practices, personal devotions and so forth. 


Without bothering to ask any deeper questions, the absolute suspicion is, then, an assumption that any Muslim presence in itself represents a danger to society. I personally don't think that would be a wise, reasonable or fair suggestion to make. This is not to say that dangerous extremists don't exist, or that they don't have some type of influence in some Muslim institutions. But simplistic associative assumptions on the totality of both minorities and their 'sister' populations abroad (and on the activities of both) never help to solve problems relating to their integration (if they are minorities) or dealings with the international community (if they are 'sister' populations). Rather such assumptions can and do in fact exacerbate the problems they face. Equally important, such assumptions also greatly more complicate the tasks and problems the host society (if within a single country) or the international community (if we're talking about Muslims worldwide) undertakes/confronts in its relationships with them.


Yes, events like September 11 have triggered knee-jerk reactions the kinds of which that both reinforce, and are reinforced by, ignorance and stereotypes. The pain and anguish reflected in the knee-jerk reactions is understandable. But the reactions themselves are not. It is precisely because of grusome events like September 11 and their backlash---which have in turn begun to trigger much-needed discussions over the two so-called "twin problems" of Islamophobia and Anti-Americanism/Anti-Westernism---that a seriously more careful, calm, and fair look is urgently and desperately required not only at terrorism and extremism but also at Islam, Muslims, Arabs, the Middle East, South Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Arab world. Equally important is to place a similar emphasis on serious analysis of foreign policies carried out by major state actors including primarily, but not limited to, the United States. If not, we may then have to brace for an ever-continuing and more-intensifying cycle of misunderstanding, missteps, violence and repression.

A British Study, European and American Social Attitudes, and the Media

I came across an article the other day regarding a British study that apparently measured the continuation of new trends affecting old public attitudes linking appearance and behavior. Let me first start off by saying that I’m not going to focus on gender differences, or on evaluations thereof. Nor will I touch upon any evaluations or value judgments on the sources of influence on evaluating gender differences. I’ll leave these kinds of considerations to you, the readers. So that there are no misunderstandings, let me clarify that I’m writing this piece simply to try to understand (by triggering discussion on) whether different trends have emerged between the United States and Europe regarding this specific topic (represented by Britain) as stated in the British study and its journalistic coverage, and if these differences are informed by diverging cultural, societal, and value foundations/makeup across the Atlantic.

It’s reasonable to assume that the results of any appearance-behavior correlation are informed/ affected by cultural and social ideals for what constitutes the “ideal” (i.e. the ‘mainstream’) male or female. Likewise, the “ideal” male or female has often been defined in the corridors of the communications area and of the specialized/ targeted media: fictional television and film drama, in magazines like Cosmopolitan, Men’s Health, Women’s Health, in photographic magazines/websites like FHM, Maxim, and Askmen.com, and finally in talk shows like Tyra and Oprah. These kinds of social (if we include gossip/rumors and everyday person-to-person interaction) and cultural influences—commercial and non-commercial—and the penetrative impacts they have had on appearance-behavior judgments are nothing new. So are the relationships and gaps between public and private perceptions linking appearance and behavior (as defined by the above-mentioned norms, ideals, influences) on the one hand, and the public and personal realities of appearance and behavior, on the other. So, what is new, and very frankly surprising to me, is what the recent study claims as new trends affecting male-female relationships.

For example, the article mentioned that “Women see masculine-looking men as more unsuitable long-term partners but men with more feminine features are seen as more committed and less likely to stray, researchers said Wednesday.” These feminine features—cited as “finer facial features, fuller lips, wide eyes and thinner, more curved eyebrows”—were more desirable to women than masculine features (cited as “square jaws, larger noses and smaller eyes“) because the former demonstrated a “better bet for long-term relationships.” The masculine features, however, were reported as demonstrating “significantly more dominant, less faithful, worse parents and as having less warm personalities” among men.

If we take these results as representative of Westerners, this is a significant jump or even reversal, in attitude from nearly seven years ago. Then, prominently in high school (secondary school) and somewhat later and lesser so in college, I distinctly remember how much emphasis for males/by males was placed on bodybuilding and rugged sports activity (especially American Football)—considered “masculine” characteristics---as indicators for success in both social and professional relationships. In such an environment, the high school male jock, the high school football quarterback, these were the people that mattered, that got the most attention from the general public, media, fictional drama, and from members of the opposite sex. Judging by the lesser attention from this environment, the public and personal attitudes were significantly different for a larger chunk on the other side of the high school environment aisle. Here, the studious and academically bright, the ‘serious’ individual, the family-oriented male, the non-athlete, the smart Chess player, or anyone else who didn’t qualify as having what was seen as a glitzy background, were considered not to have the personal and social skills needed for bright, glitzy success. To put mildly, they were “average.” And some segments among them were labeled what I would, with relative euphemism, substitute as “below-average” for the much more commonly labels of “loser,” “nerd,” or “geek.”

Which is why I am surprised when I now read that there is “ ‘high amount of agreement’ between women about what they see in terms of personality when seeing a man's face and they may well use their impression to decide whether or not to engage with him.” That women, according to the study and the article, find men with “older faces” more favorably than their counterparts with “younger ones.” Just as the promoted contrast between muscular/atheleticism and non-muscular/non-athelete is taken as a metaphor to contrast general “masculine” and “feminine” charactersitics, so too can the apparent level of seriousness and maturity be taken as a metaphor for the contrast between the same two groups of gender characteristics. If seriousness and maturity were/are not associated with masculinity then/now, then the reported preference of “older faces” over “younger ones” is a significant jump in female attitudes, assuming of course that older appearance = greater seriousness and younger appearance = less seriousness.

But wait a minute, the study was conducted in Great Britain on British females, not in the United States on American females. Now, among most educated Caucasian Americans and perhaps among a significant number of Brits as well, Great Britain has been historically and traditionally viewed as the closest of European countries to the United States in terms of culture, societal values, and political alliances and interests. Absent current rifts or differences on pivotal/ sensitive issues between leading American and British policymakers (such as on the Iraq War?), the claims of Anglo-American proximity and affinity are even stronger. Yet, despite the political, legal, and societal differences between Great Britain and the rest of the European Union, and despite these special and complicated Anglo-American commonalities, a strong claim could also be made that Great Britain is still very much a part of the EU with a still very strong European cultural, social, and political orientation. And as British policymakers see their position and status wane in the European Union, undoubtedly they will battle to restore them by demonstrating greater affinity for European values and political interests. These demonstrations not so much in the form of “anti-American” stance. But they could materialize in a stance that displays a tougher “pro-European” tone politically, culturally, and socially.

So while, for instance, public hug greetings and/or cheek kisses between males has been ‘traditionally’ seen as more of a sign of friendship or brotherhood in say, France, Italy, Greece, Eastern Europe, and even more so in the Middle East (at least in the Arab- and Muslim-majority countries here) and in the East (at least the Muslim-majority countries here, like Malaysia, Indonesia) in contrast to a different Anglo-American understanding over such an intimacy (which is more towards homosexuality), maybe the recent British study shows significant differences having been developed between Americans and British with the Atlantic Ocean continuing to serve as a dividing fault line between aggregations of American and European cultures overall. This fault line may continue to exist just as much for affecting Greater Europe’s influence on the British as claims between Anglo-American cultural commonness and solidarity continue to cement that solidarity.

Another crucial point to consider here relates to the age range and time range of the participants in the recent British survey. The main point is that both the time range and the age range of respondents in the British survey have to match the time range and age range of a similar study on American females’ attitudes. If studies concerning similar topics feature respondents having time and age ranges that are different in Great Britain and the United States, not much of a reasonably accurate comparison and contrast could be made. What I saw in high schools seven years ago in the States could be different now. What is prevalent among American female teenagers may not be prevalent among older American women both years ago and more recently (in other words, if they are any significant vertical or generational changes/gaps). Time and age ranges can also significantly impact what American females (both teenagers and older females) view as “long-term” or “short-term” prospects (in other words, like any significant longitudinal changes within generations or comparative extent/rate of changes among different generations then and now). The same kinds of considerations will have to be factored into any reasonably accurate appreciation of British and other European females. Otherwise, to use an old American saying, it would be like un-standardized “apples and oranges” comparison, which wouldn’t be “fruitful” at all.

Finally, we would have to fully look at the British study itself. While the article quotes the most significant findings, it gave only scant reference to its source (listing only the journal title, and excluding the report’s title and number pages). The article also left out important details such as those on when the study was conducted, when the results came out and was analyzed, and on whether the study was a follow-up to a preceding one. I checked the journal’s official website and found what strongly appears to be the article here. To be more thorough and accurate, we’d have to do the same for a similar American study.

So, what can an article headline and its coverage on a published study tell us about trans-Atlantic values and trends? Hmmm, I’ve probably left you and myself more confused by the time you have reached reading, and I have reached writing, this sentence. Just as important is another question: what about the Euro-American divide or similarity on this topic? We can come closer to understanding these questions through discussion. Any suggestions or thoughts?

Vanuatu and Globalization: Avoidance or Adaptation?

While browsing through the Internet, I came across a very interesting story about a tiny island nation-state called "Vanuatu." The headline of the story which read, Is Vanuatu really the 'happiest' nation on earth? , initially led me to assume that the video segment consisted of an exploration into socio-economic conditions and crime rates. As I watched this joint ABC News/BBC News clip, however, I began to wonder if a more profound theme was struck here---one that would add to increasingly raging debates and controversies surrounding Globalization. In fact, and especially pertaining to a question at the end of the segment (along the long lines of "how long could Vanuatu's 'happiness' last?"), I began to come up with another, perhaps more accurate, headline for the story/video piece: "Vanuatu and Globalization: A Unique Experiment in Avoidance or Adaptation?"

The crucial basis behind my artificially-created headline is initimately connected to the ups and downs of Globalizations and their implications for the Developing World. Despite the general increase of global wealth and standard of living overall (the world economy taken altogether) and notwithstanding the disparate individual (and seemingly limited) cases structural adjustment and other economic reform initiatives, there can be no illusions that gaps between the Developed and Developing worlds have increased. These stark inequalities would encourage developing countries to attempt to develop an alternative to the international trading system and to the global economy, if they all lived in an ideal world and if theory could be easily translated to practice. But such alternative attempts, such as import substitution, have faired misrably and have achieved very little in relation to expectations. On the other hand, what else could they achieve through the present trading and economic systems to bring hope, curb violence, ensure positive and substantial social, economic, and political reform?

So what will become of Vanuatu's "struggle to fend off modernization"? According to the beginning part of the news segment, one crucial part of this nation's 'happiness' goes back to its attachment to "strong traditions." Which brings another theme to mind: how will such traditions deal with the classically-argued "homogenization" that Globalization supposedly brings to the international community and leads (especially) newly emerging/industrializing markets as well various other parts of the Developing world towards an "Americanization/Westernization." One other crucial question/theme/aspect of Globalization deals with currency transactions, which according to the news segment has particularly significant implications for Vanuatu's future because of its insistence on using, and attempting to pressure the international community towards recognizing, a unique currency system that uses pig tusks and other locally-valuable materials instead of paper bills and metal coinage. This system has its own conversion and evaluation methods, a reality which would understandably make it hard for international/Western lending institutions, stock exchanges, development organizations and corporations, currency exchanges, and other financial and development institutions to utilize, let alone recognize.

On the other hand, the "struggle to fend off modernization" could be approached from an entirely different angle of the country's self-implied right to embark on its own path of "self determination." Taken in this light, maybe then its experimentation is not so much an "avoidance" of modernization and globalization than a way of "adapting" to them. After all, the news segment reports that this experimentation is already helping the natives to take steps towards increasing living standards (however clearly that is yet to be defined by "modern" standards) in the midst of what could seem to outsiders as abject poverty. If this is the case, we could ask conversely if the status-quo of modernization and globalization (as they now stand) could "adapt" to the seemingly improving socio-economic conditions and advancements of Vanuatu? Could Vanuatu's experiment be replicated with at least some success in other parts of the Developing world and to what extent?

The use of non-monetary currency has a long history and enormous geographic reach. For example, alongside the use of coins minted by the Romans (and later,) the Arabs, there existed a trans-Saharan parallel system of exchange where such coinage often did not account for much. In this system, Arab traders north of the Sahara would often trade their salt for gold and ivory from African kingdoms and tribal areas immediately south of the Sahel, and vice-versa. It was a mutually beneficial exchange in the viewpoint of both parties, because the salt was as valuable to those African traders as gold, ivory, other precious materials were to their Arab counterparts. That such an exchange worked for a relatively long period with a relatively considerable extensive reach shows its viability in international and regional trading systems. And there were perhaps countless other examples in human history that could be compared to the trans-Saharan trading system. Keeping this mind, what prospects could Vanuatu's domestic trading and economic systems provide for their international and regional counterparts and vice-versa? And though we may be tempted to view the question of "how long it can last?" as a negative rhetorical exclamation, perhaps we can with the thought, "it is still too early to pass a conclusive verdict."

The skeptics will say, "but we're living in the post-industrial, post-service, and information( and communication)-driven global economy." As this group will point out, the fast-pace system, with features like money wire transfers and instantaneous global web-based trade and exchanges, is rightly something that also can neither be taken lightly nor denied. Tools like email that were a mere extra convenience a little more than a decade ago are standard and necessary equipment today. Even though Vanuatu's currency system of pig tusks includes the ability to carry out mortgage payments, take out loans, and pay for ordinary everyday expenses, a considerable lack of communication technology can provide a serious impediment to "modern" economic expansion and development. For example, according to the latest estimates provided by the CIA's World Factbook (2007), a small number consisting of 7,500 internet users [2004]--accounting for less than 1 percent of the population [211,971, July 2007]--are serviced by an even smaller number of internet hosts [413, 2006]. Using 2004 and 2005 estimates for telephone use, and the population estimate for 2007, the total percentage of phone users--both cellular and mainline--account for slightly less than 1 percent of the total population. Given these statistics, the outlook appears grim as communication access is impeded both domestically and internationally.

In all fairness, though, the only conclusion left is to expect a lot of uncertainty. Despite what outsiders may see frustrating and detrementally slow progress or even debilitating regression based in rejection of things "modern," residents Vanuatu may have mixed feelings of fear and anxiety combined with real hope, joy, and acceptance. The clash, co-existence, or complimentarianism, of the these two different worldviews will lead their proponents back to problems over the meanings and characteristics of globalization and modernization. And such problems cannot be resolved in the forseeable future, perhaps not for a long time to come.

Remolding Arab solidity and destoying it in the construction of words, Literally

Remolding Arab solidity and destoying it in the construction of words, Literally

ON THE POWER OF WORDS...AND MORE WORDS

An interesting phenomenon is taking place in the Arab World. Arabs are finally talking to one another, apparently with less nationalistic or ethnographic sensitivity than what has generally existed previously. Even more suprising, they seem to be accepting the exchanges quite amicably. Had Nasser, Michel Aflaq, or any of the other Pan-Arabist fathers lived on to see it, they likely would have been pleasantly astonished. What was perhaps probably seen privately by some as lip service has now in the past two decades been developing into some benchmark of progress.

But wait, unity? A substantial reduction of sensitivity? Are you kidding? You must have had a puff too much of "shoushou"----an affectionate and effeminately seductive term for hasheesh used by young males----to have come up with such a far-fetched idea. Don't get me wrong here, there has been a growth of Arab cooperation on regional (mainly economic?) issues [or at least a semblance thereof]. But where is this "growth" going? Not certain. Are there any tools that can be used to measure progress or regress? Not that the leaders themselves know of.

Talk of 'projects' regarding "Political" and "Geographical" unity (which has since been replaced with the more euphemistic and less-indulging cooperation, and especially mawqaf muhadd) in the press and among/by officials have probably been relegated to dinner- table opportunities for so-called 'obsessed' and 'passionate' discutants and debaters at best, cool-reception or just plain resentful apathy by the general public at worst. But nothing more meaningful than that. Judging by the waves of protests demanding "action" since the Second Intifada onwards. And "action" could ultimately be achieved, a growing public thought concluded, by refocusing shift away from the traditional topics of "improvement through unity" to domestic democratizing reform.

The various sectors of Arab Nation (al watan al 'araby) have excelled in artistic/cultural solidarity and symbolic support--rallying up genuine heartfelt emotion through expression highlighting the plight of the suffering. Mind you, this may seem like a miniscule thing to outsiders because they see no "tangible" result or "effective" accomplishment. This sentiment has also been shared by a great, great many among the masses, as well. So an intelligent (or cynical) person may ask: what's the point, for example, in promoting the song Al Helm al 'Arabi, when its desperate cry for hope serves little more as a reminder of a graphic recurring nightmare? I don't mean to be picking on the song, it formed a deep impression on me the first time I heard it and the first time I saw the associated music video. However, solidarity songs in the Arab context fill a certain gap with limited perimeters, because of their impact or lack thereof, contingent upon one's views. Confined to a specifically designated space, they are trapped within the "heat and spirit of the moment" that space creates. The mushrooming of this particular art form will spike and dip with time, circumstance, etc. and, depending on the size of the space, may or may not have lasting impact on the creative consciousness and mobilization of a population. Or the form may fit the characteristics of that ever-so-controversial word, "propoganda." Many people, from the youngster to the elderly still remember and listen to Halim's romantic cache of songs, but few of our generation know--or even care--about his often-direct praises of socialism and of the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser. I would venture to add that, while our parents' generation is more likely to cherish these songs (and perhaps more as personally nostalgic or historical keepsakes), our generation is more likely to them as possessing little meaning or value. And many of us might even be charged by our parents with what they may see as contempt for, or misunderstanding/misinterpreting of, this historical treasure chest.


THE NEW 'GLOBALIZATION'---FOR ARABIC SPEAKERS, BY ARABIC SPEAKERS

Another more telling reality concerns me, for it signals that in visible terms at the very least, Arabs are showing a will for putting aside the emotional, historical, and modern sensitivities that have so hightened ethno-regional distinctions into grudges, resentment, and arrogance/ egoism/ egotism among others heretofore. Significantly it is not happening at the top, but being propelled by market forces, consumers---and most crucial of all the general public, most of whom are teenagers and young adults participating simultaneously as target and targeter. Among this segment of the Arab world, old models of unity and integration, it convincingly appears, are bowing out to new ones. Whether this is deliberate or not remains unclear. What is certain, however, is that a revolution is taking place in Arab world art, and particularly music.

Well, maybe the word revolution is too strong and too suggestive. Maybe it does risk overlooking the simplicity or complexity of the relatively recent developments. Maybe these developments are only limited to the pulls and pushes of emerging new markets, sources of capital, and target audiences. Maybe they aren't reflective of abstract, non-economic and non-commercial concepts such as unity, collective identity, and individual identity. Then again, maybe forces from both worlds are collaborating in ways we cannot yet fully comprehend. Such an enigma can reflect an old debate among social scientists the interplays and causal scenerios of economics and political/other non-economic modes of behavior ever since the intellectual fermentations of the 19th Century. Which came first? What is the kind of affect? How should a balance and/or collaboration be maintained? Which should be prioritised? Why? And, finally, equally as important as the preceeding questions: in the context of dialect usage, are we (or should we be) giving the possibility of such connections too much credit or attributing too much significence? In the interest of covering some history of the recent developments, I'll skip this point and return to it later.

Starting roughly in mid 1990s and blooming in this decade, Arab performers have reevaluated proprietary rights over their own individual dialects and accents. In a general sense, exclusivity of ownership and use is out; sharing/exchanging and creating instrumental pieces around them are in. What used to be largely "private" (that is confined to a particular location/region) are now "common/public" goods for the craft of the trade. The spread of dialects and accents to different audiences is nothing new to the region, diversity has surfaced throughout its markets since the early days. What is different (and noteworthy) is that more performers are taking the time to learn different dialects and accents. And as has time has passed, this new outreach has expanded with greater frequency.

To be sure, performing in a foreign tongue is not unique to this new current phase of Arabic musical form, either. A number of prominent & less prominent classical artists sang and spoke entirely or predominantly in Egyptian Arabic, despite their non-Egyptian origins. Consider Farid el Attrache, Sabah (in earlier days), Wardah, Walid Toufic (in his earlier days), Latifa, the list goes on. Of course, there were exceptions who at least performed exclusively or primarily in their own tongues, such as Fahad Ballal, Mohammad Abdu, and Wadee el Safie. But this group was just it, the exception to the rule. And to be just as sure, these two trends are not fading memories. They have continued well into the present.

Equally undeniable is the new persistent trend of fluidity. A sort of open borders, open ports [if not completely free trade zone] type of transactions. No longer can policymakers implement protectionism on their countries' "word economies". Not with much success anyway if they wanted to. Arabs are being allowed to "invest" in the use of each other's differing The fluidity is led, and even championed, by an ecletic mix of engines: production companies, poets/lyricists, composers, and consumer audiences. There exists no uniformity as how to different policymakers or private citizens, either collectively or individually, cope with the relatively rapid and sweeping change taking place.

"Globalization?" I can imagine the interjection of a puzzled reader, "You must have meant 'regionalization'." After a moment of contemplation, I would reply, " 'regionalization' ? I've never heard of such a term." I have reservations about globalization, not least when it concerns or could potentially affect matters of identity or economic inequality, fair trade, and domestic reform. But I also believe that embracing it is inevitable. As the saying goes, "the Devil is in the details." It's not overall rejection or overall acceptance that counts. It's what we choose and how we choose it, and how and why it is either obstructed or facilitated. So we will then come across some nerve-wracking but essential questions. Does the exchange of culture, goods, services, and technology which globalization entails have to be restricted to communication between different regions of the world? The most visible mode of exchange occurs along the lines of the West-Far East Asian, those between the "West and the Rest," (and most recently, the West-Arab Gulf--visible in at least prominent international trade or tourism publication). The reasons for visibility here are obvious--the primary 'engines' and 'movers & shakers' of Globalization, the major mulitnational corporations, also collectively known as the "herd," and the emergence of "fertile ground" like the Asian Tigers and Dubai, UAE. But what about intra-regional exchange? Could that qualify as 'globalization' as well?


FROM 'ISH LAWNUK' TO 'YA HALA'

The earliest manifestations I can recall of the recent exchange of dialect uses began around the the early to mid 1990s along a Shami (specifically Lebanese)-Khaleeji axis. Mainly newly rising Lebanese performers, especially females, seemed to have adopted rather eagerly (and helped mainstreamed) the Khaleeji dialects in new songs within the new mix albums being produced. This was accompanied with a burst of Lebanese television programming brought about by satelittes. Significantly, this spread of Lebanese culture coincided [?] with the post-civil war reconstruction, chunks of which could be traced back to investments from the Arab Gulf (particularly Saudis).

As Lebanese performers began singing more frequently in Khaleeji, and the reach of Lebanese satelite broadcasting enchanted Khaleeji viewers, so too did sales of Lebanese albums skyrocket in Khaleeji markets. Then Khaleeji performers reciprocated the gesture and began releasing songs in the Lebanese dialect. Apparently this new venture was a gamble, but it worked: as Khaleeji songs began a process of evolution and more Shami songs were introduced by Khaleeji performers, their frequency has increased on the main Lebanese satelite channels, especially LBC and Future. Except for few and rare instances, Egyptian music and Egyptian performers were largely absent from this exchange.


EGYPTIAN COLORS-ONCE AGAIN?

Roughly around the same time, the emergence of some transformative trends appeared to signal a noticable but less-acknowledged resilence (if not bounceback) of Egyptian dialectal and cultural influence on the Arabic music exchange scene.

In my opinion, the most visible of these trends to make deep impressions on Arab youth & music production throughout the region could be characterized somewhat as the 'Amr Diab revolution.' It began with the song and videoclip Nour el Ein (perhaps the international success of this new style and format--as evidenced by a World Music Award given to the song for "best song in the Middle East"--helped to popularize this new trend). The dramatic shift to increasing and distinctive Western rhythms and beats underlying new songs, the glitzy "stylish new look" persona and hairdo marking every new album, the many female dancers (sometimes wearing clothing that tests the edges) have all had a successfully strong appeal and catapulted Diab's fame to new heights. Rotana (the Saudi music giant) cashed in on this trend early by signing record deals with Diab. Cafés themselves evolved to, or alongside with, this new music development. From a relatively open-aired to a closed indoor setting offering privacy, the new meeting establishment was created to be markedly distinguished by disco lights, fast-food, base, sheesha, and satelite-based pan-Arab music channels featuring the latest clips, with professional waiters. And of course, the new Amr Diab songs played continuously and prominently in the background.

A second major trend has been the increase of foreign singers targeting the Egyptian market. Though this is not new, as Egypt has been a sort of hub for Arab culture, art and literature, what's new is the increase of new and upcoming artists (particularly Lebanese female vocalists) beginning their music careers with Egyptian lyrics while mixing their albums with songs in their native dialects. That these singers have overshadowed Egyptian artists is perhaps an awing point that has not swifted by unnoticed or bemoaned. These foreign singers attract among the best or most well known of Egyptian composers, poet-lyricists, and directors; their concerts have gained greater frequency, perhaps even popularity, and greater attention. And it can be argued that posters advertising their albums feature more prominently than others on the walls of music stores. And finally, they seem to have greater acceptance by Egyptian listeners themselves. Even Khaleeji artists are tapping into the Egyptian dialect. Kuwaiti Nabil Shoail's new song Gani has come after Leih ya Gharam?, while Saudi female performer Wa3d provides another example of Khaleejis crossing the previously red line.

Alongwith with this trend is the growth of songs featuring Egyptian lyrics performed by foreign artists--especially among the newly-emerging-- about, or in praise of Egypt. Who can forget Nancy Ajram's Ana Masry, praising the common Egyptian man who struggles to stand back up in the face of adversity? Ajram has apparently followed up on this song with a new one, Ahli wa Zamalek, targeting the traditional soccer fervor and rivalry in the Egyptian public.

So even though they popularize the Egyptian culture more throughout the region, it begs the question of where this trend is going. It begs the question of whether this is a temporary phenomenon---one where artists will temporarily humor a particular crowd for an initial and strong fan-base, and where "Egyptians" and "Egyptianness" will continue to decline to the margins of the Arab psyche, the Arab cultural production, and even Arab pride? Or will it be one that can push Egyptian artistry back into rejuvenation, back into its golden era, and where Egypt could retain some claim to leadership in this regard?

But would it be a stretch to ask these questions? After all, some Egyptians have ventured into non-Egyptian songs. Take Khalid Selim. His first album featured a song with Khaleeji lyrics, and the associated videoclip played repetitiously on satelite music channels. So it does not seem that Egyptians are at all bothered or worried by balance of the different dialectal songs in the market. But then again, Selim is the only Egyptian (save for Ehab Tawfik who sang in praise of Dubai nearly a decade earlier on the occasion of Dubai Shopping Festival on Dubai TV) I can recall up until now who has chosen sing Khaleeji, or any other dialect for that matter.


THE MAKING OF THE TV STAR, AND WITH IT, A RISING STAR IN COMMUNICATIONS

Another interesting trend is really a barrowing from the British and American originals--a mixture of reality television programming and vocal competition. Attracting contestants from across the Arab world, many of whom sing in their own native dialects and at times sing in other dialects when performing a particular major classical song, these programs are truly pan-Arab. Participating judges are also selected from throughout the region as well.

Yet, this trend may also signal of a new "cultural/song leadership" (or alternatively, "monopolization"), too. The two major programs are Superstar and Star Academy, produced and aired by Future Television and LBC. As such, both programs are primarily based in Lebanon with native crew and cast. Many, if not most, of the judges are also Lebanese. And perhaps, not suprisingly, more contestants have come from Lebanon. Added to this is that while some sort of "democracy of participation" is offered to those who vote for their favorite contestants, "a nationalistic streak is evident in voting patterns" and "how decisive of a role [it will play in leading to a 'democracy of governance'] is something that remains to be explored."

All in all, aside from all detail issues, this new phenomenon furthers any claim Lebanon has in making of itself a new hub for Arab culture and art. What the radio (especially Sawt al Arab) and cinema did for demonstrating Egypt's pan-Arab primacy and spreading Egyptian culture, perhaps satelite programming will do for Lebanon. Long before the launch of reality television and vocal talent shows like Superstar or Star Academy, Lebanese hosts and tele-journalists had penetrated deeply throughout, and were manning, various major Pan-Arab and Arab channels. But such shows may add a distinctive twist that is openly and directly Lebanese, despite pan-Arab appeal and audience. Yet, it's still too early to determine any impact these shows will have in this regard. What is undeniable and visible, however, is the reach of Lebanese presenters, broadcasters, and production crew, in Lebanese and non-Lebanese channels.

KHALLEEK 'COOL' MA'3A (PAN-) ARAB RAP, AH YA MAN!

Yep, rap and hip-hop are emerging with more full-force popularity throughout the Arab World. Who could've thought this is possible? The success of MTM's Ummi Masafra; the growing number of Palestinian groups rapping in Palestinian Arabic and Hebrew about the Israeli occupation, the general frustrations of youth, distrust of Palestinians towards Israeli Arabs, and ostracized position of Palestinian residents in Israel proper (with a sizable Israeli Jewish audience and fan base)--you can also have a look at this op-ed; several who served as guests on influential or popular Arab talk shows such as MBC's Kalam Nawaem and Shahrazan. What makes this music genre particularly attractive to performers is the freedom and power that it gives to the latter: led and created by youths, it functions as a relatively open forum for airing common concerns that youth can relate to, from socio-economic malaises and predicaments to protests over political repression. For them, it is also a medium for creativity as well as for an assertion of some sort of independence and uniqueness from the broader society and the rest of the culture in which they live--a society and culture they see as largely stagnant (and even regressive). Finally, in multiple instances--and especially in more troubled environments--it seems that rap and hip-hop serve as cries for hope and help among performers and listeners alike.

THE BOY AND GIRL BANDS

One last trend deserves mentioning, if for general similar characteristics being played out throughout the Arab world in a comparable way to similarilities between British and American artists/performers. Best represented in the band Wama, this trend carries with it stark resemblances to the original American and British pop counterparts. For, in both Wama and the Western troupes, the performers are groups of 4 or 5 who have "soft melodic" voices that compliment one another in noticably harmonious tones and pitches. And similarly in both, all the troupe members take turns in singing lyrics, alternating between a fairly regular sequential pattern of performance and a group chorus. Female counterparts for Wama have proliferated more than the male groups, and these, too, share dumbfounding similarities with the Western originals: hence, the Lebanese Four Cats and Egyptian Virus are variously comparable in general style and format to the British Girls Aloud, the American Pussycat Dolls, and the now-defunct British Spice Girls.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

All of the above trends seem to a point to a limited reconciling of sensitive differences, if only for a short period of time. Significantly, these trends are neither created nor advanced by either political leaders or cultural elites. Rather the main engine seems to be the corporate world, and primarily music production and satelite television industries. The trends are also mostly geared toward the mass public, and youth and young adults specifically. At least among the participants (both producers and consumers), they do not appear to be as controversial as other topics and trends (save for, perhaps, what has been characterized as the emerging rise of 'lewd' or 'sexually suggestive' work). All of this can lead to the shaping of strong common ground among youth and young adults across the region. In this sense, some form of 'unity' can be achieved.

Yet, the trends are not without setbacks and potential flopping, however. Despite carrying an apolitical nature, nationalistic bias surfaces frequently when choices are to be made, as in the cases of Superstar and Star Academy have shown. Furthermore, flags are abundantly displayed in the episodes as if on cue to cheer on, or identify, a particular contestant.

Secondly, the power, or fear, of these new developments to reshift the balance of cultural productivity and leadership in the region is bound to foment some sort of tension as pan-Arab communication becomes more sophisticated or high-tech. It is fair to say that, alongwith general Arab satelite channels, music production companies and satelite music channels play no insignificant role here. The interplay of the largest production companies, concert organizers, and satelite channels has led one prominent and highly-loved Egyptian singer in a television interview to assert what he sees as a deliberate collusion to marginalize and exclude Egyptian performers from publicization and support of their work.

Finally, because it is based around entertainment, chances are that these trends will not constitute "serious" enough of forum to generate momentum for unity on other, serious issues confronting the region where workable agreements and collaboration would be required. The formats of these trends themselves could not be expanded to serve as a model for solving the other issues. The most they could do is to build hope for a common sentiment of 'Arabness' during trying times. But will these sentiments (and hope) be profound enough to initiate and sustain substantive change/improvement? Will they last long enough to promote similarities while respecting legitimate differences, and help work through conflicts and disputes? Or will they just be like mere expressions, conveyed in the moment, only to relegated, disregarded, or forgotten later?