**This post was originally published on Sunday, March 20, 2011. But it suddenly disappeared from the blog without any explanation. Luckily, there was an extra copy.**
The referendum results came out earlier today: about 77% in favor of the proposed amendments and roughly 23% opposed, with a 41% turnout. In the days before the referendum, I have maintained the latter position (of "no" to the amendments). My understanding is that a number of things need to be established before parliamentary and presidential elections can be held. A new solid constitution laying out separation of powers, checks-and-balances, individual rights (civil rights and civil liberties), due process of law, rule of law, etc. An alternative administrative framework for the interim/transitional period (that allows for more transparent and open power-sharing and policy-crafting) between a civilian transitional government and the military, with which security is coordinated. More time for further developing the political and social momentum and revolutionary environment (i.e. for example, restrengthening of existing parties and building of new ones, along with time for developing platforms, cohesiveness and outreach to and support with the public, etc). [Under the current plan announced by the Supreme Military Council and supported by the referendum, the parliamentary and presidential elections are expected to be held in June and August respectively, or by slightly later on in the year. ]
Many reasons exist for this rationale. One deals with examining historical examples of rushed or nervous elections and state-building across countries. The examples point out how incomplete evaluation of circumstances and/or the creation of insufficiently adequate institutions, along with other factors, ultimately resulted in tragic missed opportunities. A second reason lies in concerns about the constitutional amendment proposals themselves. The amendments address a number of popular demands, such as some restrictions on the ability to institute the state of emergency and limits on presidential terms, which create a positive incentive for approval. Yet, they still present problems, among them a reluctance to dive deeper and more substantially into the still-extensive and expansive presidential executive powers. There are also concerns I have about the relatively closed process that brought those proposals forward. A committee comprised of a few men was charged by the supervising military council to come up with a draft for amendments within 10 days. The committee deliberated behind closed doors, and nothing emerged from those meetings except the draft that would, with some modifications, become the text of the referendum. In the end, only 9 changes were proposed, and these changes addressed a few articles in the Constitution. Reportedly only 3 weeks were given for public discussion of this text. Finally, there are concerns I have about the process the referendum will institutionalize for rewriting the Constitution. One of the provisions of the referendum stipulate that, after parliamentary elections, the incoming parliament will appoint a body to rewrite the Constitution. I share others' concern that the resultant body may not be as inclusive in its representational makeup, and that some groups may have an edge over others in drafting a new foundational document for the country's politics and government.
Yet, I am very cautiously optimistic about what comes next. We all have the seen the reawakening of socio-political consciousness in Tahrir and throughout post-Revolution Egypt. Which is a good sign, but this is not enough as Egypt moves forward. Turning momentum into concrete efforts and results will take, at the very least, time, openness of space, wise vigilance, and continued civic engagement. I do believe and notice that this has begun to come out very early on, and that will be of a measure of reassurance. Furthermore there is the realization that, since approval of the landmark referendum is the majority position, it must be respected and Egyptians must move forward from this point on. To challenge it may not be a wise move, and may be more likely counterproductive, allowing for instability and institutional uncertainty by fomenting unnecessary divisions and frictions. While abstaining from post-referendum organizing might risk missing upcoming opportunities in further shaping dynamics of reform, of rebuilding the government's and the state's institutions (and enhancing socio-economic institutions too), and of participating proactively in the creation of a new constitutional framework.
The hope and (guarded) anticipation are that Saturday's approval was based on informed decision as well as on careful and thorough evaluation. Hopefully, such approval is reinforced by continued vigorous debate and discussion in an open, respectful, and inclusive atmosphere, which is then translated into careful, concrete, and timely actionable policy. I also hope that, above all, such an atmosphere also results in strong, meaningful institutions which balance security and individual rights through separation of powers, through checks-and-balances, and through the expansion and maintenance of a vibrant civil society. The beaming of civility, eagerness and earnestness towards a better a future, and a calmness (excepting a reported rare incident of violence towards Mohamed El Baradei) displayed during the hours of waiting in long lines and voting is a positive sign and potentially shining indicator in this pivotal moment. Previously voting was marred by irregularities and intimidations, and results were virtually guaranteed well in advance. Though much remains to be done in the period(s) ahead, the referendum is---at least initially for now---a major step towards a break from a past so familiar to many Egyptians.
No comments:
Post a Comment